


















 Hope and Uncertainty in 
Contemporary African 
Migration 
This volume examines the relationship between hope, mobility, and immo-
bility in African migration. Through case studies set within and beyond the 
continent, it demonstrates that hope offers a unique prism for analyzing the 
social imaginaries and aspirations which underpin migration in situations 
of uncertainty, deepening inequality, and delimited access to global circuits 
of legal mobility.
The volume takes departure in a mobility paradox that characterizes con-
temporary migration. Whereas people all over the world are exposed to 
widening sets of meaning of the good life elsewhere, an increasing number 
of people in the Global South have little or no access to authorized modes of 
international migration. This book examines how African migrants respond 
to this situation. Focusing on hope, it explores migrants’ temporal and spa-
tial horizons of expectation and possibility and how these horizons link to 
mobility practices. Such analysis is pertinent as precarious life conditions 
and increasingly restrictive regimes of mobility characterize the lives of 
many Africans, while migration continues to constitute important livelihood 
strategies and to be seen as pathways of improvement. Whereas involuntary 
immobility is one consequence, another is the emergence and consolidation 
of new destinations emerging in the Global South. The volume examines 
this development through empirically grounded and theoretically rich case 
studies in migrants’ countries of origin, zones of transit, and in new and 
established destinations in Europe, North America, the Middle East, Latin 
America and China. It thereby offers an original perspective on linkages 
between migration, hope, and immobility, ranging from migration aspira-
tions to return.
Nauja Kleist is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International 
Studies.
Dorte Thorsen is theme leader on gender and qualitative research in the
Migrating Out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium, University of
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Nauja Kleist and Dorte Thorsen 
This book started with a walk. On a warm afternoon in March 2008 Nauja,
one of the co-editors of this volume, met Sam. She was heading across the 
campus of the University of Ghana, when a young man addressed her. ‘Hi,
are you from the States?’ ‘No, why?’ Because, Sam explained in a broad 
American accent, he loved America but was deported a few years ago.
What had started as a promising stay had gradually turned into an ill-fated 
adventure, mainly because he could not regularize his papers. Now Sam was 
studying business but badly wanted to return to the United States again,
always on the alert for possible connections or opportunities to help him 
realize his dreams. Nauja studied Ghanaian migration policies at the time,
but Sam’s story added to her growing puzzlement about the gulf between 
policy-makers’ ideas about well-managed migration and the sense among 
ordinary Ghanaians of feeling unable to realize their migratory aspirations.
She was intrigued.
Meanwhile Dorte, the other co-editor, was doing research with adoles-
cent boys from rural Burkina Faso who audaciously set off on migration to 
neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, sometimes without knowing where they would 
sleep on arrival and sometimes with insufficient money for the entire fare.
They talked about being housed and fed temporarily by strangers and help 
extended by migrant relatives, but their accounts also dwelled on suffering.
The boys were not pioneers but followed in the footsteps of older brothers,
fathers, and grandfathers in trying to broaden their opportunities and move 
out of poverty. Dorte was astounded by her young interlocutors’ disregard 
of barriers to their migration and how they had to negotiate border control,
whether they had the right papers or not.
Gradually, our initial curiosity grew into a research program on new 
geographies of hope and despair in West African migration, developed and 
conducted with Ida Maria Vammen. We set out to explore the effects of 
restrictive mobility regimes for West African migration, taking our departure 
in a contemporary mobility paradox: that images and ideas of the good life,
often taking place elsewhere, are circulated all over the globe, while access to 
legal international mobility circuits is a scarce resource for most people with 


















viii Nauja Kleist and Dorte Thorsen 
for hope for West Africans migrants and their families, approaching hope as 
an analytical perspective that highlights anticipation and the simultaneous 
potentiality and uncertainty of the future.
Finalizing this book, the topic of hope, uncertainty, and migration seems 
more topical than ever. The emergence of the so-called refugee crisis, with 
one million people crossing the Mediterranean in 2015, has brought unprec-
edented public and political attention to migration. Poignant images have 
gone viral of the small body of Aylan Kurdi, washed ashore, and of the many 
men, women, and children on highways walking from the southern and 
eastern borders of the European Union. Meanwhile, most European states 
have implemented increasingly restrictive asylum and migration policies. In 
the process, the terms migrant and refugee have become conflated into one 
category, which is now widely connoted with persons whose mobility is 
considered illegal and purely motivated by economic motives. In this flawed 
logic, migrants are pulled by mirages of Europe, as soldiers of fortune, driven 
by ignorant hopes, while refugees’ need for, and right to, protection has been 
downplayed unless they agree to remain in the so-called neighboring area.
This is a deeply problematic assumption which fails to take into account 
the multiplicity of political, sociocultural, and economic dimensions of 
mobility. It also ignores the ambivalence and precariousness of hope. Focus-
ing on stereotypes, the webs of social relations, livelihood practices, col-
lective social imaginaries, and aspirations remain hidden or are impugned.
Likewise, the focus on boat migration easily overshadows the fact that most 
African migrants do not cross the Mediterranean in a rickety boat to Europe.
Rather they tend to travel within their region or, increasingly, orient them-
selves towards destinations in the so-called Global South. A considerable 
number also find themselves stranded en route, emphasizing the importance 
of involuntary immobility and the many constraints that migrants face.
In this collection, we explore these other dimensions of African migra-
tion through nine case studies, ranging from countries of origin to destina-
tions elsewhere in Africa, Europe, and further afield. The chapters analyze 
how migrants, their families, and local communities deal with the effects 
of restrictive mobility regimes and economic and political crisis, answering 
the following questions: What are the meanings and implications of hope in 
African migration? How is hope generated, distributed, brokered, or with-
held in practices of mobility and situations of immobility—and how is it 
associated with different locations and futures? We thereby aim to put hope 
in context.
Finally, a note of thanks to all the people and institutions who have made 
this book possible. Research is a collective affair where we learn from other 
scholars and our interlocutors. It requires not only rigor but also openness 
to serendipity. An afternoon walk may be the first step in an unexpected 
direction. Whether those steps turn into something tangible—a research 
program or a book—depends on whether people want to talk and work 
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Studying Hope and Uncertainty 
in African Migration 
Nauja Kleist 
Contemporary migration is characterized by a mobility paradox: the increased 
reach and accessibility of communication, media and transport technologies 
mean that people in many parts of the world are exposed to visions of the 
good life elsewhere. At the same time, because of growing inequality, paired 
with restrictive mobility regimes, the vast majority of people in the Global 
South are excluded from the circuits of legal mobility, not least on the African 
continent.
This volume uses hope as an analytical prism through which to exam-
ine the mobility paradox in African migration. For millions of Africans,
migration constitutes one of the ways in which to cope with uncertainty 
and difficult life situations. The volume analyzes migrants’ temporal and 
spatial horizons of expectation and possibility and how these horizons link 
to mobility practices in contexts of uncertainty and precariousness. Such 
analysis is pertinent, we argue, because deepening marginalization and 
increasingly restrictive regimes of mobility define the lives of many Africans,
while migration continues to offer important livelihood strategies. The con-
sequences are the intensification of high-risk migration, such as the crossings 
over the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea, involuntary immobil-
ity when (aspiring) migrants cannot leave their countries of origin or are 
stranded in transit zones surrounding the desired destinations (cf. Carling 
2002; Lubkemann 2008), and, finally, the emergence and consolidation of 
new destinations in the Global South and BRIC countries, like China, Brazil,
and Argentina.
We argue that hope constitutes a fruitful analytical framework in which 
to link questions of political economy and mobility regimes with analyses 
of the collective social imaginaries and aspirations which imbue migration 
projects—to examine the social effects of the mobility paradox, in other 
words. We approach hope in a broad sense as an anticipation of the ‘not-yet’ 
(Bloch 1986), characterized by simultaneous potentiality—faith or confidence 
in the future—and uncertainty. As Lubkemann suggests in this volume, hope 
can be perceived as the ‘sustenance of the possibility of a (desired) alternative 
to a (currently lived) reality’. Hope is neither a description of the present nor 

















2 Nauja Kleist 
through making sense of, the practices of a society’ (Taylor 2004, 2). Hope 
is grounded within the realm of the thinkable or imaginable and hence has a 
strong collective and normative dimension. It may inspire action (Cole and 
Durham 2008; Sarro 2015), make people cope with suffering and difficult 
life situations (Zigon 2009), or lead to resignation and passivity (Crapanzano 
2003). Being embedded in uncertainty, hoping is different from knowing or 
from having absolute faith. Hope can be disappointed and may remain a dis-
tant horizon. Yet uncertainty may also invoke hope in that the future remains 
unpredictable (Cooper and Pratten 2015a; Johnson-Hanks 2005). In that 
sense, hope offers a particular take on uncertainty, one which emphasizes 
potentiality and anticipation rather than fear and doubt.
Approaching hope as an analytical framework thus implies examining 
both potentiality and uncertainty. The focus on potentiality means analyzing 
social imaginaries of the good life or ‘sparks’ of faith or confidence, how-
ever frail; uncertainty implies examining precarious or unpredictable life 
conditions and how the hoping subject deals with them. A hope perspective 
enables us to analyze how visions of the good life or future are generated 
and distributed, and how horizons of possibility and expectations are linked 
to different places and temporalities. It thus illuminates meaning-making 
practices and the potentiality of life, to explore how and whether migrants 
maintain or create a sense of anticipation or faith in the future in uncertain 
and precarious situations.
There has been a revival of interest in hope and the future in anthropol-
ogy and social philosophy since the turn of the millennium (e.g., Crapan-
zano 2003; Miyazaki 2004; Rorty 1999; Thompson and Zizek 2013; Webb 
2007). Key themes include temporality (Appadurai 2013; Cole and Durham 
2008; Dalsgård et al. 2014; Miyazaki 2004; 2006; Piot 2010), social change 
(Castells 2012; Hage 2003; Zournazi 2002), and uncertainty (Cooper and 
Pratten 2015b; Horst and Grabska 2015; Johnson-Hanks 2005). Despite 
the centrality of mobility and migration in contemporary life, studies of 
mobility and immobility constitute a surprisingly small strand of the anthro-
pological literature on hope (for exceptions, see Cole 2014; Hage and Pap-
adopoulos 2004; Kleist and Jansen 2016; Lucht 2011; Mar 2005; Narotzky 
and Besnier 2014; Pine 2014; Vigh 2009). Our volume contributes to this 
literature in three ways—first, by suggesting an analytical framework for 
studying hope in relation to migration and (im)mobility, second, by situating 
African migration in the mobility paradox, and, third, by exploring hope in a 
range of ethnographically grounded and theoretically informed case studies 
on the continent and beyond.
The chapters focus primarily on West African migration. As a region,
West Africa has been shaped by mobility for centuries. From the transat-
lantic slave trade, forced labor migration, and seasonal mobile livelihoods 
to inter-continental migration to Europe, North America, and emerging 
destinations in Latin America and Asia, West Africa is characterized by 


















nature, the volume is global in geographical scope, with case studies set in 
neighboring countries in West Africa, zones of transit on the continent, and 
new and established destinations further afield to migrants’ countries of ori-
gin in the case of aspiring migrants or returnees. The chapters analyze how 
African migrants contend with and circumvent impediments to their mobil-
ity: how they struggle with perilous situations, generate strategies to accu-
mulate material and symbolic wealth and grasp new opportunities, and their 
imaginative work in insisting on the possibility of devising a meaningful life,
but also elaborate on extended periods of waiting, and of suffering, shame,
and social death when migration projects fail and hope is postponed or lost.
To avoid misunderstandings, let me also emphasize what we do  not do 
in this volume. We do not claim that migration is determined by migrants’ 
individual hopes alone, as a kind of reversed rational-choice approach where 
‘information’ has been replaced by hopes or dreams. Such an approach 
would ignore not only situations of conflict and violence but also the struc-
tural opportunities and constraints, including the sometimes restraining sets 
of social and economic obligations and expectations in which much migra-
tion is embedded. It also lends itself to the perception shared by many pol-
icymakers that migrants are uninformed and unrealistic soldiers of fortune 
whose mobility can be prevented through information campaigns about 
the hardships of life in Europe or other destinations. Not only is this a 
misguided perception, but it also reflects a theoretically flawed conceptu-
alization of hope as naïve optimism and individual desires. Rather, the vol-
ume as a whole emphasizes the pertinence of social and collective hope as 
well as anxiety, frustration, periods of waiting, shame, and failure, as much 
as achievement and notions of meaningful futures. A focus on hope thus 
offers a fundamentally ambivalent perspective.
The remainder of the introduction is structured in the following way.
First, I elaborate on the mobility paradox; second, I present an analytical 
framework for studying the relationship between hope, mobility, and immo-
bility; and third, I situate the chapters in relation to three overall themes: 
repositories of hope, temporality, and existential (im)mobility.
The Mobility Paradox: Stratified Globalization 
and Restrictive Mobility Regimes 
Two sets of conditions make the analysis of migration, mobility, and immo-
bility in relation to hope particularly relevant today: widespread crisis and 
rising inequality, and the consolidation and expansion of restrictive mobility 
regimes.
Crisis and precarity constitute permanent conditions of life for many 
people today (Cooper and Pratten 2015b; Hage 2003; 2009; Horst and 
Grabska 2015; Standing 2014). Stratified processes of globalization marked 
by privatization, the expansion of markets, and deregulation have deteri-
orated the living conditions of millions of people (Sassen 2014). Likewise 
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conflict, political instability, everyday violence, and the effects of securitiza-
tion create or deepen precarity. Such processes can be observed all over the 
world—including Africa, with its history of IMF-induced structural adjust-
ment programs since the 1980s and, in many countries, the continuous 
deregularization of the economy and cut-back of state services (Ferguson 
2006; Harrison 2005). Hence, whereas the global financial crisis unleashed 
in 2008 exacerbated conditions of precarity, it did not create them alone 
(cf. Makhulu et al. 2010). Indeed, in many African countries and elsewhere 
in the world, a sense of enduring crisis or marginalization is experienced as 
a permanent life condition, which has led to a diminished belief in the state’s 
capacity to secure a good life (Johnson-Hanks 2005; Narotzky and Besnier 
2014). Crisis may indeed be the context, rather than the exception, as Vigh 
(2008) has suggested.
One of the implications of this observation is the pertinence of uncer-
tainty (Cooper and Pratten 2015a; Horst and Grabska 2015). Two sources 
of uncertainty can be distinguished: imperfect knowledge and the unpredict-
ability of the future (Williams and Baláz 2012, 168). As Horst and Grabska 
(2015) point out, both sources are relevant in relation to conflict and 
displacement—and indeed to a range of other situations. Johnson-Hanks has 
described how life in Cameroun is characterized by such extreme unpredict-
ability that ‘plans are always tenuous, partial, more hope than conviction’ 
(2005, 369). This, however, does not mean that uncertainty is implicating 
passivity or resignation. Rather, uncertainty can be productive, constituting 
‘a social resource [which] can be used to negotiate insecurity, conduct and 
create relationships and act as a source for imagining the future with the 
hopes and fears this entails’ (Cooper and Pratten 2015a, 2; cf. di Nunzio 
2015). Uncertainty implies an at least preliminary lack of closure and hence 
a space for hope.
Rising inequality constitutes another relevant dimension for examining the
mobility paradox. Inequality in an African context is not novel, of course,
given the history of the extraction of human and natural resources over 
several centuries, from the slave trade to colonization and postcolonial pred-
atory regimes in some parts of the continent. Inequality today, however,
is also linked to the contemporary processes of stratified globalization, as 
indicated above. Some African economies are booming. Seven out of ten of 
the fastest-growing economies in the world between 2011 and 2015 were 
African, yet income inequality increased in the same period (Chotikapa-
nich et al. 2014, 3). One dimension of the African ‘lion economies’ and 
high growth rates is precisely increasing inequality, where some get rich 
and richer—quickly and visibly—while the number of poor people is rising 
(Chotikapanich et al. 2014; Mubila et al. 2012). Another dimension is that 
the spectacles of modernity and conspicuous consumption of global and 
national elites—such as corporate buildings made of steel and glass, luxury 
cars, and expensive consumer brands—are plainly visible in African capitals 
and major cities. To be seen but not to be touched or lived in. Likewise, there 
 






















are construction booms of comfortable private residences in many places,
often owned by international migrants (Graw and Schielke 2012; Makhulu 
et al. 2010; Smith and Mazzucato 2009).
Inequality may inspire migration, especially in those parts of Africa with 
a well-developed culture of migration (Graw and Schielke 2012), where 
migration is often seen as one of the few possible ways to change one’s 
situation for the better. As is well documented in the literature on West 
African migration, internal, regional, and intercontinental migration con-
stitutes established livelihood strategies, modes of fulfilling social obliga-
tions, sending remittances, pursuing further education, or establishing access 
to opportunities for oneself or one’s family (Akyeampong 2000; Awedoba 
and Hahn 2014; Cligget 2003; Cole 2014; Graw and Schielke 2012; Horst 
2004; Kabki et al. 2004; Nieswand 2013; Riccio 2008). Whereas most West 
African migration takes place within the region (Ratha et al. 2011), there 
is significant migration not only on and outside the continent, including 
Europe and North America, as well as to emerging destinations in Asia and 
Latin America.
However, the consolidation of contemporary regimes of mobility (Glick 
Schiller and Salazar 2013) has made access to legal migration an increasingly 
unequally distributed privilege. This is the second aspect of the mobility par-
adox. Restrictive immigration policies in Europe—and indeed most places in 
the world—filter and divide migrants into desired and undesired categories,
according to qualifications, labor shortage, and assessment of migrants’ per-
ceived intentions or likelihood to overstay their visas or engage in other kinds 
of unauthorized activity (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011). Migrants are thus sub-
jected to risk assessment in terms of (what may develop into) irregular entry 
to or stays in Europe or other (perceived) destinations, even when their 
mobility may be perfectly legal at the outset. The result is that the majority 
of Africans are  de facto excluded from legal migration to Europe and other 
parts of Africa outside their home region. The maritime border zones of the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, which simultaneously link and 
separate North and West Africa from Europe, are heavily patrolled through 
the use of increasingly sophisticated surveillance technology. Furthermore,
European border control is increasingly externalized and carried out in 
collaboration with local authorities and private companies in transit and 
departure areas in African countries, including territorial waters and coastal 
and inland areas (Andersson 2014; Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011; 
Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011; 2013; Lemberg-Pedersen 2013; Streiff-Fénart 
and Segatti 2014).
This development has made unauthorized migration more difficult, dan-
gerous, and expensive. This is a global tendency. African migration, how-
ever, is the most affected in the world when counting fatalities within the 
continent and especially towards Europe (Brian and Laczko 2014). Between 
January and September 2014 were registered the deaths of 3,072 people 




















6 Nauja Kleist 
were of sub-Saharan (mainly West and Central African) origin (2014, 25).
In 2015, the registered number of dead or missing persons between Janu-
ary and the middle of December was 3,6051 and this number continues to 
increase. Zooming further out, there were an estimated 22,294 fatalities 
between 2000 and 2014, making the Mediterranean by far the deadliest 
border region in the world (Brian and Laczko 2014). Crossing the Sahara 
to reach Libya or other North African countries for the purpose of work or 
onward migration is another deadly migration route, with 1,790 reported 
fatalities between 1996 and 2013 (2014, 24), although these figures are most 
certainly under-reported.
The high number of fatalities is testimony to the fact that restrictive 
mobility regimes do not put an end to high-risk and unauthorized migration.
What is more, the waning of legal migration possibilities does not only con-
cern intercontinental migration to established destinations; the EU’s global 
approach to migration management has repercussions for intra-African 
migration in terms of more restrictive border control within the continent.
Migrants experience prolonged blockages in so-called transit zones, partly 
or wholly funded and implemented by the EU. The borderlands in Niger and 
Libya (Brachet 2010; Bredeloup and Pliez 2011) and Senegal, Mauretania 
and Morocco (Andersson 2014; Streiff-Fénart and Segatti 2014) provide 
well-known examples. Likewise, the EU has funded and supported migra-
tion management programs in a range of sending countries, focusing on the 
prevention of (what is expected to become) irregular migration into Europe,
for instance through the introduction of biometric identification, intensified 
and technologized document control and sensitization campaigns (Anders-
son 2014; Kleist 2015). Such blockages and impediments may terminate,
deter, or defer migration through detention or deportation (Andersson 2014; 
Andrijasevic 2010). Likewise, they may cause prolonged periods of immo-
bility while waiting for mobility ‘openings’ (Poutignat 2012) or connections 
(Alpes 2011), or while accumulating funds (Lucht 2011). They constitute 
thresholds, as Jocelyne Streiff-Fénart and Aurelia Segatti (2014) argue.
The growth and consolidation of global and local inequalities, in com-
bination with restrictive mobility regimes, exacerbate conditions of uncer-
tainty in relation to migrants’ livelihoods and possible futures, as described 
above. However they also generate new geographies of hope. Whereas West-
ern countries have been affected by the economic crisis unleashed in 2008,
rising economies in the South are reshaping the distribution of possibilities 
globally, following their emerging markets and high growth rates. One of 
the consequences is the emergence of new migration destinations, due to the 
combination of restrictive mobility regimes in established destinations and 
economic growth in the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
and a range of other states.
The authors in this volume explore these transformations, examining how 
precarious living conditions, restrictive mobility regimes, and new opportu-





















   
Introduction 7 
Situating Hope: Potentiality, Uncertainty 
and Social Imaginaries 
Hope is a tricky concept to pin down, with its simultaneous vernacular and 
theoretical usages, ranging from everyday aspirations to eschatology and 
existentialism. The contributors to this volume do not necessarily employ 
the same hope theories but do share an overall approach to hope as ‘a 
socially mediated human capacity’ (Webb 2007, 68). This implies attention 
to the situatedness of hope, i.e., the social imaginaries and realities that hope 
is embedded in or inspired by. Furthermore, as indicated above, hope as 
an analytical perspective implies attention to simultaneous potentiality and 
uncertainty of future. Below I elaborate on these two interrelated dimen-
sions in more detail.
According to Ernst Bloch, perhaps the most well-known of the hope the-
orists, hope is ‘the most human of all mental feelings’ (1986, 75), consti-
tuting the antithesis to despair, fear, and anxiety. In Bloch’s opus magnum 
The Principle of Hope (1986), he calls for a temporal reorientation of phi-
losophy from retrospection to the future (cf. Miyazaki 2004), approaching 
hope as an anticipatory consciousness towards the ‘not-yet-become’ (Bloch 
1986, 11) and as embedded in the conditions of the present. This has become 
an influential position in hope theories. As Craig Browne notes: 
From Ernst Bloch through to Richard Rorty, discussions of hope in 
philosophy and social theory have highlighted the significance of antici-
pation and the practical consequences of projections that simultaneously 
emerge in the present but point beyond it.
(2005, 68) 
The focus on anticipation is central for our understanding of hope. The 
emphasis on potentiality implies confidence in the future but also entails the 
possibility of failure and slippage (Whyte 2002; Zigon 2009). The hoping 
subject does not know if or when uncertainty turns into certainty and the 
potentiality of hope evaporates or materializes. Hope is not static but may 
change, be transformed, weakened, or strengthened. Such a perspective thus 
emphasizes the temporality and elasticity of hope—how it is related to pro-
cesses of becoming and horizons of expectation and possibility (Graw and 
Schielke 2012; Narotzky and Besnier 2014). However, the modes and con-
tent of hope are situated in overall socio-economic and socio-cultural setups,
in specific times and places (cf. Cole and Durham 2008).
The situated nature of hope thus accentuates attention to its collective and 
social dimensions and how they are related to social imaginaries and col-
lective visions of the good and meaningful life and future within particular 
societies and groups. This is what Ghassan Hage (2003) calls  social hope.2 
Migration and mobility are important elements of social hope in some soci-
eties, connoting potentiality and hope at the symbolical and material levels 
 
 


















8 Nauja Kleist 
despite the uncertainty and risk that migration may imply. Hage emphasizes 
the role of the nation-state as the most important actor in generating and 
distributing social hope to the population—so-called societal hope. Socie-
tal hope consists of visions of the good life and achievement within soci-
ety. Such visions may be related to upward social mobility, security, and/ 
or social recognition or symbolic capital in a Bourdieusian sense (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992). The power of societal hope is ‘the ability to maintain 
an experience of the possibility of upward social mobility’ (Hage 2003, 13,
emphasis in original)—in spite of existing structural constraints and inequal-
ities. Inspired by Bloch, we may say that societal hope is an example of how 
the state puts the potentiality of the ‘not-yet’ to work.
Hage’s concept of societal hope calls for attention to the political visions 
of a good life and to the question of who are included in or excluded from 
these visions. They direct attention to the link between individual hopes 
and the socio-cultural and politico-economic circumstances in which social 
hope is generated, distributed, and mapped (cf. Narotzky and Besnier 2014).
However, in large parts of Africa, and indeed elsewhere in the world, soci-
etal hope for (aspiring) migrants and their families is challenged on at least 
two fronts. First, by protracted crisis in many countries and precarious life 
conditions, as described above. Second, by the ‘disjunctive sets of “flows”
of people, goods, images and ideas’ in the present moment of globalization 
(Cole and Durham 2008, 14; cf. Appadurai 1996; 2013). Such flows may 
widen and increase social hope through providing alternative visions of the 
good life and sources of knowledge about how to realize these visions, and 
where they are supposed to take place. This indicates that the role of the state 
in generating societal hope is ambivalent to say the least. Indeed, the chap-
ters in this volume amply show that societal hope is not necessarily the most 
important mode of social hope for migrants and their families. Rather, it is 
a key concern to distinguish between the different kinds of social hope and 
their spatial location.
In what follows, the chapters are situated in relation to three dimensions: 
first, repositories of hope; second, spatial and temporal dimensions of hope; 
and third, connections between existential and physical (im)mobility in rela-
tion to postponed or lost hope.
Repositories of Hope: Locating Social Hope and Its Pathways 
Migration is linked to ideas of different places and the opportunities or 
constraints they are perceived to offer in a stratified and unequal global 
world (Mar 2005; Vigh 2009). Such perceptions may be grounded in images 
circulated in the media and public culture and through social networks. As 
the chapters in this volume show, much migration is inspired by the success 
of peers or previous generations of migrants, pointing to the role of social 
imaginaries and of the past in shaping visions of the future (cf. Sarro 2015).





















instance, to the visions of the good life and how they are associated with cer-
tain places—and to the underpinning notions of how to realize or cultivate 
such hope. In other words, to different sources of knowledge, institutions,
and forces that are perceived as brokering or facilitating social hope, how-
ever ambivalent or uncertain they may seem to be.
The contributions to this volume examine how notions of opportunities 
and meaningful lives and futures are located in different places, sources of 
knowledge and spheres of life. Four such repositories of hope are identified: 
papers and bureaucracies (Drotbohm and Vammen), spiritual and religious 
institutions (Haugen, Vammen, Bredeloup, and Lucht), public culture (Bja-
rnesen), and social networks (especially Drotbohm, Bredeloup, Hernández-
Carretero, Lucht, and Kleist).
Heike Drotbohm shows how social hope is generated in the interaction 
with administrative and classificatory regulations of migration regimes in 
Cape Verde. Analyzing how aspiring migrants understand the relationship 
between bureaucratic classification and their gendered life and family posi-
tions, she shows that the process of visa application at the American Embassy 
is experienced as a social performance, based on (perceived) knowledge of 
the logics of the American mobility regime. Whereas the would-be migrants 
say that they must convince the consular officer of their eligibility through 
having something or somebody left behind to ensure their return to Cape 
Verde—for instance, small children—consular officers disregard such ideas 
as ill-informed rumors. However, Drotbohm points out that the bureau-
cratic procedures and outcomes of visa applications are so uncertain and 
incoherent that visa applicants may maintain an, albeit delimited, hope for 
a future in the United States.
The relationship between legal papers and hope is also central in Ida Maria 
Vammen’s chapter on a regularization program for undocumented Senega-
lese in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The implications are quite different, however.
The amnesty was a result of a lobbying campaign by a Senegalese diaspora 
association in collaboration with Argentinian human-rights lawyers and 
NGOs. Vammen examines the conflictual understandings of the program 
from the point of view of the association on the one hand, and undocumented 
Senegalese street-hawkers on the other, analyzing how the different actors are 
seen as ‘brokering hope’, as she coins it. Whereas the association perceived 
the amnesty as an expression of brokering societal hope in Argentina through 
obtaining political rights, the street-hawkers were convinced that it was the 
work of God. This view was endorsed by a visiting  marabout and interpreted 
as religious confirmation of their moral virtue as a group. In their view, social 
hope was embedded in moral and religious being, rather than in state logics.
Religious practice and guidance thus constitute a source of knowledge and 
a repository of hope for these migrants, rather than the relatively delimited 
societal hope distributed by the Argentinian state.
Jesper Bjarnesen demonstrates how hope can be located in public cul-

















10 Nauja Kleist 
Côte d’Ivoire to Burkina Faso with their families following the conflict in 
2000–05, Bjarnesen shows how this group of young people finds hope in 
the Ivorian music style of Zouglou and its urban and cosmopolitan mode 
of life and personal comportment. Having been born and raised in Côte 
d’Ivoire, these young migrants face challenges of integration in Burkina Faso 
and of establishing livelihoods in a context characterized by prejudice and 
competition for scarce resources. Bjarnesen shows how the consumption of 
Zouglou music and the performance of a confident Zouglouman style serve 
as a repository of knowledge for a hoped-for future—for instance, through 
lyrics offering advice on how African migrants should behave in a European 
metropolis. The social performance of Zouglou thus entails hopefulness,
exemplifying how social hope may also be generated in the collective con-
sumption of public cultural flows.
Finally, the chapters emphasize the importance of social networks. The 
role of family members, friends, experienced migrants, and connection 
men in supporting, advising, informing, or dreaming about migration runs 
through almost all the chapters in this volume. Social networks are perti-
nent in the much-practiced ‘migration talk’, as Drotbohm terms it, when 
(aspiring) migrants seek and exchange knowledge about the challenges of 
visa application, living in a new environment, or handling the hazards of 
journeys (see also Bredeloup and Hernández-Carretero). Connection men,
return migrants, or religious authorities may serve as particularly important 
sources of knowledge on migration (Vammen, Haugen, Lucht, and Kleist),
but social hope may also be generated in the visible or imagined achievement 
of successful migrants, when they visit, or through the material outcomes 
of their migration, such as houses, remittances, or prestigious consumer 
goods (cf. Makhulu  et al. 2010). Indeed, much migration is fed on ‘inher-
ited hope’, as Bjarnesen puts it: following in the footsteps of earlier genera-
tions of migrants and repeating their success, as also shown by Bredeloup,
Hernández-Carretero, and Kleist.
Social hope is thus exchanged and mediated in and through different 
repositories and sources of knowledge, including but certainly not delimited 
to formal channels of information. Rumors, lyrics, sermons, and the ubiqui-
tous migrant houses generate alternative understandings of how migration 
may be a pathway to a meaningful future and how to realize it. This points 
to the question of temporality—to when the visions of the good life are sup-
posed to take place—to which I now turn.
The Time of Hope: Near and Distant Futures 
The second overarching theme in the book is the relationship between 
hope and temporality in migration. A key feature of hope is its futurity; 
or more precisely, hope may be a key aspect of the future. Following Cole 
and Durham (2008), the future can be conceptualized as having three 




















temporality’; the ways in which individuals orient themselves to the future,
for instance, through hope; and, finally, how individuals create the future 
through ‘designing and normalizing new kinds of practices’, which may also 
generate hope in the process (2008, 10).
However, to state that hope is related to the future does not indicate when 
this ‘not-yet’ is (imagined to be) taking place. Jane Guyer’s (2007) analysis of 
temporal reorientation in the post-cold war period is useful to consider here.
Guyer claims that there has been ‘a strange evacuation of the temporal frame 
of the “near future”’ (2007, 409) which has become increasingly ‘punctu-
ated’, being scheduled by dates, terms, and events that structure everyday 
life and postpone the meaningful future—the ‘not-yet’ in Bloch’s terms—to 
an abstract long-term perspective. Guyer shows this through the examples 
of evangelic and macro-economic thinking. In the first case, meaningful exis-
tence is located in prophetic time or ‘end time’ (cf. Piot 2010) marked by 
the Second Coming of Christ; in the second case it is postponed to the long 
run of macro-economic development, where the payoff of economic inter-
ventions (or their absence) is supposed to take place. In both cases the result 
is an extreme long-sightedness and a ‘gap between an instantaneous present 
and an altogether different distant future’ (Guyer 2007, 417). Reframing 
Guyer’s thoughts in a hope perspective, we can say that a central question is 
when and where the potentiality of hope—where ‘the good’ may happen—is 
perceived to be taking place.
In this volume, we identify three distinct answers to this question: spatial 
transposition of hope in the context of the moral breakdown of the present 
(Lubkemann), temporal reorientation from the future to the present (Haugen),
and the postponement of hope to the distant future (Hernández-Carretero,
Lucht, and Drotbohm).
Steven Lubkemann examines discourses and practices of diasporicity in 
relation to historical and contemporary considerations of ‘return’ to Liberia 
among the descendants of the transatlantic slave-trade in the middle of the 
nineteenth century and refugees from the civil war in the 1980s and 1990s,
respectively. He argues that diasporicity as a social practice is characterized 
by the sense of attachment elsewhere but that this sense is determined by his-
tories and present conditions of structural violence—in this case in relation 
to slavery and racism in the United States—rather than by originating else-
where. Thus, in situations of a morally broken down present, hope may be 
located in a (potential) parallel existence within this  elsewhere. Diasporicity,
then, constitutes a spatialized instantiation of hope, rather than a temporal 
one. Diasporicity, Lubkemann suggests, may be ‘usefully conceived as a par-
ticular instantiation of hope which is constructed through processes of social 
imagination that rely upon spatialization’. Hope is not located in the future,
in other words; it can only be imagined in another place.
Such a spatial transposition of hope stands in contrast to temporal reori-
entations of hope from the future to the present (Miyazaki 2004; Pedersen 













12 Nauja Kleist 
for a temporal reorientation of the retrospective nature of philosophy from 
the past to the future. Miyazaki approaches hope as a method, focusing on 
the ‘prospective momentum entailed in anticipation of what has not-yet-
become’ (2004, 14)—on sparks of hope in the present. However, Miyazaki 
also examines how certain concepts and ideas serve as sources of hope taken 
up by individuals or groups to reorient their knowledge and engagement 
with the world through changing their modes of life and hence transforming 
their presence in the process. In such cases, temporal reorientation concerns 
how the presence is reimagined ‘from the perspective of the end’ (2006,
157) through the pursuit of particular actions and modes of life. Just as the 
future cannot be reduced to hope, this approach shows that hope cannot be 
reduced to a phenomenon exclusively of the future.
Temporal reorientation is central in  Heidi Østbø Haugen’s chapter on a 
Pentecostal Nigerian migrant church in Guangzhou, China. The church is 
mainly patronized by Nigerian traders who often find themselves in difficult 
and uncertain situations in relation to their businesses and legal situation.
Haugen demonstrates how a Nigerian pastor and congregants make sense 
of and cope with these challenges through religious messages and prac-
tices that not only praise achievement, success, and prosperity, and hence 
generate hope for the future, but also articulate and perform the (hoped-
for) achievement as facts of the present, regardless of the challenges they 
face. The seemingly fantastic promises of wealth constitute a reality still in 
the making—in the state of the ‘not-yet’ to use Bloch’s term—which can 
be appreciated, as Haugen argues, for the social momentum they produce,
rather than their accuracy. The Pentecostal prosperity gospel thus consti-
tutes a method for practicing hope in the present as well as in the distant 
future of prophetic time.
In many migration projects, however, the aim is to establish a better life 
and future ‘back home’ through saving money, sending remittances, and 
gaining experience. In these cases the temporary horizon of hope is located 
in the future. This is indeed the case in  María Hernández-Carretero’s chap-
ter on the striking difference between decisions to migrate from Senegal to 
Spain and decisions to return. Hernández-Carretero shows how migrants 
have been willing to confront considerable uncertainty when migrating to 
Spain but insist on being well-prepared and hence to minimize uncertainty 
when returning to Senegal. She argues that this is grounded in pressures and 
expectations from their family and peers as well as the migrants’ perceptions 
of the capacity of the Spanish and Senegalese states, respectively, to deal 
with crisis. Whereas they regard the economic crisis in Spain as temporary,
Senegal is perceived to be in a state of permanent crisis without much socie-
tal hope. In line with Guyer’s reflections on temporal reorientation and her 
distinction between the near and the distant future, Hernández-Carretero 
shows that the realization of the hoped-for life may be postponed to the dis-
tant future while the present and the immediate future is put on hold in the 

























opportunities. Whereas long-term hope may be preserved, the present and 
immediate future is evacuated.
These perspectives demonstrate the volatility of the temporal horizons of 
hope. Practicing hope through temporal reorientation locates hope in the 
present and spatial transposition locates it in an elsewhere, whereas many 
migration projects locate hope in—what is hoped to be—the near future.
However, in some cases, hope is postponed or suspended to a more distant 
future, pointing to the possible failure of migration projects.
Existential (im)Mobility: The Perseverance 
and Failure of Hope 
The third theme in this volume focuses on the role of hope in delayed or 
failed migration projects. This concerns the social and existential repercus-
sions when migrants get stranded en route and end up in protracted periods 
of involuntary immobility (Carling 2002; Lubkemann 2008), when they can-
not meet the expectations of family members or themselves to send money,
let alone return in glorious or just remotely respectable ways or, worst of 
all, when they come back empty-handed. These are not trivial concerns in 
the context of economic crisis, political conflict, and restrictive regimes of 
mobility that characterizes much African migration today. By implication,
large numbers of people are excluded from legal or safe migration, their 
journeys and the outcomes of migration projects are highly uncertain, and 
the risk of failure is high.
However, as already stated, this has not brought migration to a halt. In 
spite of uncertainty and possible dangers, migration keeps on connoting 
potentiality and hope at the symbolical and material levels for many (aspir-
ing) migrants in situations characterized by precarious or stagnating living 
conditions. Indeed, one of the tensions inherent in the mobility paradox,
described in this introduction, is the ‘schism between the culturally expected 
and the possible’ (Vigh 2009, 95; cf. Graw and Schielke 2012). Migration is 
one way of endeavoring to resolve this schism. This may be through sending 
remittances and/or maintaining or fulfilling other social obligations. How-
ever, migration may also be the expression of a related desire to move on in 
life which, in many cases of African migration, is closely related to fulfilling 
social and economic expectations and hence become a proper adult man or 
woman (Cole 2014; Vigh 2006).
The sense of being socially on the move or going somewhere in life has 
been conceptualized as existential mobility3 by Ghassan Hage (2009; Hage 
and Papadopoulos 2004). Hage distinguishes between physical and existen-
tial mobility and describes the latter as ‘an intrinsic feature of how we expe-
rience our humanity’ (Hage and Papadopoulos 2004, 112). According to 
Hage, one of the drivers of migration is a sense of existential stuckedness or 
of moving too slowly. Migration is ‘a powerful trope for imagining oneself 








   
   
 










14 Nauja Kleist 
from a frozen future’, as Gaibazzi has noted in relation to young Soninke 
men in the Gambia (2014, 173). In other words, the urge to go somewhere 
in life (existential mobility) may be dealt with through physical mobility.
Conversely, existential immobility or ‘stuckedness’ refers to the feeling of 
not going anywhere in life, of being stuck.
The connection between existential and physical (im)mobility and how 
migrants cope with hardship and suffering is explored throughout the chap-
ters. Migration may constitute a moral experience or adventure (Bredeloup 
and Vammen) where migrants maintain a sense of moving forward in life 
in spite of challenges. However, for many migrants, involuntary immobility 
corresponds to a sense of existential immobility, of ‘not moving well enough’ 
(cf. Jansen 2014) or even moving backwards, hence a sense of abjection in 
Ferguson’s terms (2006; 2008). As the chapters show, migrants may experi-
ence immobility during migration when they are stuck en route (Lucht) or in 
the country of destination (Hernández-Carretero). Other authors show how 
aspiring migrants and deportees may find themselves in situations of invol-
untary physical and existential immobility before migration (Drotbohm) or 
after deportation (Kleist).
Exploring the moral and existential dimensions of hope in the context 
of uncertainty, involuntary immobility, or delayed or failed migration proj-
ects, the chapters point not only to the perseverance of hope but also to its 
limitations. Taking departure in the notion of migration as  adventure in
Francophone West and Central Africa, Sylvie Bredeloup argues that migra-
tion constitutes a moral experience for young migrants in their search for 
moral independence as well as their desire to live a different life, finding 
fulfillment and returning in a successful way. The social hope invested 
in migration thus relates to both the process of migration itself and to 
its outcome. Adventure is seen as a stage in life, that of youth, which is to 
be followed by settling down in socially respectable ways; it may thus be 
characterized as a hopeful practice. However, in the case of failure—when 
migrants fail to meet the expectations of their families, their peers, and 
themselves—adventure and other kinds of migration project are embedded 
in shame and social death.
Failed migration projects may cause migrants to postpone their return.
Yet many migrants show a remarkable perseverance in maintaining a sense 
of hope, in spite of structural constraints and seemingly hopeless situations,
whether caused by economic crisis, conflict, or unlucky personal circum-
stances. Such perseverance is a remarkable feature of Hans Lucht’s chapter 
on Ghanaian migrants in Niamey, Niger, a hub for sub-Saharan migrants 
waiting or preparing to cross the Sahara to reach Libya. Whereas most 
migrants spend some time in Niamey waiting for good travel connections 
or accumulating resources, others end up being stranded, neither being able 
to move forward nor wanting to return empty-handed. Taking departure in 
the funeral of a Ghanaian man, Lucht unpacks the migration circumstances 

















Living from hand to mouth and in spite of extreme challenges, this group 
still maintains the hope that their lives will change for the better and that 
they may once again go back to Ghana in a successful way. Lucht proposes 
that such perseverance of hope can be understood as a sense of ‘existential 
continuity between one’s efforts and the responses they generate’. Not giving 
up hope indicates a continuing faith that one’s efforts will pay off, if not in 
this lifetime, then in the afterlife.
Whereas the stranded Ghanaians in Niamey refuse to return empty-handed,
such refusal is not possible for deportees and other kinds of forced returnee.
As shown in several chapters in this book, this mode of return is perceived 
as the worst possible way of returning, as an unthinkable move, and a 
catastrophe for both the migrant and his or her family—to be avoided at 
all costs. In the final chapter of the book, Nauja Kleist examines life after 
deportation in the context of high-risk overland migration from Ghana to 
Libya and onwards to Europe. Whereas deportees may be seen as successful 
if they return with money and resources, returning in an untimely way and 
empty-handed is embedded in feelings of shame and a sense of individual 
failure, despite widespread knowledge of the dangers and uncertainty related 
to high-risk migration. Kleist argues that this social conundrum can be under-
stood as an expression of the local persistence of social hope in the lack of 
convincing and desirable alternatives.Whereas the Ghanaian state distributes 
societal hope that emphasizes a prosperous future in Ghana through educa-
tion and hard work, dismissing high-risk and irregular migration, large parts 
of the population feel excluded from realizing these visions and continue to 
place social hope in migration as a pathway to a better future. Individualizing 
failure thus enables the continued collective and social hope for a better life 
through migration.
These and other chapters in the volume thus demonstrate that the analysis 
of hope is not equivalent to examining success, achievement, or optimism.
Rather, they highlight how much African migration is characterized by chal-
lenges and potential failure, although that individual and especially social 
hope may be maintained, even in the face of seemingly invincible constraints 
and difficulties.
In Conclusion: The Ambivalence and Precariousness of Hope 
In this introduction, I have argued that hope constitutes a fruitful analytical 
framework in which to examine the social imaginaries underpinning Afri-
can migration in the contemporary moment, characterized by inequality,
protracted crisis, and restrictive mobility regimes. Whereas the paradoxes of 
mobility in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have been elab-
orated on in other anthropological and sociological literature, the contribu-
tion of this volume is to link and employ theories of hope with studies of 
migration and (im)mobility. This provides us with new and insightful ways 





















16 Nauja Kleist 
in the practices and perceptions of a good and meaningful life, in spite of 
sometimes formidable challenges.
The framework of hope analysis that I have proposed is based on an 
understanding of hope as a social and collective phenomenon that encapsu-
lates the simultaneous potentiality and uncertainty of the future. With inspi-
ration from, in particular, Ernst Bloch and Ghassan Hage, I have outlined 
four dimensions of this framework which are also reflected in the chapters.
First, a distinction between societal hope and other modes of social hope.
This implies examination of the institutions and actors who generate, dis-
tribute, and broker collective visions of the good and meaningful life. Second 
and relatedly, different repositories of hope, i.e., the sources of knowledge 
and spheres of life which provide or inspire social hope in relation to migra-
tion. The most central repositories of hope examined in the chapters are 
social networks, religion, legal papers, and public culture. Third, analysis of 
the temporal and spatial horizons of different modes of hope, where we have 
identified three models: the spatial transposition of hope in a broken-down 
present, the temporal reorientation to the present, and the postponement of 
hope. Fourth, the  relationship between existential and physical im(mobility).
This calls for attention to be paid to the ways in which migration projects 
may be disrupted, delayed, or fail, to how hope may be suspended or lost,
and to the glimpses of anticipation that tomorrow—or next year—might 
be different to today and yesteryear, even in seemingly hopeless situations.
Theoretically, this volume thus demonstrates the value of including a hope 
perspective in migration studies and the pertinence of adding a spatial and 
mobility dimension to the expanding hope literature. Empirically, it empha-
sizes the ambivalence and precariousness of social hope in migration in the 
context of the contemporary mobility paradox. In the face of crisis, conflict,
or stasis, many migrants (and other sectors of the population) find visions of 
a meaningful future and how to realize it in spheres of life other than those 
distributed by the state they live in or originate from. This reflects dwindling 
faith in the (nation-)state’s ability to secure a meaningful future and provide 
societal hope for its citizens which, again, adds to the explanation of the 
importance of migration as a pathway of hope today.
Finally, we make it abundantly clear that an analytical focus on hope 
should not necessarily be perceived as a hopeful exercise (cf. Crapanzano 
2003; Sarro 2015). Migration projects do not always succeed and many 
migrants find themselves being exploited or ‘stuck’, without opportuni-
ties for sending remittances, moving on to new locations, or returning in 
socially acceptable ways. Some migrants die or disappear, whereas others 
are deported empty-handed, facing shame and social death. Hence, the link 
between mobility and hope is not only embedded in uncertainty but is also 
precarious. The contributions to this volume do not constitute a celebration 
of hope in migration but, taken together, they draw attention to how the 
ambivalent and precarious nature of social hope is exacerbated and ampli-
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Notes 
1. Data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php, accessed 14 December 2015. No infor-
mation on the nationality of dead or missing persons in 2015 could be found.
2. Rorty coined the notion of social hope, referring to the stories which members 
of a society ‘need to be able to tell themselves [. . .] about how things might get 
better’ (quoted in Schneiderhan 2013, 429).
3. Hage also uses the term ‘upward symbolic mobility’ rather than ‘existential 
mobility’ in his conversation with Papadopoulos (2004).
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2 How to Extract Hope from Papers? 
Classificatory Performances and 




Emilia,1 a young woman living in my neighborhood on the Cape Verdean 
island of Fogo, had been waiting for weeks for Laura, a good friend, who 
was living in the United States at that time. The day Laura came for a visit,
she, Emilia and another friend, Mauricio, sat in front of Emilia’s house.
When I passed by, they asked me to join them and Emilia told me that 
they were school friends who had all finished the liceu— the local secondary 
school—in the same year. Then she instantly changed the topic and said,
‘You know, Heike, I am carrying hope, twice’. She giggled and I hesitated,
not sure what to say because I was aware that Emilia was pregnant and 
that, for several weeks already, her swelling belly had been watched by the 
entire neighborhood. I thought that her allusion to ‘hope’ was related to this 
intimate condition and that she might want to tell me something about her 
longed-for baby. Sitting down I said, ‘Sure. Lucky you! But twice?’ To my 
surprise she did not talk about her pregnancy but, instead, explained that she 
had just received an invitation to an ‘interview’ at the American Consulate in 
Praia, the capital of Cape Verde. Then she continued: ‘Having a very young 
baby will make it much easier to travel. The baby is my “linki”.2 Laura 
knows a lot about this. She will help me (‘ dar apoio’) and, with the baby,
all this [the visa application] won’t be a problem. All is in order now, and 
we’re finally going to make it’.3 In this dialogue, Emilia—whose particular 
perspective will follow at a later stage of this chapter—connected her pos-
itive attitude towards the visa application to two complementary features: 
firstly, she assumed that her pregnancy and, hence, the presumed changing 
bureaucratic category, might improve her chances in the administrative pro-
cess. Secondly, she counted on the support which her friend Laura, who had 
successfully migrated before, had promised to provide.
In this text I will explore how young Cape Verdeans manage to progress 
their emigration plans despite the unpromising circumstances. Just like her 
friends, Emilia had grown up in an African context in which any attempt 
to access the international circuits of work, business, or leisure travel is 
somewhat unrealistic. However, despite the negative experiences of others 
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of this long and often delayed process, Emilia was able to maintain an opti-
mistic attitude. In what follows I argue that the ability to continue on the 
bumpy, contingent, and often frustrating path of visa application depends 
on the dynamics between the bureaucracies of border-crossing, the support 
provided by social networks, and legal classifications which change over a 
person’s life course.
Evidently, contemporary forms of mobility are hard to imagine without 
understanding the social meaning of migration rights. As several authors 
argue, the present era of migration control has become the final stronghold of 
state sovereignty.While nation-states, on the one hand, are losing control over 
many realms of social life, they implement a wide variety of measures for reg-
ulating border-crossing and entry and migrant’s rights—such as their access 
to residency, employment, social services, and citizenship (Bauböck 1991; 
Bosniak 1991; Dauvergne 2004; Morris 2002; Sassen 2006). Today, migra-
tion scholars examine law not as a containment of regulation, but rather as a 
social field in the Foucauldian sense, wherein technologies of control, super-
vision, and discipline are created, stretching from consulates, border-control 
agents, the military and the police, to prisons, factories, schools, and health 
and social services (Donnan and Wilson 2010; Fassin and D’Halluin 2005; 
Feldman 2012; Heyman 2009; Hyndman 2000; Salter 2006).
The procedures of the modern administrative state constitute a highly 
selective and porous process, differentiating between and allowing entry 
only to a certain category of eligible non-citizen populations. Whereas the 
documentary requirements for border-crossing are demanding and costly,
the rules and regulations are usually not only unequal and selective but 
also arbitrary and incoherent. Most of all, the bureaucracies of interna-
tional travel are discretionary and imply an assessment of ‘moral worth’ 
or ‘deservedness’ of the applicant, judging his or her financial, social, and 
moral capacities and determining the likelihood that she or he will create 
security problems in the receiving country. Those intending to migrate have 
to explore their individual mode of potential transit; they have to under-
stand not only the formalities and requirements, but also the scope for inter-
pretation and the loopholes through which they might be able to pass. In 
this process, entry visas, as a supplement to a country’s citizens passport— 
which are issued by the consulates of the countries of destination prior to 
the envisaged journey—can turn into fetishized objects of desire (Heyman 
2001; 2009; Hoag 2010; Jansen 2009; Salter 2006).
In many parts of contemporary Africa, obtaining access to international 
travel constitutes the most vital and promising social sphere, in which a 
better, more prosperous and more secure life can be imagined. In his 2010 
book, Nostalgia for the future, Charles Piot examines the desire and the 
attempt to obtain a visa for going abroad as being part of a particular histor-
ical post-Cold War crisis, in which local connections to the global diaspora 
generate new fantasies about exile and global membership. In a compa-
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future as a key element of the local ‘zeitgeist’, in which hope emerges as an 
‘intellectual emotion’ motivating migration processes, which are assumed to 
provide access to better living conditions. In his article on migration from 
Hong Kong to Australia, he describes ‘social hope’ as ‘a particularly open-
ended and speculative practice, that encompasses long spans of time, steep 
curves of cultural learning and social attunement, risks and investments that 
occur across generations’ (Mar 2005, 365). Drawing on Hirokazu Miyaza-
ki’s (2003) elaboration on hope as a way to study critiques and utopian 
alternatives to capitalism, Mar (2005) suggests approaching hope in order to 
examine how processes of knowledge formation are produced in the context 
of transnational migration. This approach can be complemented by Simon 
Turner’s (2015) work on Burundian refugees in Nairobi, who live in condi-
tions of extreme uncertainty. Turner confirms this understanding of hope as 
a collective, utopian perspective and argues that, for many of these refugees,
an ‘open-ended’ form of hoping is the only possible way, as it helps to imag-
ine a life beyond the current state of suffering. In contrast to this, he observes 
‘goal-directed’ modes of hoping in institutionalized contexts, such as refu-
gee camps, churches, or international NGOs, where the promise to improve 
contemporary living conditions can be understood as a key commodity. He 
further argues that ‘hope may be seen as a mode of governing, shaping the 
desires and aspirations of subjects through hope’ (Turner 2015, 177). This 
connects to ‘societal hope’, as described by Kleist in the introduction to this 
volume.
In this chapter I base my argument on these theoretical assumptions of 
the collective and institutionalized aspects of hope and examine the striking 
paradox between the pessimism of a life trajectory across national borders,
which turns out to be barred for the majority of young Africans on the one 
hand, and their continuing perseverance on the other. More precisely, I will 
study how those who intend to migrate manage to persist despite the obsta-
cles of visa bureaucracy, how they organize their knowledge, and nurture 
their optimism in the course of a bumpy and often barrier-strewn route.
After this introduction, I first outline the particularities of the Cape Verdean 
transnational field and focus on the impact of migration on local forms of 
social stratification. Next, I return to the three individuals introduced at 
the beginning of this chapter and reflect on their specific conditions for and 
experiences of travel. The crucial impact of support networks as well as the 
duty to submit to expectations and claims articulated therein, will then be 
addressed. Finally, I turn to hope fostered in the institutional sphere through 
bureaucratic classifications and the discretionary power of migration offi-
cers, whose attitude and room for maneuver need to be interpreted by those 
islanders who wish to go abroad.
To support my argument I rely on ethnographic fieldwork carried out 
between 2006 and 2008 on Fogo and Brava, two small islands lying to the 
south-west of the Cape Verdean Archipelago. I integrated my own family life 
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interior as well as to the neighboring island of Brava. During these twelve 
months of fieldwork, I combined participant observation with semi-structured 
or narrative interviews as well as ego-centered network techniques. Subse-
quently, I also visited family members living in Lisbon and in Boston.Whereas 
this research was actually concentrated on the dynamics between mobility 
and immobility within cross-border family networks, the desire, intention, or 
plan to travel appeared constantly as a side strand of information among the 
islanders, especially of those belonging to the younger generation.
Rights of Passage as a  rite de passage in Cape Verde 
The small West African country of Cape Verde offers itself particularly well 
for the study of the meaning of hope in the context of migration regimes,
because the imagination and the speculation about possible avenues to migra-
tion have long shaped everyday life in the archipelago. Since the mid-fifteenth 
century, Portuguese traders used these ten islands, located approximately 
550 miles west of the coast of Senegal, as trading posts for trafficking in 
slaves, sugar, and cotton. Being a constituting element in the context of Afri-
can Atlantic economies (Guyer 2004), the Cape Verdean population gained 
an international reputation and accumulated wealth by means of creating 
bonds with other Atlantic trading populations—be they in Portugal, along 
the Upper Guinea Coast or in Brazil (Batalha 2004). The decline of slavery,
which began in the middle of the nineteenth century, signaled drastic eco-
nomic changes; hence the search for new economic foundations began. Cape 
Verde is a desert country and its local agriculture provides only few crops.
There is hardly any national industry, to the extent that 90 per cent of all 
food and consumer goods need to be imported. Due to demographic growth,
the country faced severe famine during years of drought and frequent food 
crises marked life on the islands until the 1960s (Bigman 1993). Because of 
these conditions, spatial mobility and global networking turned from being 
a privilege into being an essential means of survival.
Already during these hard times, the emigration of individual family mem-
bers, their strongly felt absence on the islands, and the collective waiting for 
their material support or greetings sent from abroad all constituted essen-
tial elements of everyday social life on the islands. Those traveling were 
accompanied by the hopes of their loved-ones, who integrated the vision 
about the dangers of the Atlantic crossings as well as the burden of living 
and toiling abroad into their daily talks, imaginations, songs, and prayers 
(Halter 1993). Over the course of history, migration destinations changed.
Whereas, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Cape Verdeans regu-
larly crossed the Atlantic to make new lives in North America (particularly 
in Massachusetts), once their country became politically independent from 
Portugal in 1975 there emerged strong flows of labor migration to Portugal,
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and, more recently, Italy. A consider-
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African colonies such as Guinea Bissau, São Tomé and Principe, Angola and 
Mozambique (Batalha 2004; Carling and Batalha 2008; Drotbohm 2009; 
Halter 1993).
After centuries of Cape Verdean migration, the diaspora population 
now outnumbers the 550,000 inhabitants of the ten islands. Today, Cape 
Verde can be understood as a ‘migration culture’—i.e., that social practice 
and the perception of self and society cannot be understood without tak-
ing into consideration the dynamics between physical and spatial mobility 
and social stratification (Carling and Åkesson 2009). Lisa Åkesson (2004) 
describes migration as ‘making a life’, which captures the local population’s 
perception of migration as only according social recognition by means of 
cross-border migration. Certainly, not everybody in Cape Verde is able to 
travel and leave the country and some never even leave the island on which 
they were born. However, during my fieldwork I rarely came across someone 
who did not have one or more family members living outside Cape Verde.
Comparable to van Gennep’s (1909) interpretation of a  rite de passage, 
which accompanies a person’s maturation and status shifts in the moment 
of biographical transition, a Cape Verdean who manages to organize and 
realize cross-border migration gains recognition and respect in his or her 
community of origin (see also Chavez 1992; Monsutti 2007). The access to 
‘rights’—be it to visas, to territorial entry, or to other types of immigrants’ 
rights eventually obtained after reaching the country of destination—is con-
sidered a crucial and longed-for element in defining the position, the capac-
ity, and the ability of the individual aspirant or migrant. Hence, ‘rights’ are 
part and parcel of the ‘rite’ of passage, during which the successful migrant 
transforms his or her spatial as well as social position, especially towards 
those remaining in the country of origin. Under ideal circumstances, she or 
he is expected to establish a stable life abroad, acquire economic capital, and 
support family and friends back in the country of origin (Drotbohm 2016).
Support, here, infers not only the sending of remittances and other kinds of 
material support, but also, particularly, the responsibility to help others to 
migrate (Carling 2008; Gaibazzi 2014; Khoo 2004; Menjívar 2006). Hence,
successful cross-border migration in Cape Verde today can be understood as 
a quasi-ritualistic process, which is initiated and observed on a communal 
level and contributes to social stratification by dividing people into ‘achiev-
ers’ compared to ‘aspirants’ or ‘failed’ individuals. A successful migration 
transforms a person’s social position and generates social expectations and 
hopes for a better future—not only for her or himself, but also within her or 
his social networks extending across national borders.
Uneven Biographical Conditions of Travel 
Whereas many Cape Verdeans travel regularly between the islands and some 
eventually also travel to other African countries,4 the term migrason refers 
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better life, and generally indicates places in North America or in European 
countries. The peripheral position of the Cape Verdean Archipelago implies 
that a clandestine crossing of these borders is quite unlikely. Most island-
ers aspiring to gain entry into Europe or North America plan for a ‘docu-
mented’ border-crossing and concentrate on the process of visa application,
with its regulations, requirements, classifications, and measures. ‘Arrangar a 
lei’—literally ‘to arrange the law’—is a common expression in Cape Verde,
describing the contingent and unpredictable social process of visa applica-
tion. Those intending to migrate are aware of the fact that criteria of capac-
ity and eligibility are not fixed and permanent but change over the course 
of a person’s lifetime.
The three school friends—Laura, Emilia, and Mauricio—presented in the 
introductory vignette had shared similar conditions at a particular moment 
in time. They spent their childhoods on the same minor Cape Verdean island 
and in the same town, had succeeded in continuing their education after pri-
mary school, and had witnessed the changing conditions for international 
travel and visa application within their social networks. Contrary to their 
mothers and fathers, some of whom had been traveling on a Portuguese 
passport, Cape Verde’s political independence in 1975 complicated entry 
into the most popular destination countries.5 In recent decades, Portugal’s 
signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1995 in particular, and the events 
around 9/11, which were followed by a fusion of migration control and 
security measures on both sides of the Atlantic, contributed to barring visa 
applications from poor countries, especially Africa.
Despite these deterrents, the three friends imagined themselves going 
abroad one day in the future. They were also aware that they each faced 
highly distinct starting conditions, which might oblige them to ‘travel on dif-
ferent tickets’ in order to realize their plans. Laura, who had been introduced 
as ‘the visitor’ in the initial vignette, had always been convinced that she 
would one day be able to leave the country. During one of our talks, she told 
me that her father had been a successful lawyer, living in the country’s capital 
city, Praia, and that he often traveled and worked in Boston, Massachusetts.
Although he had not married Laura’s mother but lived with his wife and 
children on the neighboring island, he had always affirmed his fatherhood 
and supported Laura socially and financially. Laura, who had been a diligent 
and talented student, dreamt of following in her father’s footsteps and enter-
ing his profession after finishing college. In order to support this aim, her 
father had arranged for her to undertake an internship at a friend’s law firm 
in Boston. By the time we met, Laura was still working there. The continuity 
of her stay in Boston, however, had remained undecided. Laura had entered 
the United States on a tourist visa and had received a temporary residence 
permit through her labor contract at the law firm. Simultaneously, she per-
sistently tried to win a scholarship to a public university. When we met, the 
challenge of establishing a long-term legalized stay in the United States was 
still unresolved, and she even feared that she might not be able to re-enter 
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Unlike for Laura, nurturing such precise migration plans would have been 
a mere illusion for the two other friends. Mauricio had grown up in the same 
neighborhood, together with his parents and an older sister. Some years ago 
his mother had been granted a special visa which enabled her to travel to 
Portugal and receive proper medical treatment for a severe renal disease.
Although her husband and her two children had expected to follow her 
within a short time, ‘arrangar a lei’ proved to be difficult for Mauricio’s 
mother, who commuted between clinics and several social-service offices 
and tried to get all the documents prepared. During the first two years of 
her absence, she called nearly every Sunday and promised her children that,
sooner or later, everything would be fine. Some months ago, only Mauricio’s 
sister received her papers and succeeded in obtaining a visa for Portugal.
Mauricio, however, was expected to continue working in his father’s grocery 
shop and in the family’s gardens; he would eventually be able to follow them 
abroad at a later point in time—depending on his mother’s health and her 
ability to stabilize her economic foundation in Portugal. He was still at this 
uncertain waiting stage when we met.
Of the three of them, Emilia was the only one who never had any kind 
of precise migration plans. In her own words, she had always been a lazy 
student and knew that she would never receive a student scholarship of any 
sort to enable her to go abroad. Her personal linkage transcending national 
borders was ‘some kind of uncle’ in Canada, but definitely not someone 
who would want her to join him. Emilia had never considered migration 
to be a realistic future project. Rather, as she told me, she felt able to adapt 
to constantly changing circumstances and to make the best of it. When,
recently, she fell in love with a young man living on a neighboring island,
and fell pregnant, she knew that he would probably not be reliable enough 
to support her adequately. At the same time, however, her pregnancy made 
her reconsider her ability to care properly for her as-yet-unborn child, and 
she began to assess her options for going abroad. Whereas some friends had 
suggested that she participate in the ‘visa lottery’ of the U.S. Embassy, others 
underlined the particularly opportunistic issue of her pregnancy, which will 
be explained in more detail below.
Despite their different biographical situations, all three had shared a 
positive, even utopian, attitude towards their personal futures. They had 
dreamed of opportunities away from their country of origin, even while hav-
ing to cope with the unexpected temporalities of migration, the prevailing 
uncertainties, the experience of delay, or in Mauricio’s case, the frustration 
of an eventual failure. The perseverance of hope, I argue in the following 
section, is nurtured not only by a person’s individual capacity to continue 
this uneven trajectory. Essential elements are, first, the bureaucratic proce-
dures of migration regimes, which are imprecise and incoherent enough to 
allow the individual to believe in the eventuality of him or her overcoming 
this obstacle, and, second, a social environment which not only encourages 
an optimistic attitude but also provides support in various ways. In this 
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from a collective and rather vague imaginary of a life abroad, to a more indi-
vidualized mode of hoping, which supports them in organizing the required 
social backing and particular kind of knowledge.
From Aspiration to the Organization of Support 
and Knowledge 
In contemporary Africa, those who make up the poor, uneducated, and 
young social strata are highly aware of the uneven distribution of migration 
potential. In everyday life, the general ways and opportunities to migrate,
and the individual attempts and failures, as well as changes in the legal 
conditions for international travel, are constantly discussed in the public 
realm as some kind of daily ‘migration speak’. As Jørgen Carling (2001) 
made clear in his work on Cape Verdean migration, we need to differentiate 
between people’s aspirations to migrate and their ability to do so in order 
to understand why some individuals manage to migrate whereas others do 
not. In his aspiration/ability model, he analyzes both characteristics on two 
analytical levels. First, analysis on the macro level, which he understands as 
a particular social, economic, and political environment of emigration which 
may hinder or facilitate attempts to migrate. Second, he refers to certain 
characteristics, such as age, gender, and the social status of the person aspir-
ing to migrate. As he points out several times in his article (Carling 2002),
interpersonal relations, social networks, and households complicate a clear 
distinction between aspiration and ability, as these features also consider-
ably affect the outcome of migration plans.
My own empirical observations in Cape Verde confirm this crucial mean-
ing of the meso level, where plans and strategies for migration are drawn 
up and fostered. The shift from a vague wish to a precise action is generated 
within a social environment which provides not only moral backing, but also 
the necessary organizational information as well as practical and financial 
support. In other words, emigration can never occur on an individual level.
To facilitate a person’s journey, economic resources need to be calculated 
and social relations need to be activated within families and households. In 
most migratory contexts, migration is encouraged, generated, and facilitated 
by ‘sponsors’, who see the financial and organizational support they provide 
as a kind of investment, which might eventually generate a positive outcome 
for themselves (Lindquist 2012). Even if a migrant fails and is unable to pay 
back his or her debts, the sponsoring person’s reputation will be strength-
ened in the respective social environment. At the same time, migration spon-
sors are usually aware of the fact that not everybody will be able to sustain 
the burdensome and often prolonged process of visa application, and, hence,
some focus their backing on certain chosen individuals.
In his article on visa application procedures in the Gambia, Paolo Gaibazzi 
convincingly elaborates on the kinship networks necessary for obtaining a 
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to prove that they are ‘fit for migration’ within their personal networks in 
order to receive the appropriate and requisite type of support. In this West 
African case, the backing essential for migration tends to engender kinship 
reciprocities as well as intergenerational dependencies. Young Gambians 
are forced to remain obedient and submissive vis-à-vis senior kin; hence,
it is not only state actors, such as consular officials, but also older family 
members who turn into an additional regulatory authority for migration.
According to Gaibazzi, ‘The visa regime actually pushes young Soninke men 
into the system of support, thereby sustaining the norms and uncertainty 
of social certification’ (Gaibazzi 2014, 51). Complementarily, Obadare and 
Adebanwi (2010) reflect on the role of religious or spiritual authorities in 
Nigeria, who might also approve of the individual travel plan, depending on 
their reading of the obstacles the would-be migrant might face.
In addition to a docile attitude vis-à-vis the authorities, other individual 
characteristics such as age or gender may impact on the decision as to who 
might qualify for support. The individual positions of the three friends dif-
fered considerably in this respect. Whereas Laura felt embedded and sup-
ported in multiple ways by her wealthy father, Mauricio experienced quite 
the opposite: his older sister was felt to be more ‘valuable’ in Lisbon, where 
their mother was suffering from ill health. In addition to this gendered pref-
erence, age might be a second criterion: often, amongst siblings, those born 
earlier are expected to travel before the others, since being officially a minor 
is often a prerequisite for travel on the basis of family reunification—a crite-
rion which might disappear in the course of time. Hence, a relative’s decision 
to postpone or reject a claim for support eventually boils down to quite 
rational decisions based on the calculation of a family’s resources, capac-
ities, and needs. From the perspective of the would-be-migrants, however,
delays allow room for interpretation and usually throw up serious doubts 
about the trustworthiness of their social environment. In Mauricio’s case, his 
mother’s repeated promises to take him to Lisbon fed his continuing expec-
tations, but his sister’s migration reinforced a sense of gendered inequality 
and rivalry within his family. In the end, Mauricio struggled with a growing 
fear that he was being misinformed or cheated on and, hence, eventually not 
‘deserving’ to migrate.
In general, visa application procedures are a particularly blurred field of 
social practice which requires the help of others. Just filtering the correct 
information from a consulate’s website, leaflets, brochures, or other types of 
informational material requires the ability to master a foreign and bureau-
cratic language to an advanced level, which usually discourages many poten-
tial travelers. Additionally, several forms need to be downloaded from the 
Internet, filled out electronically and uploaded again, a technique requiring 
assistance in many cases. In Cape Verdean towns and villages, teachers or 
other individuals with higher education often serve as trusted translators 
and help to interpret broadly held formulations, to make sense of incompre-
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migrant returnees who are well informed about the most recent changes in 
migration law as well as the tips, tricks, and traps to watch out for.
Getting access to the right type of knowledge is considered crucial for 
being a successful applicant. Laura, who was able to rely on a very support-
ive network, but whose father did not live permanently in the United States,
profited not only from his contacts but also from her ability to differenti-
ate between the different types of application procedure. Through her per-
sonal networks she had learned that neither the work permit she had been 
promised nor her official application to a U.S. university while still being 
in Cape Verde would have constituted good grounds for a visa application.
In order to distinguish herself from the many others who intended to study 
abroad, she concentrated her application process on a tourist visa, which 
can be obtained much more easily providing that the applicant possesses a 
sponsoring letter from an American citizen who can prove his or her inde-
pendent political and financial status. Additionally, her father helped her to 
fill out the forms, paid her travel to the country’s capital and the requisite 
visa-processing fees. Laura’s trajectory recalls Mar’s (2005) understanding 
of hope as being part of a long process of cultural and social learning that 
needs to be transmitted across generations.
Finally, I want to return to the collective dimension of hope. Islanders,
like Laura, who were able to improve their individual opportunities and 
conditions and successfully obtain a visa, are usually immediately contacted 
by friends and relatives who wish to acquire additional, non-official, infor-
mation through her experiences. Within her friendship networks, Laura 
instantly had to serve as a resource person, supposedly assisting those who 
lacked sufficient understanding of the formal requirements. Many migrants 
told me about the ‘turning point’, when their successful application trans-
formed them into a positive role-model. Zé, a man in his thirties who had 
presented himself at the American Consulate in Praia some weeks before our 
encounter, told me about his best friend, who had not only photocopied his 
filled-out application forms, but also asked him about the entire procedure 
of self-presentation, the queuing in front of the consulate, the type of per-
son receiving him, the size and the aesthetics of the office, and the kinds of 
questions asked by the consulate official. Finally, his friend took note of all 
these details and discussed each of Zé’s answers again and again. By means 
of accessing this type of knowledge, those aspiring to migrate expect to 
find out about the ‘hidden secrets’ of visa application and try to transform 
the inconsistent initial information into a more precise and reliable level of 
understanding.
Hope and Empathy in ‘Classificatory Performances’ 
The social support and knowledge thus acquired need to be understood as nec-
essary prerequisites for confronting arbitrary and incoherent state bureaucra-
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Obadare and Adebanwi (2010), referring to the Nigerian context, describe 
the visa application process as a ‘space of abjection and humiliation’. What 
was once the ‘open-endedness’ of hope has to turn into a ‘goal-directed’ 
attitude (Turner 2015), as the individual is supposed to focus on the very 
precise and individual bureaucratic steps to be taken in order to be success-
ful. As already mentioned, traveling requires a wide range of fees to be paid 
and documents to be obtained which are all considered crucial criteria for 
eligibility. These documents—processing fees, return tickets, proof of profes-
sional qualifications and of possession of adequate finances to live abroad 
independently, health certificates, and a clear criminal record—will be pre-
screened by immigration officers working at the consulate. ‘The mobile sub-
ject is configured by the receiving state in terms of health, wealth, labor/ 
leisure, and risk’ writes Mark Salter (2006, 176) in his reflection on the 
intersection between border regimes and the individual in the moment of 
visa application. He underlines the crucial meaning of confession, i.e., the 
applicant’s ability to narratively fit into the conceptual schema of migration 
managers who pre-screen the individual’s body and characteristics before 
giving (or rejecting) admission.
Would-be-migrants are fully aware of the fact that their papers need to be
perfectly complete, but that even this still does not guarantee actual access to a
visa.A person who has managed to assemble and fill out the appropriate forms
and hand them in at the consulate has to wait for the case to be processed and to
receive an invitation to a personal interview. In Cape Verde, this period until ‘a 
chamada’ (‘the call’) can last several months or even longer, during which time
the visa applicant has to cope with feelings of uncertainty and fears of failure.
It was during this phase of her own visa application that Emilia informed me
about her ‘double hope’. After the short encounter together with her friends,
I contacted her again, curious about her particular story and her most recent
efforts to migrate. Once more she began the conversation by stating how opti-
mistic she was that this time she would be granted a “non-immigrant visitor’s
visa” to the United States.Then she talked about the different types of visa and
the sorts of people who, according to her, are usually granted them:
It’s not easy to go abroad if you don’t have much to offer. To provide 
you with a visa, they want you to have ‘strong ties’, you need to be 
well connected to your home country. They want to be sure that you 
won’t stay over there and they want to see this on paper. They want a 
good work contract, or a full bank account, material things, a house— 
everything which can prove that you will certainly return. This kind of 
proof is difficult for young people, who do not have much to offer, you 
can imagine. I don’t have a house or a big car. But I have my baby [She 
touched her belly with a smile].
According to Emilia’s interpretation of the U.S. Embassy’s visa regulations,6 
a mother of a young child is considered to return more willingly than a 
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person without the intimate ties that would bind him or her to the country 
of origin. This is why she speaks of a duplication of hope: Emilia expects not 
only her first child, but also to increase her visa eligibility through this key 
biographical shift, which would transform her personal status and enhance 
her chances considerably. Interestingly, during my stay in Cape Verde, this 
nexus between a newborn baby and the probability of a successful visa 
application was confirmed several times. Another woman told me that it 
makes sense if a mother applies for a visa in the early phase of her pregnancy,
as the bureaucratic procedure will take some time and the child should not 
become too old. An older child, she told me, would not be understood as 
forcing a Cape Verdean mother to return within a few weeks. One woman 
tried to translate the perspective of the consulate official for me: 
They want to know the reasons, good reasons for our return. It is 
important for them that we do not stay when we enter their territory as 
tourists. And these people working here at the embassy, they know that 
a woman, in Cape Verde, wouldn’t hesitate to leave her children behind 
if they are older. Simply having a child is a weak reason for return. But if 
she has a small, a very small baby which remains at home, the mother is 
expected to return within a couple of weeks. The people at the embassy 
say that a mother would be too irresponsible if she stayed away. For 
Cape Verdean mothers this is a bit different, but they do not understand.
Both Emilia and this informant connected their reading of migration law to 
an assumed interpretation of their visa claims by ‘them’—i.e., state bureau-
crats, who employ ‘moral categories’ of deservingness when making their 
decisions. Such a bureaucratic interpretation refers to the discretionary pow-
ers of consular officials who are empowered to apply legal regulations in 
order to defend their country’s interests. Several authors have elaborated on 
the ‘culture of suspicion’ (Alpes and Spire 2014) among street-level bureau-
crats who are committed to combating fraud (Griffith 2012; Hoag 2010).
In his work on state power at the U.S.–Mexico border, Josiah Heyman 
(2001, 129) highlights bureaucratic classification as ‘public acts of cognition
of selves and others’ (emphasis in original) and asks ‘how categorical statuses 
attach to people so that they stick: how they are publicly broadcasted, widely 
acknowledged, and internalized into actions’ (2001, 129). He introduces the 
term ‘thought-work’ (131) to describe the perspectives of immigration offi-
cers, who employ conceptual schemas through which abstract regulations 
are translated into the evaluation of specific cases. In his model of ‘classifica-
tory performances’, the decision to admit or reject refers not only to a legal 
superstructure but also to ‘covert classifications’, which serve to classify and 
evaluate an applicant’s moral worth (Heyman 2001, 131).
As the classificatory performances of migration law promise the eligibility 
for cross-border mobility for certain categories of person, people try to make 
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in the paragraph above, who tried to copy the bureaucratic steps under-
taken by his friend in order to uncover the ‘hidden secrets’ of visa applica-
tion, many Cape Verdeans compare their own ‘classificatory features’ with 
other applicants who have been successful or have failed before. Among 
those intending to follow the same path, parallels and similarities are closely 
observed in order to glean the alleged key information. The arbitrariness 
resulting from covert classifications has an impact on the attitude of visa 
applicants, who feel obliged to interpret the officers’ thought processes and 
identify the perfect ‘classificatory void’ into which they might fit.
Obviously, a person’s characteristics—age, financial or employment sta-
tus, social conditions, and situation of dependency—change over the life 
course. Scholars such as Fassin and D’Halluin (2005), Kastner (2010) and 
Ticktin (2006) have examined these classificatory transformations, when 
pregnancies, marriages, personal threat, disease, or other events change a 
person’s eligibility for a visa or citizenship. I discussed Emilia’s peculiar 
idea—that a pregnancy or a newborn baby might facilitate the mother’s visa 
application—with one of the consular officials at the American Embassy in 
Cape Verde’s capital, Praia. She confirmed that many comparable types of 
rumor exist and that she and her colleagues were aware of misunderstand-
ings resulting from the positive admission of a person in a certain ‘category’,
which then is taken as an example to be followed by others. This officer, in 
an interview at the U.S. American Embassy in January 2007, commented: 
The problem is that the characteristics and features of one successful 
case cannot simply be copied. Our decisions rely on a very complex 
assemblage of impressions, forms, individual accounts, additional infor-
mation that the applicant eventually is not aware of. But we can’t change 
this. This can cause unforeseen misunderstandings, as in this case, and 
this is surely unfortunate, but we can’t change this.
In addition to their individual interpretations of covert classifications, visa 
applicants focus on their expected dialogical encounter with a consular offi-
cial. When Emilia repeatedly stated that she does not have ‘much to offer’ 
she revealed a particular understanding of this administrative procedure. As 
an applicant, she tried to learn the rules of the game and submit herself to 
some kind of bargaining situation in which she would have to offer a certain 
value in order to receive admission.
After the longed-for invitation to an interview, hope flourishes again. A 
person who is invited to the consulate tries to learn from other people’s prior 
experiences and invests much time and energy in discussing the appropriate 
dress code, the expected conduct, and the variety of answers from which 
they might chose. Several interviewees told me that they needed to main-
tain a positive attitude and sympathy towards the bureaucrat, in order to 
face the tension of this particular moment. Emilia, who had been invited to 
present herself at the consulate for the first time in her life, was extremely 
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anxious about this event, which she perceived as having an enormous poten-
tial impact on her future. During one of our meetings, she calculated the 
approximate time span between her child’s birth and the interview date and 
said: 
I might have a big belly in this week. If it’s a woman, she might be nice,
she might think that a mother is a good person and needs support. A 
man, if it’s an old man especially, you never know. I think I can handle 
the situation. But I am very nervous; I am even scared, yes, sure.
Imagining ‘the bureaucratic other’s gender and age, and thinking of her or 
him as a person having a humanist attitude or simply ‘a good day’, and his/ 
her space for decision-making, helps would-be migrants to transform the 
yet unknown into a more predictable situation. Several interviewees con-
sidered the applicant’s ability to remain confident and trusting as being cru-
cial to withstanding the pressure of this stressful encounter. Therefore, visa 
applicants also try to measure and eventually adjust the plausibility and 
credibility of their own biographies and migration interests before the real 
encounter with the administration. During my fieldwork, I heard several 
stories about bureaucrats who were known for detecting discrepancies or 
missing information and who had used the personal encounter to demon-
strate their own cleverness. In most of these stories, the migration official is 
imagined as an evil, mistrusting human being who focuses on ‘minor’ errors 
such as misspelled names or the blushing of a candidate.
As several ethnographical studies on encounters in bureaucratic contexts 
have brought to light, both service applicants and officials are obliged to 
negotiate their particular sense of ‘truth’ or ‘honesty’ and handle impressions 
of uncertainty, contradiction, and disagreement (Fassin and d’Halluin 2005; 
Griffith 2012). Heath Cabot, working in a refugee center on the EU border 
of Greece, concentrates on the limited forms of agency emerging within 
systems of aid and protection: 
[.  .  .] aid candidates and service providers are also deeply engaged in 
seeking to respond to and make sense of each other, through highly 
personal, contextualized, and unpredictable sets of encounters. These 
intersubjective dynamics and the social aesthetics through which they 
unfold reflect, invoke, but also sometimes undermine normative frame-
works of assessment.
(Cabot 2013, 453) 
In this phase of the process, the applicant’s ability to believe in the positive 
outcome of the process of visa application not only depends on bureau-
cratic facts but is once more nourished by multiple aspects ranging from the 
moral backing of friends and relatives to the capacity to organize the formal 
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bureaucrat, and the will to repeatedly overcome structural barriers. What 
becomes obvious here is the fact that not only is hope a social resource, but 
that institutions—such as states’ visa regimes, and also consulates and other 
kinds of migration broker—foster and distribute hope as a crucial resource.
At certain moments, the moral support necessary to persevere even needs
to be activated through ‘external’, i.e., transcendent, spheres. On the day on
which Emilia had packed her bag to travel to Praia and to present herself at
the consulate, she sat uneasily in her kitchen, sipping her tea and listening to
her father’s seemingly endless advice. Then one of her mother’s good friends
entered and passed her a small picture of the Virgin Mary, which she suggested
that Emilia should carry on her way. In Cape Verde, offering a blessing on
the day of a traveler’s departure is a typical way of expressing solidarity and
empathy in precarious moments, when hope runs the risk of losing its strength.
An Open Ending: When Hope Travels Abroad 
In this chapter I have elaborated on the uneven and bumpy trajectories of visa 
applications and the hopes that accompany or fuel this process. Comparing 
the cases of Emily, Mauricio, and Laura, three young Cape Verdeans who 
shared similar visions at a certain point in their common lifetime but who 
experienced different outcomes, I have tried to show that the confidence an 
applicant feels in obtaining a positive outcome to her or his migration plan 
usually passes through changing conditions and experiences. Referring to 
Phillip Mar’s suggestion that we understand hope as a method for approach-
ing processes of knowledge formation, I isolated three socio-cultural dimen-
sions through which hope is generated.
First, those aspiring to migrate depend on  social networks, which support 
their transition from aspiration to realization. This personal backing differs 
according to the key characteristics of the would-be migrant, i.e., his or 
her gender, age, income, or profession as well as the individual capacity to 
prevail. Within social networks, hope can remain at a utopian, open-ended 
level. Among the three individuals, Mauricio is an example of a person 
whose hope never managed to transcend the social dimensions. In contrast 
to his stagnating position, would-be migrants have to turn their hope into 
a ‘goal-centered’, more individual way of longing, and of being successful 
in visa applications. In this phase, the moral, financial, and organizational 
support provided by relatives and friends is crucial in reaching the second 
dimension, namely the  organization of knowledge: Putting things into prac-
tice requires accessing the requisite information, organizing papers such as 
passports and visas, and filling in forms (in the correct way), as well as 
gaining advance knowledge about the personal encounter at the embassy— 
necessary in order to resist frustrations and overcome formal obstacles.
Emilia, who understood her pregnancy as a key moment enabling her to 
eventually be granted a tourist visa, found herself in just this particular open 
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applications offers the necessary space for imagining the ‘fit’ between a per-
son’s own classificatory category and the visa requirements. Those aspiring 
to migrate need to understand the inner social logics and bureaucratic per-
formances of visa application, and to face the imagined ‘covert spheres’ in 
the minds of the ‘bureaucratic other’ through an optimistic, sympathetic atti-
tude. This institutional dimension of hope was accessed by Laura, the third 
individual presented in this chapter, who was able to rely on a particularly 
stable social network, which provided her with the information necessary to 
interpret these bureaucratic encounters appropriately.
According to my interpretation, the ability to learn, adapt, and achieve 
one’s aims not only depends on individual skills, capacities, or resources, but 
also needs to be understood as a collective and affective process, as an atti-
tude fostered not only in social networks, but also through institutions that 
‘govern through hope’ (Turner 2015). As a continuous outcome of social 
mediation, hope binds together the visions, emotions, and actions of multiple 
actors, who contribute actively to an open and contingent migration-related 
livelihood. I finally want to point out that my clear chronological distinc-
tion between these three dimensions does not necessarily correspond to the 
empirical facts. Hope does not accompany the visa application process in 
a clear-cut and linear way but, rather, as Kleist also mentioned in the intro-
duction to this volume, it has an elastic quality, moving back and forth,
shrinking and prospering in irregular curves between societal, social, and 
individual phases of hoping.
These collective, institutional, and affective dimensions of hope do not 
end at the border. Visa applicants who have successfully negotiated this long 
trajectory of interpretation, networking, submission, dialogue, and trust,
who have acquired a visa and managed to transform themselves into inter-
national beings, will again be accompanied by the hope of others who stay 
behind. Through staying in touch, calling, sending remittances, or visiting,
migrants provide the imaginative space for hope to prosper among those 
who intend to leave their country of origin sooner or later. Migrants not 
only serve as projection screens, but are also expected to act as informants,
supporters, and sponsors, in order that others can persevere on the long 
trajectory of hope which is the visa application process.
However, after gaining access to cross-border mobility and reaching those 
longed-for places abroad, many migrants realize the consequences of an often 
‘liminal legality’ (Menjívar 2006). Depending on their conditions of entry and 
residency, many have to understand their personal capacity to stabilize their 
lives and to accept how much their particular legal status affects their right 
to political and economic participation, their position within their personal 
networks, and their contacts with family members left behind. Some also 
have to carefully balance their contact with bureaucratic structures and state 
representatives and interpret the limiting body of the law, which impinges 
on the vital parts of their private lives. Finally, migrants have to accept that 
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during which the ability to persevere is crucial, not only for themselves, but 
for everyone projecting their hopes onto their successful trajectories.
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Notes 
1. All personal names have been anonymized by being replaced by common Cape 
Verdean names in order to protect the individual’s identity.
2. Emilia used the creole version of the English term here.
3. Interviews in this article have been translated from either Portuguese or Cape 
Verdean  kriolu to English.
4. Due to bilateral agreements and their membership of the Comunidade Económica 
dos Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO), Cape Verdeans can travel without a 
visa to a relatively large number of African countries. However, as the living con-
ditions in Cape Verde are generally considered better on the islands, these routes 
are mainly used by traders and other types of business people.
5. For Cape Verdeans, the legal conditions for international travel have changed 
constantly in the course of history, depending on the relevant political regimes,
types of destination, and the kinds of traveller. For good overviews, see Góis 
(2006); Halter (1993); Sánchez (1998).
6. The respective paragraph can be found on the website of the American Embassy: 
‘US law requires that your eligibility for a non-immigrant visitor’s visa be deter-
mined on the basis of strong, well-established ties to a residence outside the United 
States, as well as on the basis of reasonable, credible plans for your visit to the 
United States’, http://praia.usembassy.gov/non-immigrant_visas.html, accessed 
13 September 2015.
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3 Sticking to God 
Brokers of Hope in Senegalese 
Migration to Argentina 
Ida Marie Vammen 
Introduction 
In recent years it has become exceedingly difficult for African migrants to 
enter the European Union. The EU and its member-states have made fur-
ther restrictions on national asylum and migration policies and have de 
facto outsourced its border control by establishing agreements with transit 
migration countries in Africa. This development and the economic recession 
have together limited the possibilities for successful migration to Europe.
For African migrants who, despite the odds, do manage to enter Europe,
life often becomes a struggle at the margins of society (Jackson 2013; Lucht 
2011; Vigh 2009).
Concurrently, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, Argentina has 
emerged as a destination for West African migrants, especially since the 
middle of the 2000s. Argentina is a country with no former colonial ties, or 
direct diplomatic or socio-economic links to West Africa. When the oppor-
tunities to enter Europe are reduced, it seems that hope for a better future is 
redirected towards new destinations and emerging economies in the Global 
South (see, for example, Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2009; Haugen 2012; 
Pelican and Tatah 2009). The current political landscape in Latin Amer-
ica appears to give migrants more leeway. The Argentinian state has, for 
example, introduced new liberal initiatives that depart from restricted and 
securitized European and North American immigration models by introduc-
ing reforms that highlight, inter alia, the protection of migrants’ universal 
human rights (Ceriani 2011; Freier 2013).
In this chapter, I examine a regularization program for undocumented 
migrants in Argentina, implemented at the beginning of 2013, in order to 
explore how the affected group of migrants perceived the opportunity to 
transcend their irregular status and the process of law-making. By focusing 
on this event, I seek to show how hope is shaped and reworked among 
Senegalese migrants in Argentina. I focus particularly on the role of what I 
refer to as ‘brokers of hope’ in this process. Theoretically, I argue that hope,
as an analytical lens for migrant mobility, can capture phenomenological 
aspects of how imaginaries frame and affect livelihood strategies, mobility,
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subjective expressions of hope by drawing our attention to how visions of 
hope are linked and shaped by political, economic, and other social domains.
Empirically, the chapter draws on a total of eight months of fieldwork 
in Argentina and Senegal. The main part of the fieldwork was conducted 
from November 2012 to May 2013. I followed a group of male and female 
hawkers from different parts of Senegal, mainly in two areas of Buenos 
Aires: Once, a commercial zone with a high density of informal hawkers,
and Retiro train and bus station. During those seven months I carried out 
participant observation and interviews with the Senegalese migrants and the 
people who formed part of their everyday life. I also interviewed the Senega-
lese diaspora association, NGOs, and lawyers working on migrants’ rights 
in Argentina, and the Argentinian migration authorities. In April 2014, over 
the course of three weeks, I conducted interviews with family members 
of nine migrants whom I knew from Buenos Aires in the towns of Dakar,
Mboro, Tivaouane, Gay, Thiés, Touba, Mbacke, and M’bour. I also inter-
viewed Senegalese migration scholars and officials at the Brazilian Embassy 
in Dakar. Apart from spending time with the migrants and their families, I 
have kept in regular contact with key informants on Skype and Facebook 
since my return to Denmark.
Brokerage in the Political Economy of Hope 
In this chapter I narrow my analytical gaze on hope. In so doing, it is not 
my intent to disregard the structural constraints that shape migrants’ tra-
jectories. Rather, I want both to direct our attention to how hope is part of 
the political economy in Argentina and to use this analytical lens to try to 
understand how the migrants I met in Argentina, often to my amazement,
kept pushing forward and creating new alternatives when faced with con-
straints. Hope was not a passive activity of waiting for a better tomorrow; it 
was an active stance that seemed to expand their ways of orientating them-
selves and acting in the world. I am particularly interested in exploring the 
role of alternative horizons of experiences and logics—in this case religious 
ones—which, in my case, played an important role in this process.
To further anchor the concept of hope theoretically, I draw on the late 
German philosopher Ernst Bloch and his major work on hope to try to 
grasp the individual’s capacity to push forward in adverse circumstances. I 
also draw on the ideas of the Lebanese-Australian anthropologist Ghassan 
Hage regarding the capacity of states to distribute hope in society. Instead 
of seeing their work as contradictory, I want to use them as two comple-
mentary lenses. Where Bloch’s perspective of hope can provide us with an 
understanding of how hope as affect and emotion directs the migrant, Hage 
shows how hope is part of a political economy, where it becomes a capital 
form that can be distributed unevenly in society.
For Bloch (1986), hope is embedded in concrete historical conditions and 
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the latency of the world as it is unfolding in the ‘not yet’ and in the capac-
ity to think differently about what is possible. Hope does not dwell on the 
already existing but is a future-orientated attitude (Bloch 1998 in Miyazaki 
2004, 69). Bloch’s interpretation of hope seems, at times, to be an almost 
mystical force that makes a human being able to transcend the often brutal 
facts of everyday life and gloomy prospects for the future.
In The Principle of Hope (1986), Bloch’s starting point is the subjective 
experience of dissatisfaction and lack and the drive to fill this void. Hope 
is not only linked to escapism and daydreams but also to tendencies in 
the material world which emerge from time to time. It can be a rebellious 
hope that is provocative in its non-acceptance and discontentment with 
negative circumstances. It is a hope that does not accept renunciation and 
is not confined to individual ponder but can be learned and is teachable.
Bloch (1986, 3) describes hope as: 
. . . in love with success rather than failure. Hope, superior to fear, is 
neither passive like the latter, nor locked in nothingness. The emotion 
of hope goes out of itself and makes people broad instead of confining 
them.
Wishing for something better is what Bloch calls a ‘driving method’. The 
more vividly the goal is imagined, the stronger the wanting is or, in other 
words, the active process of going towards the goal.This may lead us to think 
that hope is a kind of over-confidence in the positive nature of the future.
However, what has not yet become manifest is projecting neither the posi-
tive nor the negative but holding the latent state of a momentum of change.
Disappointment is thus enclosed in hope because hope has not yet been 
defeated—even though it has not yet won either (Bloch 1998 in Miyazaki 
2004, 69). Hope in a Blochian sense can thus, as Hirokazu Miyazaki (2006,
157) has emphasized, be seen as a social method or practice, as a way of 
reimagining the present from the perspective of the end. So, for Bloch, hope 
is not leading to passivity or resignation but is linked to action.
Bloch’s perspective on hope can guide our understanding of the ways in 
which the migrants experience and practice hope but, as mentioned above,
to complement this perspective I link the concept of hope to tendencies in the 
political economy. Ghassan Hage (2003) explores this aspect in his analysis 
of how societal hope within late capitalism is distributed in the political 
economy. He starts at a different scale to Bloch’s more existential outset by 
emphasizing that 
. . . societies are mechanisms for the distribution of hope, and that the 
kind of affective attachment (worrying and caring) that a society creates 
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The distribution of hope is linked to the distribution of social being and 
Hage, here, draws on Bourdieu’s notion of capital in that hope, like any 
other capital form, is not evenly distributed within a given social field (inter-
view with Ghassan Hage in Zournazi 2002). One example of this is the rise 
of a neo-liberal economic policy agenda that has led Western nation-states 
to fail in infusing hopefulness and social opportunities in their citizens, con-
sequently leading to a societal crisis. Societies thus become limited in their 
capacity to distribute hope to all the subjects within their territory and there-
fore exclude weak groups like refugees or migrants from hope.
I use these theoretical perspectives to explore how hope is distributed 
by the Argentinian state, and, at the meso level, how hope is brokered for 
migrants. In this regard I introduce the concept of ‘brokers of hope’ to try to 
capture how different actors, both political and religious, become interme-
diaries in the migrants’ future-making in Argentina. ‘Brokers of hope’, like 
‘regular brokers’ in the migration industry, play a vital role in the migration 
process by shaping alternative and viable routes of potentiality when other 
options seem closed, out of reach, or simply not worth investing in. The 
concept illuminates the unfolding of things from a meso-level perspective 
and thus sheds light on how brokerage is entangled in both macro-political 
ambitions and in the aspiration of the individual migrants. Hope brokers 
thus mediate the ongoing exploration of possibilities for further mobility 
and economic gain that characterize many of the Senegalese migrants’ tra-
jectories in Argentina and beyond.
Brokers, connection- or middlemen are not, of course, novel characters in 
the migration literature. In the recent literature on the migration industry,
they are characterized as part of the parcel of actors who facilitate migrants’
mobility in licit or illicit ways through a range of services (Gammeltoft-Hansen 
and Sørensen 2013; Spaan and Hillmann 2013). Such brokers can form part 
of the informal sector that acts between the state and the migrant (Alpes 
2013) and often circumvent the legal barriers that hinder mobility. Migrants’ 
dependency on migration brokers seems to increase as legal migration 
becomes more curbed and securitized (see, for example, Lucht 2011). Yet 
the literature often tends to overlook the imaginary potential of these actors.
They not only have the ability to broker documents or facilitate travels from 
A to B for economic gain but also, I argue, broker hope by producing ideas 
of potential futures that drive migrants’ trajectories beyond structural con-
straints. To analytically proceed beyond the individual migrant’s aspirations,
we need to include those who partake in both distributing, shaping, and 
brokering hope in the migration process. I define a broker of hope as one 
who, through the act of brokerage, negotiates, sustains, directs, and, in some 
cases, governs people’s hope. With this definition, the scope of the actors 
involved becomes more multifaceted and not merely linked to concrete licit 
or illicit remedies to facilitate mobility. Depending on the given context,
other actors such as religious leaders, migrants, family members, diaspora 
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Brokers are part and parcel of the creative ways in which migrants try to 
build momentum by manipulating and keeping their options open through 
some form of intermediary agent. They are thus a key to our understanding 
of the migration process and the way in which migrants perceive their possi-
bilities for mobility in a world characterized by uneven and restricted access 
to social and physical mobility (Carling 2002; Ferguson 2008).
The following analysis of the regularization program shows how different 
actors are involved in the process of hope brokerage. To understand not only 
who it is who brokers hope for the migrants but also the power struggles 
involved, I focus on the exchange and expectations involved in the process.
The case will show that the transaction between the migrant and the broker 
of hope is not an economic one but resembles the logics of gift-giving. To 
explore this process further I draw on Marcel Mauss’s ([1954]2002) classi-
cal work on the gift.
Brokering Societal Hope in the Argentinian Political System 
At the beginning of January 2013, the area around Retiro, one of the busiest 
railway and bus stations in Buenos Aires, was transformed. Standing out 
from the thousands of daily passengers in transit, Senegalese migrants— 
many in their best clothes, carrying briefcases and paper folders—became 
visible in the crowds. A Congolese refugee commented with thick irony in 
his voice ‘If you didn’t know better, you would think that they were on their 
way to a formal job interview’, referring to the unlikely event that an African 
migrant in Argentina would get the opportunity to work at a white-collar 
job. But it was not job openings that made the Senegalese migrants pass 
through the station, it was the opportunity of entering into a temporary reg-
ularization program for undocumented Senegalese nationals in Argentina.1 
Many stopped to ask directions from their compatriots who, like most Sen-
egalese men and women in Buenos Aires, were selling all kinds of  bijouterie, 
imitations of popular designer watches, wallets, and leather belts. They 
formed part of the large informal economy of hawkers, an economic activity 
they shared with other migrants from neighboring countries and Argentin-
ian nationals. After having exchanged the formal respectful handshake and 
greetings, asking about the well-being of family members and the latest news 
from Senegal, they were directed towards the old harbor, where the office 
of the migration authorities is located in a large white building. More than 
a century ago, the same premises were used as an immigrant asylum for the 
large number of European migrants who had crossed the Atlantic Ocean in 
search of greener pastures.
The regularization program was the culmination of long and persistent 
negotiations between the Argentinian authorities, the Senegalese diaspora 
organizations, and Argentinian human-rights lawyers and NGOs. They had 
used the liberal framework of the national migration policy for migrants 
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Pacecca and Courtis 2008), to push for similar rights for non-MercoSur 
migrants in Argentina. The final regularization program was not the initial 
solution to the irregular situation of the Senegalese migrants in Argentina.
To create a more durable solution, different scenarios had been discussed.
Among these the diaspora organization had lobbied for a bilateral agree-
ment between Senegal and Argentina. The NGOs had tried to include all 
non-MercoSur migrants in the program but without success. In the end the 
special initiative was directed only at Senegalese and Dominican migrants 
because the authorities reasoned that they belonged to a category of partic-
ularly precarious and vulnerable migrants.
Despite the fact that it was not an ideal solution, Abba Goudiaby, the 
president of the Senegalese diaspora association, was very content when 
I met him one hot afternoon at the end of January 2013. ‘It is the biggest 
victory in our history and the result of years of negotiations. This would not 
happen in Europe today and especially not for African migrants’, he told 
me. Solving their undocumented status and securing legal residency for his 
compatriots had been one of the diaspora association’s main priorities. He 
explained that, although the liberty of an undocumented migrant in Argen-
tinian, to his knowledge, did not exist in any other place, it was of utmost 
importance to secure migrant rights. ‘Argentina is not like the countries in 
Europe where they reject your asylum application and then return you. But 
you never know when a crisis will arrive and they start looking for you and 
deport you’, he explained. The new possibility of modifying the legal status 
of the majority of the Senegalese migrants was a milestone that he hoped 
would not go unnoticed by the Senegalese community in Argentina. They 
might finally recognize the importance of the association and start partici-
pating more actively in its meetings, in which, in general, there was a very 
low level of participation.
Abba and the Argentinian lawyers and NGOs had managed to broker 
societal hope for the undocumented Senegalese (and Dominican) migrants.
They had acted as mediators between the state and the migrants by pushing 
the state to distribute hope in the form of recognition and legal rights. Their 
brokerage had made the authorities launch the program that, at least on 
paper, would give the migrants easier access to formal labor, housing, social 
services, and education, as well as the prospect of obtaining permanent resi-
dency within three years and access to Argentinian citizenship.
In the following section I further explore not only who brokered hope for 
the migrants but also the expectations at play among the different actors 
involved. Brokers in the migration industry most often have an economic 
interest in mind. Yet the form of brokering and the relationship between 
giver and receiver at play in this case appears to be closer to Maussian 
notions of exchange and the three obligations within reciprocity: giving,
receiving, and repaying (Mauss [1954]2002, 50). Consequently, the regular-
ization and the subsequent access to the new National Identity Document 
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migrants in terms of repaying ‘the gift’ of rights or, in other words, the soci-
etal hope which the document seemed to offer.
Reciprocating the ‘Gift of Societal Hope’ 
The actors involved in the creation and launch of the regularization pro-
gram all had different expectations of some kind of reciprocity. As indicated 
above, the diaspora association hoped for reciprocity in the form of recog-
nition, leading the Senegalese migrants to value the association and engage 
more actively in its meetings and work. Yet the state had different expecta-
tions of reciprocity for their act of distributing hope.
A few days after the program was launched, Martin Duval, the director of 
the Argentinian migration authorities, appeared on national television CN23.
He explained that the program was part of a political aim of granting peo-
ple access to rights, presented as a win–win scenario. The new DNI would 
allow the migrants to access their rights and step out from the shadows of 
society. He also presented the program as a remedy against the trafficking of 
migrants (with special reference to Dominican migrants who were perceived 
as being trafficked to work in the sex industry). The state, on the other hand,
benefited from knowing the people living on Argentinian territory—a pre-
requisite for planning and realizing any public policy. Concerning the reason 
why the Senegalese migrants had gained this opportunity, Duval commented: 
The Senegalese community has integrated very well in our society. It is 
very tranquil and peaceful and there have been no cases of Senegalese or 
Senegalese organizations involved in criminal activities. The state had to 
come up with a solution. Their deeds have shown that these people have 
the will to stay in our country and do not want to return.
(Interview 17 January 2013, CN23, my translation) 
In sum the official narrative presented an image of a responsible and respon-
sive state that cared for its people, especially migrants in a vulnerable sit-
uation and those showing good character and moral behavior. The hope 
distributed to the migrants can be characterized, in the way it cares and 
worries about them, as a form of societal hope (Hage 2003). The govern-
ment had been pushed to distribute this hope and used the rhetoric of affec-
tive attachment to justify its actions. Thus, the moral configurations (Fassin 
2011) emphasized by the state were, in the Senegalese case, one of empathy 
and a caring relationship to the good well-behaved subjects.
Interestingly, this societal hope seemed to both open up new possibili-
ties and also to confine the migrants. While granting formal access to legal 
and social rights, as well as legal mobility within the MercoSur Zone, the 
regularization program also subjected them to new forms of responsibil-
ity towards the state. It was, for example, a prerequisite for obtaining the 
DNI that one had to be monotributista (a person working on his/her own 























Sticking to God: Brokers of Hope 47 
account, or freelance). As monotributistas, the migrants would have to pay a 
fixed monthly tax and a small amount for their pension and social services,
all in all around 300 pesos—approximately 45 euros a month. If the migrant 
failed to pay this fee, he/she could lose their right to residency upon renewal.
Thus, the gift not only contained the value of the document and the sub-
sequent rights but came with the obligation of being part of the order and 
logics of the Argentinian state-governed system of benefits and taxes. The 
‘gift’ was, in that sense, not free but had a ‘burden attached’ for the receiver 
(Mauss [1954]2002, 53).
The Senegalese migrants I talked to were very well aware that the doc-
uments came with obligations.3 However, they saw little reason why they 
should invest in securing themselves a future in a country where they, in 
sharp contrast to Duval’s expectation, did not expect to reside for a long 
period of time. They accepted the gift but did not seem interested in recipro-
cating it through investing in their future in Argentina, and they were reluc-
tant to subordinate themselves to the state logic of reciprocity. Nor did they 
seem interested in becoming active members of the diaspora association,
despite the fact that some of the migrants actually recognized the associa-
tion’s efforts. Using Bourdieu’s metaphor of the game, they seemed disinter-
ested in partaking in the illusio or game involved, partly because it offered 
very few probabilities for fulfilling their expectations for the future (Bour-
dieu 2000). In order to further explain their ambivalence towards the state 
and the brokerage of the diaspora association, the following two sections 
first describe some of the structural constraints that shaped the migrants’ 
expectations and, second, explore the alternative and unofficial account of 
how the regularization came into being. As we shall see, a radically different 
description flourished on the streets of Buenos Aires, a version where power 
relations were flipped upside down and the role of the state and the diaspora 
association were almost neglected.
‘It Will Not Change a Thing’: Contextualizing the Document 
Despite the fact that the migrants chose to enroll in the regularization pro-
gram, many, to my initial surprise, seemed almost indifferent about their 
new status. Abdoulaye, a man in his late twenties, explained: ‘The document 
will not make a difference. You can’t send money home with this document; 
it will not change a thing’. Or, in the words of Alla, a Senegalese street 
hawker selling next to Abdoulaye: ‘Right now things are very complicated 
here. The document will not change much, even the Argentinians here are 
poor like us’. Alla and Abdoulaye pointed to the fact that life as a migrant 
in Argentina was, indeed, complicated. A number of structural barriers and 
contingencies that influenced their everyday life were not about to vanish 
with the introduction of a new document.
With very few exceptions, the migrants I talked to had come to Argen-
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Argentinian reality. They had expected much more. Migration brokers in Sen-
egal not only facilitated visa applications but also planted the ideation of a
new destination. In Senegal, in the region of Thiés, a  marabout who ‘facilitated’
young men’s travel to Latin America explained that ‘getting people success-
fully to Europe is too difficult these days. I don’t offer people that anymore.
Today it is all about Latin America, where people can make something of
themselves’. In a similar vein, migrants told me about the stories of successful
migration they had heard in Senegal before embarking on their own journey.
The imaginary playing field seemed vast and uncontested, as only a few bits
of news about migrants in Latin America reached Senegal. One example was
the stories of the heydays when the Argentinian  peso was one to one with the
U.S. dollar. Many considered it recent history—an epoch they just had missed.
In those days you could easily earn money and help the family, they claimed.
‘People could construct a house at home (in Senegal) after only a year in
Argentina’, one woman told me. However, in reality such narratives referred
back to a period where there were only very few pioneer migrants from Sen-
egal in Argentina. The ‘uno a uno’ monetary regime collapsed at the end of
the year 2000 and was followed by a profound economic and political crisis.
Despite the fact that the current economic context was more stable, it was still
marked by flux and inflation. In other words, it was far from the long-awaited
favorable exchange between peso and CFA-franc for which many had hoped.
Another cause of disillusionment was the limited access to the formal 
labor market. Many of the young men had come to Argentina to find ‘proper’ 
work in construction or the agricultural sector. However, other migrants 
from neighboring countries already occupied these sectors and had the 
advantage of being proficient Spanish-speakers in comparison to the mostly 
Wolof-speaking Senegalese migrants. Consequently, most of these latter 
ended up hawking in the street, forming part of the large informal economy 
that characterizes the Argentinian labor market (Maurizio 2012).4 
Despite the fact that the migrants saw hawking as a fast and fairly easy 
way to start generating an income in Argentina, it was not without dif-
ficulties. Depending on the area, most vendors gave some sort of weekly 
bribe to the local police officer to ease their mutual relationship. Yet, from 
time to time, the police would confiscate the migrants’ goods and chase 
them around the city. There were also more alarming cases, where the police 
entered migrants’ houses, claiming to look for drugs, and then ‘confiscated’ 
all items of value. Another immediate risk to migrants’ livelihoods was the 
efforts by the autonomous government of Buenos Aires to clean the city of 
hawkers. Hawkers were seen as a threat to small-scale shop-owners and as 
‘matter out of place’ that filled up and blocked the pavements in many areas 
of Buenos Aires. In sum, a range of structural barriers hindered the migrants’ 
efforts to secure a stable income, obstacles that would not be alleviated by 
the granting of a new legal status.
Another pertinent issue was the quasi-impossibility of sending remit-
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fulfillment of their migration project to be able to remit money cheaply 
and easily to their families in Senegal. Yet, the Argentine government had 
put restrictions on such transactions through a series of measures designed 
to avoid capital flight. To obstruct the efforts of upper-class Argentinians 
to secure their wealth by exchanging U.S. dollars and placing their savings 
abroad, the government put a number of limitations on access to foreign 
currency and the possibility of remitting money. While these initiatives were 
targeted towards the domestic upper and middle classes, they had a signif-
icant impact on the migrants, who had to go to a Peruvian remittance firm 
charging very high commission rates and similarly low exchange rates. The 
migrants, as well as the Argentinians, were troubled by the decreasing value 
of the Argentinean  peso. For those remitting money to their families in Sen-
egal, it was a question of how much money would reach their pockets in 
the end. One of my interlocutors, a woman from Casamance, told me that 
‘The peso is like a fart; you can only smell it for a very short while and its 
smell often can’t reach Senegal’. This unpredictable economic situation was 
holding migrants back and making it almost impossible for them to gain 
momentum, and many therefore considered going elsewhere or moving back 
to Senegal.
Exploring new possibilities in new territories was one thing that the DNI 
document could facilitate because it allowed for mobility within the Mer-
coSur Zone and facilitated legal mobility between Argentina and Senegal.
Mustafa, a young man from Thiés, was dreaming of going to Brazil or even 
to the United States. ‘There is nothing here, I came with the promise that 
there was something and there is nothing. People tell me that you can get a 
proper job in Brazil and that they have a much stronger economy’, he told 
me. The promises of onward migration to Brazil were repeated again and 
again among the street hawkers, building up a collective hope that things 
might be different in another geographical context. The new document and 
their expectations of what the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic 
Games in 2016 could generate in the way of commerce and other possibili-
ties seemed to inspire onward migration.
Migrants in Brazil or people who circulated between the two countries 
thus also brokered hope, connecting the new document more with its capac-
ity to facilitate legal mobility than rights in Argentina. It offered them the 
opportunity to explore new possibilities and find a place where their live-
lihood might be less uncertain. However, Senegalese migrants showed little 
interest in becoming long-term settlers and forming a citizen-like relation-
ship with the Argentinian state. Mauss emphasizes that the act of accepting 
a gift is a way of forming a social relationship and committing oneself to the 
giver (Mauss [1954]2002). But why should the migrants form such a social 
relationship if the gift exchanged had very little value? Due to the gravity 
of the structural barriers, the migrants did not acknowledge the potentiality 
and value of the gift, as it was not transformative for their current situation.
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legal papers did not alter the daily challenges on the ground. Hence, why 
should they form a committed relationship to the giver if the gift failed to 
infuse any substantial societal hope, other than facilitating onward spatial 
mobility? To trigger the dynamics of obligation between the giver and the 
recipient, the gift needs to be considered of value. Hence, the diaspora asso-
ciation’s act of brokering hope was acknowledged but not valued.
The above analysis has shown the importance not only of paying atten-
tion to how states distribute hope and to whom but also of following how 
the affected groups respond to such gestures. The next section demonstrates 
that the societal hope distributed by the Argentinian state was disenchanting 
in a Weberian sense. The hope and transformation which the document cre-
ated did not stem from the state but was embedded in a religious horizon. I 
will show that the migrants’ reluctance can also be explained by the fact that 
many perceived the ‘victory’ of the regularization process to be caused by a 
figure outside the Argentinian political system. As we shall see, the ‘gift’ had 
a much greater impact in infusing hope in the migrants from this perspective.
Carving the Future by Committing to a Spiritual 
Master and a Moral Practice 
For many migrants, the real broker of hope was a particular spiritual master,
rather than the state or the diaspora association. Unofficial versions of how 
the new regularization came into being flourished on the streets. I heard on 
several occasions that the community’s good fortune was closely linked to 
the migrants’ collective behavior and moral conduct as good Muslims. More 
importantly, it was through the powers and blessings of a visiting  marabout
that the program came into being, I was told. Thus the  marabout, not the 
diaspora association, was seen as the broker of hope. As a friend of God, he 
could untie the knots of hindrances on the migrants’ path and was a man 
with a special visual faculty—he could see into the future. In other words he 
could, through God, make divinations of the future and manipulate it to the 
migrants’ advantage. He was known as a man who had a talent for solving 
document issues and, on his previous visit the year before, he had offered up 
special prayers for a solution to the migrants’ irregular situation in Argen-
tina. On this occasion he had emphasized that his prayers alone could not 
do it. The community’s fortune would also be determined by their correct 
moral behavior and he had urged them to be peaceful law-abiding subjects 
comporting themselves as good Muslims. In other words, the legal barrier 
that the migrants faced would only be overcome through commitment to 
their faith.
Such alternative supra-legal accounts are authoritative in their own man-
ner. They show how agency and future-making are perceived by some of 
the migrants in Argentina. This alternative version of the birth of the regu-
larization program re-worked and overturned the power relation between 
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the religious sphere, it was not political actors, at least not directly, who had 
facilitated change. Rather change came from God through the brokering 
of the marabout (through his clairvoyance and ritual action) on the com-
munity’s behalf, in conjuncture with the migrants’ moral practice. In this 
shift of agency, the gift was also seen in a different light. From being a gift 
of societal hope in the form of individual rights it became, apart from the 
actual document, a sign of confirmation that one had the blessings of God 
and was on the right moral path—not only as an individual but also as a 
collective. Rather than the actual potentiality of the document, the whole 
event became a symbol of hope and empowerment for the future. Through 
using the marabout as an intermediary and by practicing good conduct,
the migrant could partially contribute to the carving out of his or her own 
future. The document, in other words, not only solved a problem of legality 
here and now, but also pointed towards a particular way of collective being,
a moral being bestowed with blessings and agency.
The spiritual realm thus offered an enchanted potential hope. It seemed 
to expand the migrants’ world rather than confine it. The anthropologist 
Michael Jackson has eloquently observed that people who do not feel that 
they are offered any hope or care from society withdraw their investment in 
it and seek alternative fields of recognition. In these alternative fields, such 
as religion, marginalized people can find re-enhancement often by looking 
inward and working with themselves (Jackson 2005, xxv). In other words,
investing in and subjecting oneself to religious practices can recreate a sense 
of agency. Yet the unknown nature of life was still present for the migrants 
but became somewhat tamed by engaging with a religious horizon.As Phillip 
Mar emphasizes, ‘. . . on a practical and dispositional level, hope is germane 
to the capacities to wait, to defer, discipline and even transform oneself in 
anticipation of some object that cannot be obtained in the present’ (2005,
365). Reliance on a spiritual guide and proper conduct thus constituted a 
way of disciplining the present towards a future goal, creating a sense of 
direction and hope.
The marabout’s act of brokerage was by no means extraordinary for the 
migrants, but was closely linked to the Senegalese religious–cultural space.
A range of scholars have emphasized the role of religious Murid networks 
and marabouts in the migration process (see, for example, Gemmeke 2013; 
Kane 2011; Riccio 2003). Most migrants regularly consulted  marabouts in 
Senegal to solve and transform the problems they were facing or poten-
tially might encounter, both prior to and after migration. Apart from solving 
problems, the  marabout was also seen as a broker who could carve out the 
pathway to the fulfillment of their desires. Like the transaction between the 
migration broker and the migrant, there was usually an economic exchange 
involved, although many migrants emphasized that it was not an obligation.
The migrant expected some sort of advancement in social, economic, and/ 
or spiritual terms in return for this economic exchange. In other words,
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confirmed the tangibility and strength of a religious path. Yet it also con-
firmed the capacities and powers of this particular marabout. While he was 
in Argentina for a short visit before going to Brazil in 2013, the queue of 
migrants seeking his advice and wanting his blessings was long.
Hence, rather than granting state recognition and legal papers, the regular-
ization program reaffirmed and infused an affective hope of the possibility 
of overcoming hardship through a good relationship with God, a spiritual 
master, and a collective discipline. In the final analytical section I put the 
migrants’ understandings of regularization in perspective by dwelling on 
how their belief in transcendental interference was essential if they were to 
avoid falling into despair under the challenging circumstances in Argentina.
Securing the Future through Endurance 
Issa was 18 years old when he arrived in Argentina from his home town of
Dakar after a failed attempt to get scouted as a football player in Europe.
When I met him, he was trying to navigate between his own ambitions
of making it as a professional footballer in Argentina and his mother’s
expectations that he send home enough money to start a small business
in Senegal. He spent most of his time training in a park where Argentin-
ian (mostly) football players waiting to be discovered played and trained
together. At the same time he had a small stand at the above-mentioned
Retiro train station which he paid a local Argentinian girl to man during
his hours of workout, which cut considerably into his profits. Time was
running out, he was getting older day by day in a context where youth was
crucial to being scouted as the next new football talent. After I returned to
Denmark, we continued our conversations on Facebook and Skype. One
night Issa wrote:
The only error I made in my life was to go to Argentina. Los Latinos
are poor like us. They are good for nothing. I don’t know what we are 
doing here. What we can earn here isn’t worth the trouble. I know it is 
like that all over today—there is nothing. You know what we should do,
we children of Senegal? We should go home to our belovèd country and 
try to earn a proper living there. It is what we ultimately should do but 
nobody is going to do it.
My children will never travel, never. I have the experience now and 
that is what I will teach them. I am here now and it is not easy to go 
back in the state I am in. I am talking about the future. I lost almost three 
years of my life here—I don’t want that to happen to my children or 
anyone I know. Only God knows the way now. Argentina is not a coun-
try for migration, it is the most discriminatory country in the world. I 
would prefer getting deported than to live like this. It is a country that 
doesn’t give work to foreigners and does not let us send money home. It 
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In times like this, the sacrifice that Issa was willing to make seemed frag-
mented from the expected renewal and transformation (Jackson 2013). It 
made him question his migration to Argentina and, with that, his current 
existence and identity as a migrant. Time was not leading to progress but,
rather, was wasted and alienated him further from who he was striving to 
become. Argentina was not turning out to be a place for migration or cher-
cher la fortune; rather, spatial mobility had robbed Issa of precious years 
of his life instead of enhancing it. Like Guinean migrants in Lisbon, the 
realization that it ‘was the same shit in a different continent’ (Vigh 2009,
104) created a sense of disillusion and despair. The feeling of being stuck in 
a disadvantaged position, robbed of the possibilities of transcendence, made 
it clear for Issa that he could not look for a life in Argentina. Like Senegal,
the country was placed at the periphery of economic development. In his dis-
illusion the only remedy for overcoming despair and renew the directionality 
in his life was through relying on God. In  Sickness until Death, Kierkegaard 
observed in a Christian context that it only becomes possible to ‘embrace 
despair as the passageway to faith’ and thus overcome the contingencies 
of the self through a reorientation of the self towards God ([1849]1941,
74 – 75) . In his having faith and surrendering to God, we can thus see Issa’s 
struggle as a way to regain a form of intermediated agency and resume the 
potentiality of hope. Whereas Issa turned to God for comfort and hope, he 
also embraced his ‘belovèd country’ as the ultimate possible arena for social 
becoming for himself, his compatriots, and the future generations embodied 
in his unborn children. Although being stuck physically in mobility without 
the possibility of returning home, Issa’s imagination was not stuck. Hope 
traveled in the sense that he was projecting a future where migration and 
the sacrifices that come with it were not the answer for future generations.
The realization that Argentina was not an arena for social transforma-
tions was shared by many of the other Senegalese migrants I talked to there.
One of them was my close interviewee Abdou who, despite his efforts over 
the previous three years, had not been able to realize his dream of returning 
home with enough money to settle down with his young wife and set up a 
solid business. Nevertheless, despite what appeared to be a state of stagna-
tion, Abdou appeared optimistic and calm.
They say money is the key to the world. I don’t have that kind of money 
yet but I know tomorrow will be better. Not tomorrow like this Monday 
or the next day. But I have a strong faith that tomorrow will be better,
I just know it. As long as I live a good life and don’t do bad things, I 
know that, sooner or later, God will recognize my actions. It is like an 
investment—sooner or later it has to pay off. If not now, then in Paradise.
The certainty of knowing that he could become closer to God’s blessings 
through his patient hope and practice reassured him again and again that 
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Abdou was not passive in his waiting but faithfully set up his small stand with 
sunglasses and watches every day and stayed there until late before packing 
up. Every day, seven days a week, except for when it was raining or the police 
or the municipality obstructed the hawkers’ work. Like Issa, he turned to 
God. It is agency through the act of surrendering to an all-compassing cos-
mology of reward through hard work, morality, and submission that charac-
terizes Murid practice (Cruise O’Brian 1971; Kane 2011). By refocusing his 
efforts on working on his inner state, rather than on the chaotic outer reality,
Abdou seemed to regain a sense of control. If he did what he was supposed to,
it was just a question of endurance and patience before God would recipro-
cate his actions. During the time between the action and the awaited reward,
the migrants often said: ‘Hay que aguantar’—‘One must endure’. They were 
enduring their lives in Argentina in a state of hopeful expectation.
Faith and discipline thus constituted essential ways in which migrants 
like Issa and Abdou also brokered hope in their everyday lives. It was a 
driving force for the migrants, a way of maintaining the possibility for an 
alternative future—that life, after all, could be different. By not dwelling on 
the present, they could gather the strength to endure and keep going without 
surrendering completely to despair and disillusion. However, it was a driving 
force that did not have a clearly defined goal (Bloch 1986). The reciprocal 
relationship between God and the migrant was never transparent and the 
future reward for their efforts lay hidden in God’s secure unknown.
Conclusion: Sticking to God 
In this chapter I have analyzed the events of a recent regularization program,
showing how Senegalese migrants perceived the opportunity to transcend 
their irregular status in Argentina. The case illuminates how Senegalese 
migrants navigate in a fairly new destination and how they try to gain 
momentum by relying on their known path of spirituality, but seem less 
interested in becoming new citizens within a state-governed framework of 
rights and obligations.
By introducing the concept of ‘brokers of hope’, I have tried to capture 
both structural and phenomenological aspects of hope-in-the-making.
The concept can enhance our understanding of the wide scope of brokers 
involved in the migration process and the multifaceted ways in which they 
intervene in the migrants’ lives and imaginaries beyond mediating concrete 
remedies to facilitate mobility. The chapter also exemplifies how the hope 
and promise brokered by middlemen in Senegal can rapidly be transformed 
into despair when the migrants are confronted with the contingent Argen-
tinian reality. In this particular case, different political and religious actors 
constituted brokers of hope for the migrants’ future in Argentina. However,
the case also reflects the notion that hope is only brokered if it is linked to 
some kind of transformative potential for the recipients. By highlighting 
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surprisingly, the gesture by the Argentinian state involves obligations for the 
migrants. Yet the Senegalese men and women seem reluctant to fulfill such 
obligations because they ascribe the legal document with very little transfor-
mative potential in terms of alleviating the structural barriers that limit their 
livelihood possibilities in Argentina.
Rather than accepting the gift and forming a new committed relationship 
to the Argentinian political system and/or the Senegalese diaspora associa-
tion, many migrants saw the event from the perspective of a known religious 
path of agency and imagination. From this perspective, the power relation 
between state and migrant is reversed. The regularization had only become 
manifest due to a visiting marabout’s power and providence and the com-
munity’s continuous good moral conduct. The  marabout was thus the real 
broker of hope—a hope that transcended the event itself, because it was 
closely linked to how the migrants already kept the world open by believing 
in God and through exercising moral discipline in their everyday practices.
In this way their seemingly disadvantaged position could be transformed 
and give them a sense of agency and a direction in their lives. The religious 
horizon offered them a map by which to navigate which was open to mobil-
ity and change and not controlled by nation-states’ changing caprices. A 
space where the individual had some degree of control through his or her 
actions. Sticking to God was thus a way of keeping the world open rather 
than being weighed down by global stratification factors, where race and 
geographical placement do not favor Senegalese migrants.
Notes 
1. El Régimen Especial de Regularización de Extranjeros de Nacionalidad Senegalesa. 
2.  Mercado Común del Sur, the Southern Common Market—an  economic and 
political agreement between the member-states of Argentina, Brazil,  Paraguay, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Bolivia for promoting free trade and the movement of 
goods, people, and currency.
3. The ‘gift’ was not masked by a common collective repression of the objective 
nature of give and take that Bourdieu (1998) has suggested.
4. In 2006 it was estimated that 46.8 per cent of the labor force was active in the 
informal sector (Maurizio 2012, 11).
5. Chat text omitted for legibility.
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4 Zouglou Music and Youth in 
Urban Burkina Faso 
Displacement and the Social 
Performance of Hope 
Jesper Bjarnesen 
Introduction 
One of the most striking consequences of the recent armed conflict in Côte 
d’Ivoire is the forced displacement of Burkinabé labor migrants and their 
families from Côte d’Ivoire to Burkina Faso over the decade 2000–10. It 
is estimated that at least 500,000—and probably more than 1 million— 
Burkinabé living in Côte d’Ivoire were forced to leave the country during 
this time (Boswell 2010; Reister 2011), and yet these displacements have 
received relatively little attention from researchers and humanitarian actors 
alike.
Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire emerged during the colonial era as closely 
tied and mutually interdependent parts of a regional mobility regime that 
fueled the Ivorian miracle economy in the decades after independence.
Burkinabé labor migrants thereby provided an essential part of the work-
force for Côte d’Ivoire’s plantation economy—the world’s largest cocoa pro-
ducer (Beauchemin 2005; Cordell et al. 1996). This same interdependence 
eventually fueled the xenophobic rhetoric and ethnicized politics at the heart 
of the Ivorian armed conflict, as shifting regimes in Côte d’Ivoire drew ever-
tighter boundaries around the notion of Ivorian autochthony in order to 
exclude northerners and people of immigrant descent from political influ-
ence (Dembélé 2002; 2003).1 
This chapter analyzes the practices and aspirations of young Burkinabé 
migrants arriving as refugees in Burkina Faso for the first time during the 
Ivorian crisis,2 usually accompanying their parents, who had been forced 
to abandon their migrant careers in Côte d’Ivoire. Born and raised in Côte 
d’Ivoire, these young migrants faced an entirely different challenge to that 
of their parents in integrating into a socio-cultural context with which they 
were unfamiliar and which held specific ideas about and prejudice against 
the children of the Burkinabé diaspora in Côte d’Ivoire. Through the con-
cepts of hope and displacement, the chapter reflects on how Ivorian Zouglou 
music became an important cultural vehicle for these young migrants, intent 
on performing their otherness and quite successful in exploiting that differ-
























Zouglou Music and Youth 59 
and other privileges. Zouglou music was a predominant genre in Ivorian 
popular culture in the 1990s but gained new life in Burkina Faso a decade 
later, in the context of the Ivorian armed conflict.
In exploring the meanings and uses of Zouglou music in this context,
the analysis suggests that this particular musical style served to articulate 
multiple modes of hope. In relation to their non-migrant peers, the social 
performance of Ivorian youth culture by young migrants served to evoke a 
cosmopolitan youth identity that represents the hopes and dreams of many 
Burkinabé youths—to migrate to the regional metropolis of Abidjan and 
take part in global flows of urban youth culture, consumption, and privi-
lege. On a more personal level, the lyrics of Zouglou music, together with 
its shared consumption, inspired a sense of hopefulness and confidence in its 
listeners in the face of their social exclusion as immigrants in the city.
Displacement and the Social Performance of Hope 
As noted by most scholars reflecting on hope, the notion is difficult to pin 
down and therefore challenging to use as an analytical concept. However,
rather than despair at the concept’s complexity, it may be more useful to con-
sider several modes of hoping (Webb 2007; Zournazi 2002) in conjunction 
and reflect on their characteristics and implications. As a point of departure,
we may say that hope generally relates to, or even springs from, a sense of 
uncertainty or ambiguity (cf. Cole and Durham 2008; Crapanzano 2004; 
Hage 2003; Harvey 2000; Miyazaki 2004). Hoping for something means 
wishing for a particular outcome of undetermined circumstances and the 
uncertainty thus implied may relate to both the source and the likelihood 
of that outcome. As a prelude to delimiting the different modes of hoping 
relevant to my purposes here, let me briefly consider how uncertainty may 
be seen as a fundamental consequence of social displacement.
As a number of anthropological studies of forced displacement have
shown, the distinction between forced and economically motivated migra-
tion is rarely clear-cut. Rather than movement per se, displacement has
been related analytically to the disruption of subjective senses of belong-
ing (Agier 2011; Bjarnesen 2013; Jackson 2002; Jansen 2008; Lubke-
mann 2008a). The notion of displacement, from this perspective, has been
applied when researching empirically how processes of life-making or
belonging may be disrupted or challenged by other actors or by larger
structural forces (Lubkemann 2008b, 193; see also Gill  et al. 2011, 301– 
302). Approaching displacement as a life-rupturing form of mobility
(cf. Barrett 2009, 95) invites a detailed empirical investigation of specific
histories and experiences of (im)mobility without the need for overall
categorizations of migrants or their movements—in other words, a shift
in focus from ‘the displaced’ as a population towards  processes of dis-
















60 Jesper Bjarnesen 
and the outlooks of refugees, even when the goal of such decisions may be
difficult to envisage or articulate (Piot 2010, 20). In this way, the uncer-
tainty created by displacement has been argued to hold the potential for
productive as well as detrimental effects (e.g., Hammar 2014). Involun-
tary moves or ‘stuckedness’ may have unexpected consequences, leading
to new opportunities.
The ambiguity entailed by displacement leads us back to the relation 
between hope and uncertainty. Inspired by John Dewey’s pragmatist philos-
ophy, Susan Reynolds Whyte locates hope in the space between uncertainty 
and possibility or, as she phrases it, in subjunctivity— in the conditional: 
‘. . . it is not just doubt, but hope for a better future that hangs on the ifs and 
maybes’ (Reynolds Whyte 2002, 177; see also Weiss 2004, 14). The mode 
of hope evoked by the idea of subjunctivity may be said to rely on a sense 
of optimism in the face of an uncertain future (Hage 2003, 24). Behind this 
seemingly innately personal capacity, however, lies a fundamental structural 
condition that is important for an anthropological analysis of hope: ‘.  .  .
[H]ope depends on some other agency—a god, fate, chance, an other—for 
its fulfilment . . . [H]ope presupposes a metaphysics’ (Crapanzano 2003, 6).
In political terms, hope’s reliance on the agency of another presupposes an 
unequal power relationship: some external source of agency is needed to ful-
fil hope and, whether that source is perceived to be metaphysical or not, this 
reliance expresses a hierarchical relation between the one(s) hoping and the 
one(s) granting those hopes. Here, some analysts evoke hope as a resource 
that is distributed unequally within a population (Ghassan Hage in Zour-
nazi 2002, 155). For example, Arjun Appadurai speaks of ‘the capacity to 
aspire’ as a ‘navigational capacity’ accumulated by those with the privilege 
of more opportunities to exercise it (Appadurai 2004, 69). In this fairly neo-
liberal vision, wealth generates wealth, whereas the disadvantaged are left 
searching for ways to expand their ‘. . . more brittle horizon of aspirations’ 
(2004, 69).
It seems to me that the social distribution of hope evokes the stratification 
of a relative dependence on external agency. Those who hope would prob-
ably rather not be in such a position of dependency. Here it is important 
to distinguish between two different modes of hope: hope as a personal 
disposition and hope as a social predicament. On the one hand, a sense of 
well-founded optimism may be seen as a resource—what Hage refers to as 
‘dispositional hopefulness’. ‘[H]opefulness’, he argues, ‘is above all a dispo-
sition to be confident in the face of the future, to be open to it and welcom-
ing to what it will bring, even if one does not know for sure what it will 
bring’ (Hage 2003, 24). Such a confidence may certainly be nourished by 
past experiences of success or achievement, as Appadurai suggests. On the 
other hand, hope may be the last resort in the face of profound uncertainty.
The uncertainty caused by displacement may also be seen to be unequally 
distributed—in refugee research, it is consistently emphasized that neither 
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rasa, but rather accentuates existing inequalities and stratifications (see, eg.,
Allen 1996; Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 2002; Jansen and Löfving 2009).
Being reduced to a state of hoping for the intervention of external agency,
whether in the form of humanitarian or of supernatural forces, is anything 
but a desirable position to be in (Bjarnesen 2009). The predicament of hope 
reflects social stratification as much as it reflects the accumulation of dispo-
sitional hopefulness.
Hope may, in other words, be both an expression of a personal faculty of 
resourcefulness and a social condition resulting from uncertainty, for exam-
ple, in the context of forced displacement. However, even the former, more 
positive, mode of hope—or hopefulness—is an ambiguous state of being. Just 
as we must understand the external agency evoked by different modes of hope 
in specific social contexts and particular situations, we must examine analyt-
ically how hopes are inspired and articulated by larger social discourses and 
institutions. Hopefulness may seem to the individual to be an innate capacity,
independent of outside intervention but, as Hage (2003) shows, a central 
function of a society or a nation-state may be said to be that of inspiring 
‘social hope’ in its citizens, by which he means a sense of ‘existential mobil-
ity’, of ‘going somewhere’ (Hage 2007). Hope, from this perspective, is laced 
with power and potentially with structural violence, rather than simply being 
a synonym for optimism: ‘[W]e have to note how capitalism hegemonises the 
ideological content of hope so it becomes almost universally equated with 
dreams of better-paid jobs, better lifestyles, more commodities, etc.’ (Hage 
2003, 14). Although I would argue that it remains to be empirically tested 
in each instance, it is significant to relate the passivity implied by this kind 
of hope to capitalist ideology, since ‘[t]he power of these hopes is such that 
most people will live their lives believing in the possibility of upward social 
mobility without actually experiencing it’ (Hage 2003, 14).
This warning is critical to our analysis of the experiences of young Afri-
cans, who may be said to generally face some of the poorest odds for achiev-
ing such aspirations. In most studies of young Africans, youth agency makes 
little sense without a consideration of the hierarchical orders that young 
people take part in. The social position of youth implies that young people 
direct their efforts towards expanding their social networks and accumulate 
social recognition by all possible means (Christiansen et al. 2006; Durham 
2004, 2008; Honwana and De Boeck 2005), leading some to evoke their 
youthfulness in a context where such a social role is perceived as an asset,
and others to emphasize their sense of responsibility and moderation to a 
different audience.
In relation to the aspirations of Burkinabé labor migrants, the overall 
dream of upward social mobility and an idea of a globalized middle-class 
consumer lifestyle were certainly present in the narratives of those still hop-
ing to leave Burkina Faso for Côte d’Ivoire and of those who had been forced 
to return. However, capitalism takes specific structural and discursive forms 
in specific contexts and, in the relationship between Burkina Faso and Côte 
  
 














62 Jesper Bjarnesen 
d’Ivoire, it has been shaped by the colonial division of labor, by which the 
former has been constituted as a reserve of cheap manual labor for the plan-
tation industry of the latter (Amin 1967; Cordell et al. 1996). In this partic-
ular case, the hopes of aspiring migrants in Burkina Faso have been inspired 
by the successful returns of several generations of migrants, who were able 
to acquire the right to cultivate land in Côte d’Ivoire and accumulate enough 
wealth to retire back home. In this way, the narratives of aspiring migrants 
during my fieldwork in 2009–10 articulated the hopes of stepping in the 
footsteps of past generations of migrants—what Miyazaki characterizes as 
an ‘inherited hope’ (2004, 139). In Miyazaki’s understanding, hope works 
as a driver of social action; a method for inspiring agency, and this method 
‘. . . is predicated on the inheritance of a past hope and its performative repli-
cation in the present’ (2004, 139). The inherited hope of aspiring Burkinabé 
migrants was based on the history of Côte d’Ivoire’s social, cultural, and 
economic superiority in the eyes of aspiring Burkinabé labor migrants. The 
standardized contents of the narratives of aspiring migrants in Burkina Faso,
then, did not stem from a global homogenizing force of capitalism, but from 
the specific institution of circular labor migration between Burkina Faso and 
Côte d’Ivoire, developed and maintained in its fundamental structure since 
the early twentieth century.
These introductory remarks on hope and displacement have served to 
outline several aspects, or modes, of hope that will be relevant for under-
standing how Zouglou music and its adherents in urban Burkina Faso coped 
with uncertainty. For young adult involuntary migrants in Bobo-Dioulasso,
Burkina Faso’s second-largest city, uncertainty arose primarily from their 
persistent sense of displacement—a predicament that had followed them on 
their travels from Côte d’Ivoire to Burkina Faso during the Ivorian armed 
conflict. The following section traces the origins and shifting sociopolitical 
affiliations of Zouglou music. After this brief historical contextualization,
the chapter continues by analyzing the modes of hope evoked by Zouglou 
lyrics, and by the shared consumption of Zouglou by young urban refugees 
in Bobo-Dioulasso.
Generation Zouglou 
Originating in the academic circles of Cocody University in Abidjan, Zou-
glou emerged as a musical genre around 1990, in the context of Ivorian 
President Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s last years in power and the political 
transition from a one-party state to multiparty democracy (Blé 2006, 170).
The often satirical prose of the lyrics was initially an expression by univer-
sity students of their dissatisfaction with the political elite and the experi-
ence of exclusion and marginalization by the well-educated youth (Konate 
2002, 784–785). In this way, Zouglou served its originators as both a source 
of insight into the societal transformations taking place in Côte d’Ivoire and 
a source of belonging mobilized by a sense of shared struggles and identity 
 
 













   
 










Zouglou Music and Youth 63 
(Blé 2006, 170). The name Zouglou itself is usually said to stem from its 
meaning in the Ivorian Baoulé language, designating a shapeless mass but 
used as a derivative for a garbage heap or trash can (Adom 2013, 32).
Another interpretation refers to the Bété phrase zou glou, meaning ‘bury us’ 
or ‘reject us’—both linguistic references connoting abjection and marginality 
from the establishment and a rhetorical sense of hopelessness.
During the 1990s, the messages of Zouglou lyrics developed from being
primarily concerned with the hardships of life as a student to reflect on larger
issues of being an urban resident and on the escalating political crisis and
armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. In this way, as I explore in more detail below,
its emergence is intimately linked with the advent of a new urban slang and its
accompanying urban youth culture in Abidjan during the same period (Konate
2002, 783; Newell 2012). From its highly localized point of departure, in
other words, the messages of Zouglou gradually encompassed the frustrations
and desires of a whole generation of young Ivorians (Blé 2006, 176).
Zouglou’s image of being the voice of Ivorian youth (see also Konate 
2002, 792) appealed to political actors on both sides of the divide that 
gradually widened during the 1990s between the proponents of Ivorian 
autochthony and its various opponents. Zouglou’s origins among university 
students in Abidjan included the involvement of the influential FESCI stu-
dent union, whose figureheads during the 1990s included men who would 
become dominant in Ivorian politics a decade later—on opposing sides of 
the political divide (Konate 2003). Charles Blé Goudé, as President Laurent 
Gbagbo’s ‘street general’3 and mobilizer of the Jeunes Patriotes youth militias 
throughout the troubled decade of 2000–10, became a known patron of and 
investor in the production of Zouglou (Koffi 2013). Even the reconciliatory 
messages—evoking an end to armed conflict and the shared responsibility of 
power holders on both sides of the political divide—of some Zouglou artists 
in the latter years of the Gbagbo regime were promoted on national TV and 
radio in an attempt to diffuse the resentment of the youth of the opposition 
(Blé 2006, 180).
Despite its affiliation with the Gbabgo regime and the Jeunes Patriotes, then,
Zouglou in Côte d’Ivoire gradually came to be seen as the voice of the dis-
enfranchised, yet politically aware, Ivorian youth, evoking a shared sense of
national belonging and injustice rather than a specific political allegiance. In
the remainder of this chapter, I illustrate how Zouglou was re-appropriated
by young Burkinabé citizens who were forced to leave Côte d’Ivoire during
the armed conflict and had settled in Bobo-Dioulasso. Given its former affili-
ation with the xenophobic Jeunes Patriotes militias, it may seem paradoxical
that this particular musical genre became a rallying point for these young
migrants but the analysis shows that Zouglou in Burkina Faso became associ-
ated with a cosmopolitan youth culture rather than a localized political mes-
sage by virtue of Abidjan’s standing as the preferred destination for aspiring





















    
 
64 Jesper Bjarnesen 
Displacement, Uncertainty and Hope in Zouglou Lyrics 
Musical performers in the booming Ivorian entertainment industry have 
come to represent a combination of cosmopolitanism and modernity to their 
audiences across the French-speaking countries of West Africa. In music vid-
eos by Ivorian artists, the most prestigious sites of global modernity—Paris,
New York, London, Tokyo or Dubai—have become familiar backdrops to 
the choreography of the performers. The hopes of many young Ivorians are 
nourished by such displays of participation in global flows of mobility and 
consumption.
One Zouglou group in particular incarnated this hope of global cosmo-
politanism by naming themselves ‘Espoir 2000’ (‘Hope 2000’)! Once they 
were successful enough to become featured on Ivorian television, their own 
hopes had already been realized and the name came to be interpreted as 
representing the hopes and dreams of young Ivorians in a more general sense 
(Adom 2013, 103). The mode of hoping represented by the group  Espoir 
2000 is, first and foremost, an expression of the social distribution of hope.
Hope, here, is a resource that successful musicians redistribute to their audi-
ences through their lyrics, music videos, and, in rare cases, band names. The 
underlying power imbalance, of course, consists in the very slim chances that 
members of their audience will experience a similar upward social mobility 
and, in this way, despite the best interests of the performers, the redistribution 
of the hope of success may be said to defuse tension and lull consumers of 
these messages into the passive ‘waiting time of hope’ (Crapanzano 2003, 5).
As noted in the previous section, however, Zouglou artists were not just 
concerned with displaying their own success; they also contributed to a 
social critique, originating in the circles of university students but eventu-
ally gaining traction among youths across the country. For example, Zou-
glou artist Soum Bill did not hesitate to berate the Gbagbo regime in the 
midst of armed conflict, lamenting, ‘We no longer know who to count on,
down with the politics of the belly’4 in his 2004 song ‘Nos problèmes’ (‘Our 
Problems’)—quoted in Adom (2013, 90). The expression ‘politics of the 
belly’—whether inspired by Bayart’s seminal work (Bayart 1993) or from 
the emic conceptualizations from which it is derived—implies a predatory 
and corrupt political rule wherein political elites feed on the resources of 
common citizens. The song thus berates the corruption of the political elite 
under Gbagbo’s rule.
Befitting of social juniors in this context, however, most Zouglou artists 
have been somewhat vague in placing the blame for their generation’s sense 
of despair. For example, Espoir 2000, in the song Abidjan, chose to appeal 
to their leaders rather than blame them for the predicaments of the young 
population, urging the political elite to fulfil the hopes to which God had not 
responded. Here, the shifting external agency affecting the circumstances 
of those hoping is spelled out: the hopers remain dependent on others to 





      














Zouglou Music and Youth 65 
they now address the power holders instead. The recognition of the author-
ity of the power holders as social seniors in relation to the musicians who 
evoke the role of social juniors, it should be noted, may be a fairly rhetorical 
maneuver, as it is shown to be in other confrontations between elders and 
their social juniors (see, e.g., Argenti 2007; Ottenberg 1971). In another 
song, the same group does not hesitate to impose its own clear-sightedness 
on the state of Ivorian politics, implying that politicians treat the popula-
tion as sheep! Finally, the despairing sentiments towards divine intervention 
expressed in the song Abidjan do not prevent Espoir 2000 from composing 
a celebratory hymn, thanking God for their own fortunes.
Reflecting a final mode of hoping, Espoir 2000’s song Abidjan is mainly 
concerned with a critique of the lack of employment opportunities and 
housing in the city, satirically changing the national motto ‘Union, Disci-
pline, Travail’ (‘Unity, Discipline, Work’) into ‘Union, Discipline, Chômage’ 
(‘Unity, Discipline, Unemployment’). These lyrics reflect the aspirations of 
many young people in Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and beyond of being 
able to escape the social moratorium of youth (cf. Vigh 2006, 96) through 
employment and wage earning which, in turn, allows for the possibility of 
establishing oneself as a social adult. Remembering Hage’s discussion of 
the relation between hope and capitalism, then, these aspirations are not 
utopian in the sense of being politically radical hopes for societal transfor-
mation or a structural redistribution of resources (cf. Argenti 2007, 246; 
Malkki 2001, 329) but, rather, conservative hopes of taking part in the 
privileges of a globalizing middle class—primarily through work, housing,
consumption, and marriage. Zouglou is not decidedly, or even primarily, a 
social critique, although commentaries on the political leadership are part 
of the subject matter of the lyrics. The central image of Zouglou is to speak 
truthfully about life as a young person in Côte d’Ivoire and, by extension,
about African youth. Having considered the shifting political affiliations of 
Zouglou in Côte d’Ivoire, and the diverse modes of hope evoked by a selec-
tion of its lyrics, the following section reflects on the role of Zouglou for 
young urban refugees in Burkina Faso.
Zouglou and the Social Performance of Hope in Sarfalao 
In the middle of the smoke-filled room where Youssouf, Félix, and a varying 
number of other young men sleep, Jo dances slowly with his eyes closed,
while singing along to the lyrics that are pouring out of a stereo lit by a 
fluorescent blue backlight on the control panel. He has taken off his white 
t-shirt, and his body is glistening with sweat from the heavy heat of a Sunday 
afternoon in Sarfalao—an informal neighborhood in Bobo-Dioulasso which 
has attracted large numbers of self-settled refugees from the Ivorian civil war 
during the past decade (Bjarnesen 2014). Alassane explains to me that Jo is 












   
   
 
 






66 Jesper Bjarnesen 
listener is drawn into the music and forgets about his surroundings. He says 
that this is how a zouglouman draws hope and courage from Zouglou to 
endure the hardships of everyday life and face the world with his eyes open 
and his back straight.
In addition to their appreciation of Zouglou, these young men—all in 
their late twenties—shared an experience of having been born and raised by 
Burkinabé parents in Côte d’Ivoire. Their Ivorian upbringing was obvious 
to their Burkinabé neighbors in Sarfalao: they spoke French with a typically 
Ivorian accent, knew relatively little Dioula, the local lingua franca, and 
dressed in a style inspired by American hip hop, in this context associated 
with Ivorian urban youth culture. Although Alassane and his friends came to 
Burkina Faso with their families when they were forced to flee persecution 
during the armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, they quickly found each other in 
Sarfalao, where they were all coping with the social exclusion by their new 
neighbors. To the long-term residents of Sarfalao, the mass arrival of refu-
gees from Côte d’Ivoire during the period 2000–05 put increased pressure 
on housing and livelihood opportunities, and local youths were provoked 
by the attitude of the migrant youths, whom they perceived as arrogant and 
flamboyant.
The attitude of local youths was, however, ambivalent, since the urban 
youth culture displayed by the new arrivals to the neighborhood represented 
the regional metropolis of Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire’s financial capital, to which 
many dreamed of migrating once the political situation in Côte d’Ivoire had 
stabilized.5 The local youths perceived of the newcomers as ‘diaspos’—a 
term originating in the circles of university students in Ouagadougou as an 
abbreviation of ‘children of or from the diaspora’ (Zongo 2010, 35), refer-
ring to the tendency for Burkinabé migrants in Côte d’Ivoire to send their 
children to Burkina Faso to continue their education during the politically 
unstable decades of the 1980s and 1990s. In Sarfalao, the term was used to 
remind migrant youths of their otherness in two different social contexts, as 
both not quite Ivorian (in Côte d’Ivoire) and not quite Burkinabé (in Burkina 
Faso). Another term applied to migrant youths was ‘ivorien vers’ (literally,
‘Ivorian towards’), taken from the terminology of Burkinabé identity cards,
where a person unable to state his or her precise date of birth would be listed 
as being born in an approximate year, stated in the identity papers as, say,
vers 1975— literally ‘towards’, meaning ‘around’ or ‘approximately’ 1975.
In other words, the term  diaspo was intended by local youths to signify their 
neither/nor status as approximately, but not quite, Ivorian or Burkinabé.
It was in the face of this experience of being doubly excluded or per-
sistently displaced that migrant youths found a sense of community with 
other migrants. Whereas migrant hometown associations typically center on 
more-delimited places of origin—sometimes specific towns, in other cases a 
more regional delimitation—migrant youths in Sarfalao paid little attention 
to the specific origins of other migrants. The common denominator for a 
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otherness and exclusion in relation to non-migrants in the city and, sec-
ondly, a familiarity with Ivorian urban youth culture, expressed through 
their dress, taste in music, and use of Ivorian nouchi slang. The sense of 
persistent displacement conveyed by the term diaspo resonated with the 
young migrants, who gradually came to embrace it and ascribe it with more 
positive connotations. This re-articulation of the connotations of the term 
diaspo sprang, to a great extent, from the sense of belonging and hopefulness 
that Zouglou inspired. For example, the popular song ‘Quel est mon pays?’ 
(‘Which is my country?’), by Ivorian Zouglou artists Yodé and Siro, explic-
itly addressed the sense of neither/nor experienced by the migrant youths,
now self-identifying as diaspos: ‘In Burkina they say “There’s an Ivorian”; 
in Côte d’Ivoire, “There’s a Burkinabé”’.
For the diaspos, the song’s lyrics provided little by way of a social critique 
but simply stated that these experiences were made on a wrongful ascription 
of identity on the basis of appearances. Its force lay rather in its recognition 
of their own predicament, in the precise articulation of their own experi-
ence of persistent displacement. Other Zouglou songs dealt with themes 
that also resonated with the diaspos. Alassane told me that Zouglou was not 
dance music for parties but was intended to inspire reflection in the listener.
Many songs were about hope, about not being corrupted by money, and 
about valuing friendship. These lyrics helped you to hold your head up high 
and be proud, Alassane explained. You could tell a  diaspo from a Burkinabé 
by his taste in music, he claimed—if someone walked proudly, as if listening 
to Zouglou, he was bound to be a  diaspo. He might even be dancing in the 
street in broad daylight—something you would never see a Burkinabé do.
This was an attitude which the diaspos had brought with them from Abi-
djan, he said. In Abidjan there were plenty of  zougloumans6 and this was the 
style that Alassane and his friends had brought with them.
At one point Nico, who had arrived in Burkina Faso during the war and 
had made a career as a singer of Zouglou and other Ivorian musical styles,
explained a song by saying that its message was that money changes a per-
son and makes you forget what is important, such as friendship. He said 
the lyrics were meant to make us understand that the life of the rich—the 
politicians and ‘the bosses’—was not worth striving for. I asked who the ‘we’ 
referred to in this context and he said that it was for ‘us, the weak’. He said 
that Zouglou was about getting good advice from people who knew how it 
was to be ‘small’. He translated the following song, about a man who leaves 
his car at the site of an accident in Paris, despite having the law on his side 
in placing the blame for the collision. Nico explained the message as being 
that, if you go to Paris (or some other place) without papers, you do not have 
rights and you would be thrown out of the country by the authorities if you 
stay. This was a fitting example of how the Zouglou songs also provided 
advice on situations that people like Nico knew nothing about but which 
represented their aspirations. They were songs to make you think and retain 





   
 










     





68 Jesper Bjarnesen 
Hage’s notion of dispositional hopefulness: through the shared consumption 
of Zouglou, the  diaspos inspired each other with optimism and faith in the 
future by creating a space of inclusion in the face of persistent displacement.
Nico had come to embrace the role of diaspo as a cultural style—a role 
that he had only become aware of through his stigmatization in Burkina 
Faso. In Côte d’Ivoire, listening to Zouglou and speaking  nouchi slang had 
been a popular youth cultural style, even in the town of San Pedro, where he 
grew up—informed by music videos and by friends and acquaintances with 
access to Abidjan. In Burkina Faso, Nico’s speech, mannerisms, and musical 
preferences stood out and, through sharing these tastes and dispositions 
with other young migrants, he gradually came to perceive his labeling as a 
diaspo as a source of pride and distinction, rather than as a derogatory label 
assigned to him by envious and narrow-minded non-migrant neighbors. As 
a re-defined social marker, diaspo came to represent a cosmopolitan youth 
cultural style, brimming with energy, satire, and wit (Bjarnesen 2014).
A social performance (cf. Goffman 1959, 77; see also Argenti 2007, 11), in 
this way, is not about pretending but about embodying a social role. As Alas-
sane expressed it above, the embodiment of diaspo youth culture in Sarfalao 
was intimately linked to the internalization of Zouglou, starting from its 
consumption in an enclosed space where the listener is gradually ‘inspired’ 
by letting the music and its lyrics fill him. As Alassane describes it, the music 
is carried with him out onto the streets, where his posture and attitude make 
him look as though he is (still) listening to Zouglou. By embodying the spirit 
of Zouglou, the  diaspos performed an attitude of confidence and hopeful-
ness that gradually came to define their sense of community and resource-
fulness, in contradistinction to the local ‘Burkinabé’ youths. In this way, the 
diaspos practiced what Miyazaki calls ‘the method of hope’, replicating the 
inherited hopes of generations of Burkinabé labor migrants through their 
social performances (Miyazaki 2004, 139).
As a self-conscious promotion of a social role, performing  diaspo youth 
culture may be understood, in this way, to be relying on the same playful 
performances that Sasha Newell has described as ‘the bluff’ in his work on 
the nouchi youth culture in Abidjan (Newell 2009, 380). In Côte d’Ivoire,
nouchi slang had been developed as a subversive language of the youth, serv-
ing as a coded language with which to critique the power holders through 
satire. Originally, this use had lent itself to Zouglou as well, allowing artists 
to express opinions that might otherwise have been censored by the author-
ities (Adom 2013, 56). In Sarfalao, however, whereas nouchi slang served 
exclusively as a tool of counter-exclusion—a coded language designed to 
leave the uninitiated guessing as to what was really being said—the role of 
Zouglou eventually became more than just a subcultural signifier, shared by 
the diaspos in opposition to non-migrant youths. In fact, Zouglou became 
the first of a series of subcultural styles that found its way into local com-
munities, serving more as a bridge between the  diaspos and their neighbors 
than as a vehicle for exclusion or stigma.
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Nico was involved in a musical group consisting entirely of diaspos, who 
would meet and play music around a shared pot of mint tea in the after-
noons. The group’s musical skills soon caught the attention of a neighbor,
who was arranging for the celebration of his newborn son’s baptism and 
who eventually hired Nico and the others to play at the party. The group 
thus rose to local fame and would play at weddings, funerals, baptisms, and 
other social events in the neighborhood, thereby earning both a livelihood 
and a legitimate place in the community. In a similar way, diaspo youths 
gradually became attractive to local radio stations because of their cosmo-
politan French vocabulary, whereas the outgoing and fun-loving attitude 
associated with the diaspo social performance proved useful for local pol-
iticians in need of a visible and dynamic youth wing at political rallies and 
important meetings. During President Blaise Compaoré’s electoral campaign 
in 2010, Nico and his friends could be seen riding around in the back of an 
open truck, singing songs in support of the same man who, in a speech fol-
lowing a series of riots at the university campus in Ouagadougou in 2005,
blamed young migrants from Côte d’Ivoire for the increasing disorderliness 
of university students! 
The relative success of diaspo youths in acquiring access to local elite 
networks and livelihood options in these different ways confirmed to the 
diaspos that their otherness could be used as an asset and further inspired 
the consolidation of a self-aware social performance of diaspo youth cul-
ture. During the last few months of my fieldwork, new steps were being 
taken to form an NGO named Diaspora et dévéloppement (Diaspora and 
Development), inspired by the success of  diaspos in using their otherness to 
get ahead in the competition over scarce livelihood options. In this way, the 
performance of the defiant hopefulness at the heart of diaspo youth culture 
gradually became a key livelihood strategy, reflecting the diaspos’ overall 
hopes for a secure income. This, in turn, would provide them with a way 
out of the informal neighborhood and into more gentrified areas of the city,
with prospects for consumer goods such as a television set, a refrigerator,
a motorcycle, and fashionable clothing, and, finally, with the possibility of 
getting married and raising a family. Zouglou, in this way, became one of 
the vehicles through which diaspo youth culture was gradually re-defined 
as a vibrant and cosmopolitan social performance in Bobo-Dioulasso. More 
than any other musical style originating in Côte d’Ivoire, Zouglou came to 
define the diaspo subculture in Bobo-Dioulasso, and, most importantly, to 
symbolize at one and the same time its singularity and its adaptability to the 
social life of the neighborhood.
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that Zouglou music became a central source of 
hopefulness for young adult migrants in Bobo Dioulasso, in the face of 
social exclusion and in spite of an uncertain future. Through their shared 
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consumption of this music, diaspo youths found a space in which to artic-
ulate and reshape a new collective identity against their persistent displace-
ment. Nevertheless, Zouglou did not serve to mobilize the  diaspos socially 
or politically in the way that rock music is said to have been a driver of 
social critique in the cultural youth revolution in the Europe and America of 
the 1960s (cf. Hobsbawm 1995, 325–327). Zouglou had served as a social 
mobilizer in a different context—first in the university circles of Abidjan 
and, later, as part of a larger pro-Gbagboist movement of articulating ‘true 
Ivorianness’ (ivoirité), juxtaposed with the unauthentic urbanites from the 
hinterland and from countries like Burkina Faso and Mali (Newell 2012).
The paradox of why this very same style of music would become the flag-
ship in the refashioning of diaspo youth culture in Bobo-Dioulasso has been 
shown here to relate to several modes of hoping. For the  diaspos, Zouglou 
inspired their social performance of hope, which proved to be a useful strat-
egy in catching the attention of the local elite and enabling access to their 
networks in the city.
Zouglou music became an important vehicle for simultaneously dis-
tinguishing and integrating diaspo youths in their new neighborhood in 
Bobo-Dioulasso. Despite Zouglou’s paradoxical political roles in Côte d’Ivo-
ire, young migrants in Burkina Faso who had experienced the increasingly 
violent xenophobia of the Gbagbo regime first-hand developed a special 
bond to this particular musical genre for several reasons. Firstly, Zouglou 
was, to the  diaspos, a favorite style during their upbringing in Côte d’Ivoire in 
the 1990s—before the ivoirité rhetoric targeted them as ‘strangers’ and, in a 
sense, turned Zouglou against them. In this way, Zouglou became associated 
with a pre-displacement nostalgia for life in Côte d’Ivoire prior to the armed 
conflict which eventually led to their forced ‘return’ to their parents’ coun-
try of origin. Secondly, the shifting political affiliations of Zouglou in Côte 
d’Ivoire were understood by the diaspos as an expression of the unavoidable 
obligation of social juniors to align with authority figures—an expression 
of the débrouillardise, or social navigation, that all youths must engage in 
(see, e.g., Christiansen  et al. 2006). Furthermore, although Zouglou became 
affiliated with the Gbagbo regime in Côte d’Ivoire, its lyrics still carried 
universalist aspirations of instilling hopefulness in young people, and was 
famously vague in its commentaries on the political situation in Côte d’Ivo-
ire. The distinction between the interpretative possibilities of the music in its 
own right and its use in social mobilization is essential for appreciating how 
Zouglou became so important to youths displaced by its proponents among 
the political leadership in Côte d’Ivoire. Third, in Burkina Faso, Zouglou 
carried the inherited hope of generations of Burkinabé labor migrants of 
seeking their fortune in Côte d’Ivoire. The  diaspos thus exploited their oth-
erness by evoking the cosmopolitanism associated with Ivorian urban youth 
culture—as a ‘stepping stone to modernity’ (Newell 2012, 42)—regardless 
of the fact that nouchi youth culture in Abidjan was explicitly articulated in 
contradistinction to the figure of the uncultivated youth from the village and 
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In this endeavor, the consumption of Zouglou was not only a social per-
formance directed at non-diaspo youths but also a collective practice that 
brought diaspos together and inspired hope in the listeners through the act 
of sharing their appreciation, as well as through the messages of the lyrics.
The consumption of Zouglou thereby illustrates the general point that the 
performance of diaspo youth culture—as any social performance, in Goff-
man’s understanding—cannot be reduced to the self-conscious impression 
management of the actor but is a multi-faceted social practice that may pro-
vide a deeply felt sense of belonging and hope while simultaneously serving 
as an identity-marker of other social roles.
Mobilizing diaspo youth culture in Sarfalao, in this way, may be seen as 
one among several strategies in the pursuit of social recognition and access 
to networks of privilege. Despite oppressive social hierarchies and debilitat-
ing material conditions, these social practices are oriented towards possible 
futures within their structural limitations. By conceptualizing the actions 
and expectations of diaspo youths as enactments of hopefulness, we might 
avoid the idealizing tendency of the concept of youth agency (cf. Durham 
2008) and move towards an approach that treats the hopes and dreams of 
the people we study as central to social dynamics and processes of social 
change.
This expression of youth agency should not be seen as revolutionary. Most 
young people seek ways in which to benefit from and fit into existing orders,
rather than turn them upside down (Durham 2008). The concept of hope, in 
this context, allows us to appreciate two aspects of youth agency that may 
otherwise be neglected: first, that youth aspirations, to a great extent, rely 
on external agency—social seniors for the most part—and, second, as Hage 
argues, that the relatively standardized discourses of these aspirations warrant 
consideration of the larger structural forces that influence and shape young 
people’s hopes of partaking in a globalized vision of middle-class prosperity.
This understanding of youth agency and the conservative nature of hope 
are also expressed in the roles and lyrics of Zouglou. Zouglou’s main message 
is not that authority can be challenged or overturned—it is as subservient 
as it is subversive—but that there is room for reflection; that the immense 
uncertainty of youth in Côte d’Ivoire and elsewhere can be articulated and 
scrutinized. This articulation inspires hopefulness: a sense of control and 
oversight in an otherwise uncertain and disorienting social terrain that 
enables the envisioning of potential futures. The main appeal of Zouglou 
lyrics is not to inspire hope for structural transformations or even for indi-
vidual fortune but, rather, to instill hopefulness in the disenfranchised—‘us,
the weak’, as Nico phrased it.
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Notes 
1. Of course, these identity boundaries were notoriously hard to define, given the 
centuries-long history of population movement that renders most residents in 
present-day Côte d’Ivoire the descendants of migrants (Geschiere 2009).
2. The term refugee is used here to emphasize the involuntary and war-related cir-
cumstances of this movement, in a context where similar routes have been trav-
eled by labor migrants for generations. Throughout this chapter, the term is not 
used with the intention of raising debate about the legal status of these migrants 
in relation to international humanitarian law.
3. Charles Blé Goudé and Laurent Gbagbo are both currently indicted by the 
International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity (AFP 2014).
4. ‘On sait plus sur qui compter ô’/‘A bas la politique du ventre’.
5. During the time of my fieldwork, Côte d’Ivoire was preparing for the presidential 
elections which were held in October–November 2010.The dramatic aftermath of 
the elections, in which the two main candidates—Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane 
Ouattara—both claimed victory, led to renewed instability and the displacement 
of several hundreds of thousands of people during the period December 2010– 
April 2011 (see Banégas 2011; Bassett 2011; Strauss 2011). The hesitation by 
aspiring migrants in Bobo-Dioulasso to initiate new journeys to Côte d’Ivoire, at 
a time when a peace agreement had officially been in place since 2007, proved 
well-warranted.
6. ‘Zougloumans’ is the French plural of ‘zouglouman’, as used by my informants.
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5 The Lack of Liberty Drove Us There 
Spatialized Instantiations of Hope and 
Contested Diasporan Identity in the 
Liberian–American Transnational 
Field (1810–2010) 
Stephen C. Lubkemann 
Empirical and Conceptual Re-Orientations 
to ‘Hope’ and ‘Diaspora’ 
This chapter examines two episodes in the long history of transatlantic 
movements between America and Liberia in an effort to posit that hope 
may be spatially, rather than only temporally, constituted, and to explore 
how a spatialized constitution of hope factors into the production of at least 
some forms of diasporan identity. More specifically, I want to suggest that,
under conditions of extreme social exclusion, diasporicity might be usefully 
conceived as a particular instantiation of hope which is constructed through 
processes of social imagination that rely upon spatialization.
In introducing spatialization as potentially the lead ingredient in the consti-
tution of a variant of hope—and through my discussion of how that variant 
compares to, and may even be brought into contention with, other variants 
of this form of social imaginary (Taylor 2004)—I aim to extend and com-
plicate contemporary theoretical formulations of hope. These formulations 
have tended to presume that temporalization factors as the primary requisite 
imaginary mechanism in the social construction of hope. Thus, foundational 
references for the new theorists of hope, including Jurgen Moltmann (1967) 
and Ernst Bloch (1986), cast hope as a form of temporalized difference— 
namely that between (currently) lived experience and the promise of a poten-
tial (hence future) alternative to that experience. Other theorists who have 
more recently grappled with the concept (Browne 2005; Crapanzano 2003; 
Miyazaki 2004; 2006) have generally followed suit in presuming temporal-
ity to be the central axis along which are drawn the key contrasts that are 
signified in—and ultimately constitutive of—hope as a particular form of 
sentiment or social imaginary.1 Zigon (2009, 267), for example, describes 
hope as a social process in which ‘the intentional and creative uses of the past 
and the future—allows for intentional and ethical action’.
Here, I propose that temporalization need not be the primary—and under 
certain conditions may even prove to be an entirely insufficient—mechanism 
for producing and sustaining credible alternative social imaginaries to those 
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when conditions of structural violence (such as those of racially violent 
nineteenth-century North America which I examine in the first part of this 
chapter) are so extreme and historically sustained, I argue that notions that 
the passage of time alone might bring better alternatives into being may 
become increasingly implausible—and eventually even come to be deemed 
(at least for some) entirely impossible.
Under such circumstances, temporalization alone may prove incapable of 
constituting hope—in the sense defined by Jarrett Zigon as ‘[the temporal 
structure of] the background attitude that allows for living a sane life in 
a specific social world . . . [of moral breakdown]’ (2009, 267) . . . that is 
‘born out of the socio-historic-cultural, as well as the personal, conditions of 
struggle’ (2009, 262). Zigon’s formulation is somewhat distinct in conceptu-
alizing ‘hope’ not so much as a map for future action but as a form of social 
imaginary that allows those under duress to contend with, and in, the here-
and-now. Following Zigon’s focus on hope as a posture for navigating the 
present as ‘an active agent in the attempt to live acceptably for oneself and 
for others . . . within the world in which one finds herself . . .’ (2009, 259),
I depart from him, however, to argue that the ‘creative use of the past and 
present’ alone (i.e., a social imaginary constituted primarily through tempo-
ralization) may prove incapable of underwriting and sustaining a ‘sane life’ 
in the most extreme situations of ‘moral breakdown’ (as Zigon terms it) or 
of ‘structural violence’ (as I term it).
I develop this part of my argument through a discussion of the emergence 
of the nineteenth-century ‘back-to-Africa’ movement which ultimately gave 
birth to Liberia. I demonstrate that, for those for whom no light seems to 
beckon at the end of the temporal tunnel, the spatialization of an aspirational 
alternative to the lived here-and-now may more aptly sustain faith in the 
possibility of its eventual realization. In such cases spatialization, rather than 
temporalization, thus becomes the central—and indeed an indispensable— 
narrative mechanism through which a variant of hope comes to be socially 
imagined.
In the course of this discussion I further posit that one particular form 
of identity narrative—‘diasporicity’—may represent an embodiment of this 
variant of hope in that it relies upon spatializing strategies for rendering 
alternative social imaginaries credible under conditions of structural vio-
lence. Diasporicity—as a form of identity narrative—relies upon and is 
organized around origin mythologies that locate the source of group- and 
self-authentication in a social milieu that is different to that in which protag-
onists currently live (Lubkemann 2015). This alternative milieu, from which 
attributes originate in the past, may exist in the ‘now’, but is most certainly 
not the ‘here’ in which protagonists live.
In suggesting that hope’s spatialization—and its enshrinement in a particu-
lar social identity form (‘diasporicity’)—may emerge primarily in reaction to 
structurally violent conditions in the ‘here-and-now’, this argument turns at 
least one conventional theoretical notion about the production and reproduc-
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respects, predominant theories about diasporas presume that the retention 
of social attachments to others who remain in the place of imputed origin 
are either a requisite or a primary determinant in the social production and 
reproduction of diasporan identity. Demonstrating how a diasporan identity 
emerged and gained social subscription when no such social attachments 
had been retained, I argue that this form of identity narrative—and the very 
myths of origin around which it is organized—may be generated as a reaction 
to particularly extreme experiences of social exclusion and discrimination in 
the lived ‘here’. As a form of identity in which a spatialized variant of hope 
is expressed, diasporicity is particularly likely to be ‘invented’ (Hobsbawm 
and Ranger 1983) in this fashion under circumstances in which entitlements 
believed to be legitimate have not only been denied in the past and in the 
present of a lived in social milieu but are also seen as certain to continue being 
denied in its foreseeable future. In such instances, diasporan mythologies of 
social origin may garner social subscription because they sustain a belief in 
the realizability of aspirations in the face of evidence—past, present and, in 
future, foreseeable—by locating that realizability elsewhere. In so doing they 
sustain a belief that a more desirable alternative to the currently lived expe-
rience and a more entitled self are still possible—even if not so in either the 
‘now’ or the foreseeable future of the lived ‘here.’ 
I grapple with the re-theorization of both of these concepts—‘hope’ and 
‘diasporicity’—through a comparative examination of diasporan identity 
formation across historical time within the transnational field that has 
linked Liberia and the United States for over 250 years. Originating in the 
transatlantic slave trade that brought Africans to North American shores 
throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, and repro-
duced most recently by refugees fleeing Liberia’s long civil war (1990–2003),
this transnational ‘social world’ (Marx 1990) currently links residents of 
Liberia with relatives and compatriots dispersed throughout Africa, Europe,
and North America. My discussion draws upon both the work of several 
prominent scholars of nineteenth-century Liberia and African-America and 
my own ethnographic, historical, and demographic research conducted since 
1999 in multiple locations (the United States, Ghana, and Liberia) within 
that social field.
As a point of departure I take the specific theoretical formulation for 
‘diaspora’ that Klimt and I proposed in earlier work (Klimt and Lubkemann 
2002) and that I have elaborated upon further more recently (Lubkemann 
2015). This approach posits that ‘diasporicity’ should be considered as a 
particular form of identity discourse in which the social self is ‘imagined’ 
(Anderson 1983) and publicly ‘presented’ (Goffman 1959) through particu-
lar types of claim2 about group origins.
What is the most distinctive about diasporicity as a form of identity nar-
rative is that, whereas it always makes reference to a history of population 
dispersal, from an analytical perspective such histories are the most usefully 
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how diasporan identities are produced or sustained is not about population 
dispersal per se but, rather, about how, under what conditions, and for whom 
particular narratives that define group boundaries in relation to a narrative 
of dispersal emerge and gain (or, alternatively, lose) social subscribers. This 
approach insists that any relationship between mobility (as a social process) 
and diasporicity (as a social identity) must be empirically ascertained rather 
than theoretically assumed. Thus, rather than being the self-evident product 
of mobility, this form of identity is merely a possibility—one that can be, and 
often is, contested or even rejected, even amongst those who share similar 
migratory experiences.
In the course of this chapter I discuss two specific examples—one histor-
ical and another contemporary—of migrants and their descendants in the
Liberian–American transnational field who pursued self-identification strat-
egies that varied immensely in this regard, ranging from those who publicly
proclaimed themselves to be sojourners from an African homeland of origin, to
others who chose—sometimes quietly and privately but at times publicly and
vociferously—to de-emphasize any African connections imputed to them and
who, in this sense, can be viewed as having ‘opted out of diaspora’ altogether.
By exploring how various forms of social difference influenced subscrip-
tion to (or, conversely, rejection of) diasporan identity at these two different 
historical moments of social disagreement, I bring into sharper relief those 
conditions that tend to underwrite the spatialized constitution of hope, while 
also exploring the sorts of choice which such spatialization implies. I suggest 
that, in contrast to variants of hope that rely solely upon temporalization,
strategies that also focus centrally upon spatialization cleave the past, the 
present, and the future in two and then assign social potentiality to one side 
of that spatialized divide while precluding it from the other.
I then examine the consequences of embodying such a spatial distribution 
of hope in (diasporan) identity narratives in which the social milieu that 
authenticates the self and to which potentiality is assigned is located else-
where, and in which potentiality is precluded from the present as well as the 
future of the social milieu of lived experience. I suggest that, in some cases,
diasporan identity narratives thus come to imply that the journey of the self 
from an undesirable condition of structural violence to a desirable alterna-
tive in which authenticity is realized cannot occur without spatial relocation.
My discussion of social differentiation in subscription to diasporan iden-
tity in both the historical and the contemporary Liberian transnational field 
demonstrates how such a proposition may threaten and undermine other 
variants of hope that remain predicated on temporalization.
The Historic Back-to-Africa Movement: The Spatialized 
Instantiation of Hope 
Liberia was one of the very earliest and has certainly served as the most 
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an ‘Africa-of-origin’ from North America. The Liberian Republic came into 
being as a result of three major waves of black migration from the United 
States and resettlement in West Africa that spanned much of the nineteenth 
century, and which ultimately led, in 1847, to the declaration of Liberian 
independence (Beyan 1991).
However, it is important to understand that, from the very outset, sub-
scription to an identity that mythologized Africa as an original and yearned-
for homeland was never a foregone conclusion for the black Americans to 
whom this notion was proposed. In fact, the very idea of Liberia required a 
great act of social imagination and a re-forging of identity that ran against 
broader currents of thought and opinion—not least of all the mainstream 
of thought amongst black Americans themselves. At the time, most black 
Americans firmly believed that Africa was part of North America’s black 
population’s past rather than its future—and felicitously so. This belief had 
been nurtured by the actual apologists of American slavery themselves, who 
had long labored in the public forum to re-cast the relationship between 
slave-owner and slave as one of familial patronage rather than of mere 
bondage, de-emphasizing the abuses of power and the slave’s legal status as 
mere (and, in fact, easily alienable) property. Central to that argument was 
a perverse recasting of enslavement itself as a form of divine redemption 
through which ‘savage Africans’ had been ushered out of the heathen dark 
and into the civilizing benefits of Christian light. This discourse left no ques-
tion that African slaves ‘belonged’—not just by might but by divine right—in 
the Americas and thus proposed that any and all black attachments to Africa 
itself had been severed by the grace of God—and, of course, the legal rights 
of property-owners (Barnes 2004; Clegg 2004; Tyler-McGraw 2007).
The fact that black Americans often reworked Christian allusions to recast 
slavery as a social journey through trial and tribulation did not mean that 
a return to Africa was envisioned by most of them as the way forward, nor 
did many harbor an attachment to Africa as a ‘homeland’. In fact the over-
whelming majority of the American black leaders of the day vociferously 
opposed the American Colonization Society (ACS)—the organization that 
was founded at the beginning of the nineteenth century and that propagated 
and financed ‘return voyages’ to Liberia—and publicly decried the idea of 
the back-to-Africa movement that it represented. In dozens of meetings 
that brought together hundreds and, in some cases, even thousands of freed 
blacks, the objectives of the American Colonization Society were publicly 
denounced and resolutions were passed which explicitly rejected any idea 
that blacks in America naturally belonged back in Africa. Convening many 
of the leaders and notables of the free black community, the 1848 Colored 
National Convention minced no words in denouncing Liberia in the year 
after it had declared itself an independent republic: 
That among the many oppressive schemes against the colored people 
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most deceptive and hypocritical—clothed with the very livery of heaven 
to serve the devil himself in. . . .
(Clegg 2004, 16) 
Many of these critics were well aware of the objectives that animated some 
of the most prominent founders and ardent supporters of the ACS—amongst 
whom were featured several well-known slaveholders and some of the most 
prominent public defenders of the institution of slavery! These included the 
prominent U.S. Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky, who saw in the Liberia 
project an opportunity to strengthen the institution of slavery by ridding 
the South of the growing number of emancipated blacks, who were loathed 
and feared by Southern whites. Similarly, Bushrod Washington (The first 
U.S. president’s nephew and a major slaveholder in his own right) served 
as the ACS’s first president. Even many of the white abolitionist Quakers,
who also figured prominently in the ACS, are documented to have been as 
motivated by segregationist impulses as by religious conviction. Thus, for 
example, the Quaker stronghold of Philadelphia was amongst the strongest 
financial backers of the colonization-to-Liberia movement largely because 
they were reluctant to have freed black co-religionists resettle in their midst 
(Clegg 2004).
Ultimately, only a very small minority of black Americans subscribed 
to the idea of Liberia or migrated there (Beyan 1991; Campbell 2006; 
McDaniels 1995). However, the motivations of that small minority may 
be explained by any interest in maintaining or preserving already existing 
social attachments in Africa, given that almost all were generations removed 
from the experience of the Middle Passage. Instead, the choice to migrate 
to Liberia had far more to do with the social and political struggles and 
racial violence of Antebellum America than it did with long-atrophied social 
attachments to Africa. Notably, patterns of interest in, and ultimately sub-
scription to, this identity narrative thus tended to correlate with and—to a 
certain extent, reflect—greater degrees of exposure to structural violence.
Thus, whereas most free blacks in the North vociferously opposed the ‘back-
to-Africa movement’, the idea of returning to Africa found much greater 
resonance amongst blacks who were still enslaved in the Southern United 
States—such as the Hillsboro, North Carolina slave Cledwell Whitted, who 
asserted that ‘There is no place in the World I should like to go as much as 
to Leberra’ (Clegg 2004, 183). Similarly, in his study of the development of 
the Negro Spiritual genre—which evolved amongst the enslaved in the South 
(and only later migrated to free black congregations in the North)—Fisher 
noted that many of the referents that have been interpreted to refer to heav-
enly transcendence (such as the referent to ‘home’ in the famous song Swing 
Lo Sweet Chariot) may have been veiled referents to Liberia and Africa more 
generally. The possibility of claiming a form of identity emphasizing attach-
ment to Africa also resonated more strongly within free black communities 
in Southern slaveholding states, which were particularly besieged by racial 
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violence which was always far more overt than was the case in Northern 
states3 (Barnes 2004; Clegg 2004; Tyler-McGraw 2007).
It is equally notable that, once migration to Liberia did begin to occur,
those contacts and social attachments that were retained between blacks in 
America and the initial black settlers to Liberia tended to dissuade rather 
than encourage further return migration and the accompanying identity 
claims that expressed such aspirations. The discouraging news sent by the 
earliest settlers in Liberia to friends and relatives back in America about the 
insalubrious and harsh conditions that prevailed in that colony and that 
produced its atrocious mortality rates (Clegg 2004; McDaniels 1995) played 
a significant role in the subsiding of the first wave of black-American migra-
tion to Liberia. Certainly, startling cases such as that documented in A Bill 
for the Relief of Emily Hooper of Liberia 1858, a young woman who sought 
to re-enter bondage back in America rather than remain ‘free’ in Liberia,
must thus have proved potently dissuasive: 
That Emily Hooper, a negro and citizen of Liberia, be and she is hereby 
permitted, voluntarily, to return into a state of slavery, as slave of her 
former owner, Miss Sarah Mallet of Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
(quoted in Clegg 2004, 187) 
In fact, the overall trend in both the private and public reports from the first 
settlers was deemed so damaging to the ACS’s objective of fostering black 
interest in migration to Liberia that the organization felt compelled to com-
mission and disseminate its own (unsurprisingly favorable) ‘independent’ 
account in 1853, drawn up by the Reverend Peterson in order to counter this 
threat. In short, even when it became possible to realize (rather than merely 
imagine) social attachments to Africa, these tended to undermine subscrip-
tion to diasporan identity narratives.
After the initial settlement wave subsided, black migration from the United 
States to Liberia occurred again only in small numbers and brief bursts— 
each one driven by particularly horrifying surges in the white brutalization 
of blacks, particularly throughout the American South—rather than by any 
developments in Liberia itself. The earliest of these waves occurred prior 
to the American Civil War, when free blacks throughout the slaveholding 
South were murderously targeted by frenzied whites after the 1831 Turner 
rebellion. Two decades later, in 1850, the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act 
facilitated the process whereby whites could claim ownership and sue for 
the possession of blacks they claimed had once been their slaves, even within 
states that had abolished slavery. The fear occasioned by this law motivated 
a modest revitalization of interest in the Liberian option over the decade 
that preceded the American Civil War. Short-lived interest in migration to 
Liberia re-emerged yet again a quarter of a century later, when anti-black 
violence peaked during southern reconstruction after the Civil War and slav-















    
  
The Lack of Liberty Drove Us There 83 
the perceived threat of black enfranchisement (Barnes 2004; Clegg 2004; 
Tyler-McGraw 2007).
What is most noteworthy is that, in each of these historical instances,
the primary factors underwriting renewed subscription to this ‘diasporan 
identity’ (and, by extension, interest in the ‘return-to-Africa’ project) were 
always the deepening problematics of racial exclusion confronted in Amer-
ica, rather than pre-existing social attachments in Africa. In this sense, rather 
than being the producers of diasporan identity formation, sentiments of 
attachment to Africa were very much the products of deepening despair at 
the accentuation of structural violence in America.
The emergence of diasporan identity narratives in this historical case is thus 
not well explained by prevailing theories4 which tend to identify and/or priv-
ilege (the preservation of) ‘social attachment’ as the primary ‘independent/ 
causal variable’ in the formation, persistence, (and even demise) of diaspo-
ran identity. The decisions of those nineteenth-century black Americans who 
opted to embrace Africa as their homeland and to migrate ‘back’ cannot 
be attributed to such social attachments—for no such prior social attach-
ments had been retained. Rather, it was the strength and nature of historically 
specific forms of social exclusion and discrimination that were confronted 
by slaves, former slaves, and free-born blacks in their everyday lives in
nineteenth-century America that underwrote the emergence of this form of 
identity, in which origin was aspirationally claimed elsewhere (in Africa).
The sentiments of deprivation engendered by these experiences can be 
described as the products of structural violence. Against an array of com-
peting ‘objectivist’ definitions of ‘structural violence’ (Farmer 1997; Galtung 
1969; Uvin 1998), I have argued elsewhere (Lubkemann 2008a) for a defini-
tion that emphasizes the sentiments of frustration that are generated by the 
gap between subjective expectations about one’s entitlements and the capac-
ity to realize these as dictated by structural conditions. It is precisely this type 
of gap that, I would argue, underwrote the interest in the original Liberian 
option—as a mechanism for achieving an emancipated status to which so 
many of those who confronted racial violence and exclusion aspired but saw 
little prospects for ever realizing in America. In short, under conditions of 
extreme social exclusion that belie the possibility for future change in the 
lived in ‘here’, I want to suggest that diasporicity might be usefully conceived 
of as a particular instantiation of hope—however, as a variant of that form 
of social imaginary that relies first and foremost on spatialization, rather 
than only, or primarily, upon the processes of temporalization that tend 
to be emphasized by the leading contemporary theorists of hope. Stripped 
down to its analytical essence, I would thus suggest that we can think (ana-
lytically) of hope as the sustenance of the possibility of a (desired)5 alterna-
tive to a (currently lived) reality. A differentiation between an undesirable 
experienced state and a desired/aspirational one may, in fact, be constituted 
through the forms of temporalization that tend to be emphasized as the 
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2006; Moltmann 1967; Yurchak 2003); however, in other cases I would 
suggest that this differentiation may be more effectively constituted through 
other processes such as spatialization.
Indeed, in certain societal situations in which oppressive structural vio-
lence is particularly virulent and profoundly entrenched, spatialization may 
provide a degree of potency for underwriting the credibility of alternative 
possibilities—and thus for ‘a sane life’ (Zigon 2009)—which temporaliza-
tion alone is incapable of providing. In the historical Liberian case, it is pre-
cisely such forms of spatialization of an aspirational alternative that located 
the authentic and potential self in an ‘elsewhere’—in reaction to a struc-
turally violent ‘here’ in which lived experience was realized—that I suggest 
was the central dynamic informing the production of the nineteenth-century 
diasporan identity and that led some black Americans to claim attachments 
with Africa—and to migrate to Liberia.
Disputing Diasporicity in the Historical Past: Spatial Versus 
Temporal Strategies for Constituting Hope 
A theoretical understanding of some of the implications of reliance upon 
spatial—rather than temporal—instantiation in the constitution of hope 
may help to explain socially differentiated interests, reactions, and subscrip-
tion to diasporan identity narratives that we witness in both the historical 
and the contemporary Liberian transnational field. As I have already briefly 
alluded to, in the historical case a diasporan identity that embodied and 
expressed spatialized variants of hope ultimately appealed to only a small 
minority of nineteenth-century black Americans—most particularly to those 
who found themselves the most oppressed.
By way of contrast, free black communities and their leaders—particularly
those in the northern states where slavery had been abolished—were the 
most active and publicly vociferous in rejecting this new form of identity that 
emphasized their African origins. They rejected this identity because they 
realized that, hand-in-hand with its explicit claims that their natural entitle-
ment to Africa should be recognized, yet another idea was also implied: that 
they were not entitled to stay in America. For this reason, leading black intel-
lectuals of the time, despite pursuing often quite different social and political 
projects and goals, tended to find common ground against the ACS and the 
notion that blacks were ‘really African’ (and therefore not ‘American’) and 
should return (or be returned) to Africa. Thus, the early black separatist 
Martin Delaney decried Liberia as an unwelcome scheme to ‘exterminate 
the free colored of the American continent’ (Clegg 2004, 181–182), whereas 
others such as the abolitionist Frederick Douglass fervently denounced the 
ACS as the ‘arch enemy of the free colored citizens of the United States’ that 
aimed to ultimately strengthen and insulate slavery by hauling away its most 
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In short, whereas a diasporan identity may have offered an effective strat-
egy for sustaining the credibility in the possibility of a better alternative for 
those nineteenth-century black Americans who saw no possible improve-
ment in America—by spatially assigning all the potential for that realizabil-
ity to an ‘elsewhere’—that very same assignment also implied the preclusion 
of any such potentiality in the lived ‘here’. The denial of any potentiality for 
imagining improvement in the lived ‘here’ constituted a profound affront 
and violation of the expectations, social projects, and ambitions of those 
nineteenth-century black Americans who continued to envision, and strive 
for, change and betterment in America itself. Their focus on the possibility 
of improving lives in America itself was readily evident in the many resolu-
tions (such as that passed at a Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church 
of Philadelphia in 1817 and quoted below) that were passed in city after 
city by free blacks during their efforts to denounce the ACS and discredit the 
deportation ambitions of its white leadership: 
Relieved from the miseries of slavery, many of us by your aid, possess-
ing the benefits which industry and integrity in this prosperous country 
assures to all its inhabitants, enjoying the blessings of religion, opportu-
nities of worshipping the only true God, under the light of Christianity,
each of us according to his own understanding; and having afforded us 
and our children the means of education and improvement; we have 
no wish to separate from our present home, for any purposes what-
ever. Content with our present situation and condition, we are desirous 
of increasing the prosperity by honest efforts, and by the use of the 
opportunities, for their improvement, which the Constitution and laws 
allow . . . Any measure or system of measure, having a tendency to ban-
ish us would not only be cruel, but in direct violation of those principles 
which have been the boast of this republic.
(Mehlinger 1916, 278, quoted in Sawyer 1992, 35) 
To those invested in the project of changing racial inequality in America,
the very idea of ‘Liberia’ galvanized a sense of indignant entitlement to
America itself and a vociferous rejection of black resettlement to Africa— 
which most leading black intellectuals decried as nothing more than a
nefarious new strategy aimed at depriving them, through deportation, of
the right to participate in a country that was, in the most literal of senses,
the fruit of their labor. For those for whom social conditions had not over-
whelmed the credibility of the claim that social change was possible in
America, hope continued to operate in a predominantly temporal register.
They therefore rejected an identity that embodied a distinctively spatial
instantiation of hope, because that instantiation precluded and denied the
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Disputing Diaspora in the Present: Gender and 
Class Differentiation 
Problematics of social exclusion have played no less a role in shaping the 
constitution of, and socially differentiated patterns of subscription to, dias-
poricity within the contemporary Liberian transnational field. Over the last 
30 years, that field has been dramatically transformed by political upheaval 
and civil war. Exclusion from meaningful participation in the political pro-
cess and educational opportunity, as well as from the economic benefits of 
the nation, were significant factors which allowed student protests to con-
verge with popular outrage at price increases and spark a military coup in 
1979. The assassination of President Tolbert, the subsequent military trial 
and public execution of prominent Americo-Liberian government officials,
and the assumption of power of Liberia’s first ‘indigenous’ president (and 
coup co-leader), Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, signaled the demise of over a 
century of Americo-Liberian privilege and dominance.
These events also generated the first contemporary wave of migrants— 
mostly of Americo-Liberians—back across the Atlantic to the United States.
Successive waves of different social composition followed over the next quar-
ter of a century. A second wave arrived in the mid-1980s after Doe’s violent 
crackdown against the Gio and Mano ethnic groups in the wake of a failed 
putsch. A third outflow followed Doe’s overthrow and assassination in 1990 
and continued throughout the country’s notorious descent into seven years 
of brutal civil war (Adebajo 2002; Ellis 1999; Levitt 2005). Out-migration 
peaked again at the turn of the millennium, as new insurgencies challenged 
the warlord-turned-president, Charles Taylor, until an UN-brokered peace 
settlement resulted in his exile in 2003 (Levitt 2005; Moran 2006).
Liberia has since undergone a challenging transition to democratic gover-
nance, safeguarded by one of the UN’s largest armed missions in Africa and 
creating the possibility of return for the hundreds of thousands of Liberians 
displaced throughout West Africa and further afield in North America and 
Europe. Yet not everyone who left Liberia has chosen to return. Much as 
blacks in Antebellum America confronted alternative identity choices, so,
too, did Liberians in the United States confront a similar question: [‘Will I 
be] “Liberian” or “[African] American”?’ 
For some, the answer to that question is clearly an affirmation of a dias-
poricity that simultaneously locates their origin and displaces their aspira-
tions elsewhere: locating their self-potentiality in Liberia. Much as in the 
historical epoch during which Liberia emerged, experiences of social exclu-
sion and frustrated expectations in contemporary America have underwrit-
ten and sustained this new diasporicity. For many Liberians who arrived 
after 1980, America did not turn out to be the promised land which they 
once envisaged. Thus, whereas some have obtained permanent residency 
or U.S. citizenship, a significant number are technically illegal immigrants 
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(TPS) or Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) status, which is subject to 
annual renewal by executive order and could end at any time (as has already 
befallen Salvadoreños and Sierra Leoneans). This insecure status tends to 
limit employment prospects for many—forcing them to work multiple shifts 
at menial jobs even if they have professional training or backgrounds. These 
conditions are accentuated by the challenges that confront most Liberians 
who made it to the United States during the war, who generally struggle 
to pay bills while also supporting relatives back in Liberia. Such condi-
tions only accentuate the discriminating effects of racism that powerfully 
shape the American socio-economic landscape. Moreover, Liberians in the 
United States also often experience additional exclusion and hostility from 
an African-American community that sometimes interprets their disinter-
est in locally oriented civic and political activism as evidence of a deficient 
commitment to anti-racist agendas in the United States (Habecker 2009; 
Lubkemann 2008b; Waters 2001).
The convergence of these different strands of social exclusion has played 
a significant role in motivating subscription to a new Liberian-oriented 
identity narrative amongst many of those who found wartime refuge in the 
United States. Many emphasize their ‘Liberianness’ in pointed distinction 
to other (potential) social identities (particularly ‘African American’) which 
are often assigned to them by a broader American public, who take their 
phenotype (rather than their nationality) as the primary indicator of ethnic 
identity. Ascriptions as ‘African Americans’ are often challenged in multiple 
ways by those who think of themselves as ‘Liberian diasporans’, including 
explicit pre-emptions or corrections in everyday social interaction (‘No, you 
see, I am Liberian [not African American] . . .’) or a preference for social fora 
with large Liberian membership, such as Liberian associations, churches, etc.
The performance of ‘Liberianness’ to internal audiences within the Libe-
rian immigrant community is particularly important for those who claim a 
diasporan identity, and takes place in socially and culturally specific regis-
ters. Thus, as I have documented elsewhere (Lubkemann 2008b), sending 
remittances and maintaining contact with relatives in Liberia—and making 
this known publicly to other Liberians—can be as much about maintaining 
status and performing Liberian identity in U.S. compatriot social circles as 
it is about maintaining attachments with the recipients of funds or of phone 
calls to those who reside back in Liberia.
Ultimately, more than merely affirming attachments elsewhere, such per-
formances of ‘Liberianness’, whether to internal or to external audiences,
often signal a form of detachment from, and a critique of, the (often disap-
pointing) here, and the now that is lived through every day in America. In 
affirming their ‘Liberianness’ these migrants actively claim (and ultimately 
privilege) their stake in a social reality alternative to the one in which the 
identity is being invoked. This identity thus signposts a possible different 
world in which an individual’s true social worth is recognized, talents are 
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this identity narrative, a former government official in Minneapolis thus 
reasserts a ‘rightful’ status that is not recognized by his current degrading 
menial job, whereas a nursing assistant in Maryland signals her potential to 
be a county health department director ‘back home’ and an adjunct college 
instructor harbors hopes of recognition as a major national political leader 
and contender for political office in Liberia.
However, subscription to this contemporary diasporic identity is no 
more universal amongst Liberian migrants at the dawn of the twenty-first 
century than was the case amongst black Americans who considered and 
bitterly argued about the merits of the initial Liberia option throughout 
the nineteenth century. Notwithstanding the status of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf 
(Liberia’s and Africa’s first elected female president) as an icon for progress 
in gender equality, many Liberian women whom I have interviewed in the 
United States remain deeply ambivalent about the prospect of returning to 
Liberia because they fear the loss of the forms of autonomy, power, and 
opportunity many have come to enjoy in the United States. Such fears are 
particularly pronounced amongst women whose higher-education creden-
tials and professional experience would suggest that they might be attractive 
recruits for government posts or NGOs back in the ‘New Liberia’, where 
gender equality is one of the most trumpeted refrains of the international 
donor community. Many of these women are well aware, however, that,
whereas education may afford them access to status, maintaining that status 
in culturally prescribed ways is likely to place enormous pressure on them 
to eventually forgo the professional activities which they currently pursue.
Thus, much as documented by Moran (1990) over three decades ago, sta-
tus for women at the highest social levels in Liberia is still largely mediated 
by marriage. Whereas their education may open the door for professional 
Liberian women to marriages with men of higher social status, Liberian 
social conventions about how that status is to be maintained and enacted 
often highly constrain or preclude women from certain forms of profes-
sional, economic, and political activity. Confronted with a Liberian social 
ideology that continues to render social status antithetical to, or at the very 
least highly restrictive of, certain forms of professional activity and personal 
autonomy, many educated Liberian women resettled in the United States 
thus prefer to remain abroad, where many social objectives are more mutu-
ally conducive rather than socially contradictory.
By way of contrast, men—and particularly those who once held elite sta-
tus in Liberia—are arguably amongst the most eager to return to post-war 
Liberia and the most vocal in claiming and performing their Liberian iden-
tity. In part, this eagerness may be explained by the fact that sentiments of 
abjection are particularly pronounced within this group, in light of the fact 
that their educational qualifications have often failed to be recognized in the 
United States, nor has political or socio-economic status once held in Liberia 
translated into commensurate standing in their country of refuge. Many 
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system that requires them, nevertheless, to seek employment but only offers 
them positions for which they feel overqualified and that fail to offer pay or 
status commensurate with that which they once enjoyed and feel entitled to.
The predominance of such individuals in the myriad Liberian community 
associations throughout the country—and particularly in the fierce politick-
ing therein—is readily noticeable, as is the extent to which they voice much 
greater interest in returning ‘home’ than is the case for many others.
Conclusion: The Differentiation of Discontentment in Social 
Subscription to Spatialized Instantiations of Hope 
I have argued elsewhere (Lubkemann 2015) that diasporicity is an identity 
frame that relies upon an implicit invocation, juxtaposition, and comparison 
of alternative possible contexts of social experience that are differentiated 
in space. Lived experiences in one location are implicitly compared with 
experiences in an ‘elsewhere’—one to which links are claimed through a 
social process of memory about migration and displacement that comes to 
be enshrined as a charter myth for social-group identity. Through an explicit 
claim about the self’s most genuine attachment to a ‘social elsewhere’ (of an 
individual’s claimed origin), diasporicity is capable of providing a powerful 
critique of degrading social conditions that are confronted in the lived here-
and-now. Thus, embedded within the central diasporan claim of ‘Elsewhere 
is a place to which I most truly belong’ lurks the unstated critical recognition 
that ‘Here is a place in which I am not allowed to fully/satisfactorily belong’.
In this case study, I have suggested that conditions of extreme social alien-
ation may underwrite the production of and subscription to—and some-
times even the outright social invention of—those narratives and notions of 
social attachment and orientation to the ‘elsewhere’ (i.e., an imputed home-
land of origin) that features as the central organizing referent for diasporan 
identities. In this vein, the diasporicity that emerged in Antebellum America 
and that underwrote the initial back-to-Africa movement can be seen as a 
desperate social effort to sustain the credibility of alternatives in a context 
of extreme structural violence in which, at least for some, temporal projec-
tion alone was insufficient to that task of social imagination. For those so 
oppressed in this particular context of ‘moral breakdown’ that the future of 
the social milieu in which they lived looked unchangeable, the perseverance 
of a ‘sane life’ (Zigon 2009) required a spatialized strategy for differentiating 
and protecting aspirational potentiality from experienced reality.
However, in relying on spatialized strategies for constituting hope, dias-
poran identity narratives implicitly assign spatial criteria to potentiality,
requiring relocation as a requisite for the realization of aspirations while 
precluding any potential for realizing aspirations in the lived ‘here’. In this 
sense, spatialized strategies for constituting hope may be mutually exclu-
sive of—or at least come into contention with—those that rely primarily 
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this peculiar effect of hope’s spatialized instantiation that renders diaspo-
ricity at once a particularly potent narrative for contending with seemingly 
hopelessly entrenched structural violence while, at the same time, mak-
ing it a socially contested ascription. As illustrated by both the historical 
resistance to the back-to-Africa movement by most nineteenth-century free 
black Americans and by the highly gender-differentiated views and anxieties 
about the desirability of ‘return’ amongst contemporary Liberian refugees in 
America, the notion that relocation is an inherent pre-condition for realizing 
the aspirational self may thus be highly contested.
In short, if the social appeal of diasporicity as an identity option lies in 
its capacity to protect aspirational potentiality and self-authenticity by pro-
jecting these in space, social variation in the subscription to this identity is 
likely to depend on whether such spatial assignment is seen as offering social 
recourse or, conversely, as undermining it. Answers to this question may 
depend in large part on how exposure to structural violence in the here-and-
now is mediated by socio-economic differences (such as those between free 
and enslaved black Americans in the nineteenth century). Responses may 
also depend on the forms of alternative structural violence which agents 
foresee as likely, should the spatial aspirations expressed in diasporan iden-
tity come to be realized (such as those foreseen by many educated Liberian 
women who are so reluctant to return to war-torn Liberia today). In short,
the implications of hope’s spatial instantiation rarely resonate in the same 
way for all social agents. Rather, subscription to (or rejection of) identities 
that instantiate hope and address discontent through spatial strategies that 
locate potentiality ‘elsewhere’ is likely to be mediated by how socio-economic
and socio-political differences shape agents’ views on the future possibilities 
for addressing that discontentment ‘here.’ In this sense, spatialized strategies 
for constituting hope are the most likely for those whose experiences with 
sustained moral breakdown and extreme structural violence underwrite 
mounting skepticism about the possibility of ever realizing positive social 
change within the social milieus which they subordinately inhabit.
Notes 
1. For an important exception see Phillip Mar (2005), who discusses how migrants 
construct social imaginaries in which different aspects of the lives they aspire to 
are mapped onto different destinations. Inasmuch as such distributions present 
migrants with a zero-sum choice between the different types of aspiration (for 
example, social and economic objectives) when these can only be realized in dif-
ferent places, Mar’s formulation implies a particularly powerful conundrum for 
migrants. In particular, it infuses the constitution of any aspirations for resolving 
this contradiction with enormous uncertainty, if not (I would argue) a certain 
sense of resignation and perhaps even ‘hopelessness’. Mar does not delve into 
the conditions that potentially underwrite—or even require (as I suggest in this 
article)—the spatialization of aspirations in order to sustain hope, nor does he 
explore the implications of organizing social identities around such imaginaries— 
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2. More specifically, Klimt and I argued that identity narratives qualify analytically 
as ‘diasporic’ (rather than as ‘ethnic’, ‘racial’ or ‘class’) if they engage with a series 
of core propositions that include an orientation to a place of origin from which 
a dispersal was remembered, a sense of affinity with others dispersed from that 
place of origin to other locations, a sense of attachment to both the place of 
attributed origin and the current place of residence—but in which the former was 
recognized as the more authoritative source for the legitimization of social prac-
tice in determining the authenticity of cultural forms, in delimiting the boundaries 
of moral community, and in establishing boundaries for groupness (Klimt and 
Lubkemann 2002, 148). Other theorists who have offered conceptualizations of 
diaspora as a form of identity narrative include Axel (2002; 2004), Brah (1996),
Kleist (2008; 2010) and Werbner (2002).
3. This is not to suggest that racist discrimination and violence were not also ram-
pant in the North—notwithstanding the technical demise of the institution of 
slavery itself by the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. On this, see,
for example, Anne Farrow  et al. (2005).
4. Thus,while differing in many other respects,both assimilationist and transnational 
analytical frameworks emphasize the central role that social attachments between 
migrants and those in their claimed homelands of origin assume in sustaining 
diasporan identities and communities (Alba and Nee 2003; Basch et al. 1994; 
Fouron and Glick Schiller 2002; Gans 1992; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; 
Gordon 1964; Haines 1997; Levitt 2001; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Rapport 
and Dawson 1998; Rumbaut 2002; Sheffer 2003; Waters 1990). Assimilationist 
frameworks, in particular, go on to explain the demise of diasporan identity (i.e.,
‘assimilation’ if and when it ultimately occurs) as a result of the atrophy of such 
ties and their replacement by others in the society of resettlement, whether over 
biographical or, more often, generational, time.
5. The opposite of ‘hope’ in this sense might be ‘dread’, thought of as the sustenance 
of the possibility of an undesired alternative.
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6 Prospective Moments, Eternal 
Salvation 
The Production of Hope in Nigerian 
Pentecostal Churches in China 
Heidi Østbø Haugen 
Protected by prayer alone, undocumented African migrants leave their 
homes in the suburbs of Guangzhou to go to church. The police in this 
southern Chinese city may intercept them on the streets or on public trans-
port. Incarceration, fines, and repatriation await those who are stopped and 
are without valid travel documents. The migrants each have a method for 
minimizing the likelihood of being intercepted: travel when the police are off 
for lunch and always move around alone. Once they reach the anonymous 
buildings that house the churches, they pray again, this time to give thanks 
for a safe journey and to request a successful service. Inside, the pastors 
promise prosperity—a main staple of Pentecostal churches worldwide— 
as well as uninhibited spatial mobility. ‘You shall be a global citizen of super-
natural influence’, one pastor declared. ‘It is not the will of God that you will 
be caged in one place. No matter where you are in your life this morning,
there is divine increase and expansion coming up’.
The smothering feeling of encagement referred to above is well known to 
undocumented African migrants in China.Without a valid visa, they can nei-
ther move around freely nor return home. They have been pushed increas-
ingly far away from the center of Guangzhou to live in areas that are less 
aggressively monitored. The policing of foreigners in and around the city has 
become increasingly tight over the past decade. African-run churches regu-
larly lose members who are incarcerated for immigration offenses and forced 
to leave China. The Nigerian pastor quoted above had just seen one of the 
musicians from his church arrested. The sound of the incomplete ensemble 
served as a reminder of the risks facing all undocumented migrants. The ill-
fated band member was obliged to pay his flight ticket and a fine of RMB 
10,000 (USD 1,600) before he could be released and repatriated, but did 
not have the money to hand. A decade earlier, the church could be counted 
on for help in such situations. However, the sense of solidarity had been 
exhausted and no move was made to collect money for the release of the 
musician or other imprisoned congregants.
This chapter explores why undocumented migrants continue to attend 
activities in the African-led churches despite the risks this entails. As hinted 
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security and the means to incrementally improve their situation. I suggest 
that the prospective moments generated through worship are crucial to the 
congregants’ continued commitment to the church. Hope is produced and 
reproduced and is shaped through religious practices and the congregants’ 
experiences of mobility and immobility.
My analysis is based on fieldwork between 2009 and 2014 among Afri-
cans in Guangzhou and return migrants in Nigeria. In September 2009, Pas-
tor Paul1 granted me permission to do research in his church, The Tower 
of Salvation World Mission (The Tower, for short). Whereas more than half 
of the congregants were Nigerian, there were members from other parts of 
Africa, the global African diaspora, and Asia. I attended services weekly 
during two fieldwork periods (September–December 2009 and January– 
December 2014), with annual visits in between. The resulting data include 
notes from participant observation in The Tower, transcribed recordings of 
the sermons, and semi-structured interviews with congregants, pastors, and 
other African migrants. I also draw on notes from participant observation 
in two immigrant-dense neighborhoods in Guangzhou.
Hope is central in all strands of Christianity but in very different ways.The 
first section in this chapter reviews the literature on migrant Pentecostalism 
and the role of hope in Pentecostal theology. I discuss how the production 
of hope in Pentecostal contexts is associated with specific ontologies of time 
and with given spatial referents. In the second section, I contextualize my 
study by tracing the history of Nigerian migration to China. The ways of 
creating hope in the African Pentecostal churches in Guangzhou are inextri-
cably linked to the modes of migration to China and the conditions facing 
migrants. Nigerians were the first Africans to establish churches in China, and 
I next describe how these are run in a secular regulatory environment. The 
three following sections draw upon my ethnographic material to examine the 
specific ways in which hope is produced in the migrant churches. First, their 
theology insists that hope has a moral dimension—hopefulness is portrayed 
as virtuous and despair as degenerate. Second, audacious hope is valued 
higher than plans for incremental improvements, and, third, the production 
of hope is an embodied exercise. The conclusion argues for a future-oriented 
stance when studying hopeful practices in Pentecostal churches.
Pentecostalism and Hope 
The topic of hope has been approached from two angles in the literature 
on African and migrant Pentecostalism. The first documents the ways in 
which religious engagement helps people to realize their desire to migrate 
and the hopes underpinning their migration projects. Such studies highlight 
the instrumental value of Pentecostal networks and theology at all stages in 
the migration process. Prospective migrants employ deliverance strategies 
to get protection during their travel (van Dijk 1997) and pastors offer both 
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(Hagan and Ebaugh 2003). Where the migrants settle down, Pentecostal 
churches provide services that facilitate life abroad: they challenge negative 
stereotypes of African migrants (Knibbe 2009); set up nurseries, kindergar-
tens, and medical and counseling amenities (Hunt and Lightly 2001); facil-
itate access to overseas contacts, professional networks, and scholarships 
(Meagher 2010; Meyer 1998; Smith 2001); offer moral and material sup-
port (Adogame 2003; van der Meulen 2009); and provide opportunities 
to take on meaningful social responsibilities (Miller and Yamamori 2007).
Pentecostal organizations thus act as stabilizing forces that narrow the gaps 
between expectations and realities.
The second approach to hope and Pentecostalism takes rupture as its start-
ing point. This scholarship refers to the unsettling effects of radical economic 
and political uncertainty in the post-colony, where individual desires for 
material wealth are intense but largely frustrated. Pentecostal churches struc-
ture how people experience the world; they are ‘narrative-machines as much 
as welfare societies and new economy interpellation devices’ (Piot 2010, 56).
The churches articulate the problems of living with fundamental uncertainty 
and offer strategies for overcoming the tribulations they cause (Marshall 
2009; Piot 2010). These strategies include the instantaneous production of 
wealth through miracles at a time when most fortunes emerge without any 
evident basis (Mbembe 2004). Pentecostal theology also encourages with-
drawal from communal obligations and kin, thus helping people to manage 
the tension between individual desires to prosper and social pressure to share 
wealth (Robbins 2004). Individualization is promoted through discourses 
that urge hand-to-hand combat with traditions and the ancestral past (Casa-
nova 2001; Meyer 1998). Whereas Pentecostalism helps to manage some 
conflicting obligations, it creates new schisms: The Prosperity Gospel—the 
promise that God will grant believers this-worldly wealth—repeatedly fails 
to become manifest in the lives of most Born-Agains (Meyer 2004).
The juxtaposition of riches and material deprivation has elicited dispa-
rate theological responses in the Global South. In Latin America, libera-
tion theology was developed from the 1950s onwards as a moral reaction 
to poverty and inequality. God was perceived to suffer with humanity, a 
creed elaborated by Jürgen Moltmann in his seminal 1967 book Theol-
ogy of hope. Moltmann’s work made Ernst Bloch’s (1986) notion of ‘not 
yet’-consciousness available to a wide Christian audience. It presents hope 
as a way of revolting against the deprivations in this world and working 
towards change. ‘We hear of ineffable blessedness—but meantime we are 
here oppressed by infinite misery’, Moltmann wrote (1967, 19). For libera-
tion theologians, hope in eschatology ought to focus on alleviating misery on 
this side of eternity, ‘in contradiction to our present experience of suffering,
evil and death’ (Moltmann 1967, 19).
The ways in which hope is practiced in Pentecostalism is radically dif-
ferent from the understandings put forward through liberation theology.
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theological traditions. As an activity pointed towards the future, hope is 
strongly conditioned by temporal conceptualizations. Whereas liberation 
theology advocates for collective action to change the near future, African 
Pentecostalism mainly works through two other time frames: the immediate
and the long-term. Pentecostal churches emphasize immediate experience 
with God’s presence. Services are understood as unique events rather than 
the re-enactment of rituals, with a dramaturgy that promotes direct encoun-
ters with God through the Holy Spirit. The long-term perspective points 
towards the Second Coming of the Messiah, when evil will be defeated and 
judgment passed on all human beings. Believers vigilantly look for signs of 
end times and prepare for them, never certain of how they will be judged.
Utopian dreams permeated public discourse in Africa in the 1980s and 
1990s, when the continent experienced strong Pentecostal growth. The pol-
icy rhetoric in Nigeria under structural adjustment and military rule invoked 
long-term vistas of progress, while most citizens struggled to get through the 
day (Guyer 2007). The suppression of the near future as a temporal frame in 
public life arguably deprived people of ‘a set of practices and representations 
aimed towards active engagement in the social world’ (Guyer 2007, 409).
The ontology of time in Pentecostal Christianity entails methodological 
challenges parallel to those associated with studying hope: how to approach 
practices to which temporal disjuncture—represented both in radical breaks 
with the past and prospective orientations towards the future—is integral.
Hirokazu Miyazaki’s (2006) treatise of hope in a Fijian context points 
towards ways of studying discontinuity and maintaining the prospective 
orientation of hope. ‘The newness and freshness of the prospective moment 
that defines the moment as hopeful is lost as soon as hope is approached as 
the end point of a process’, he writes (Miyazaki 2006, 8). Instead of treating 
hope as a subject of knowledge, Miyazaki proposes hope  as method for 
comprehending a future-oriented way of being in the world. The hopeful 
moments in Fijian cultural performance are understood as ways of gener-
ating self-knowledge. Hope as method opens up opportunities for studying 
Pentecostal practices on their own terms, approaching the churches’ fantas-
tic promises of wealth as a reality still in a state of not-yet, and appreciating 
prophesies for the social momentum that they produce rather than their 
efficacy.
The not-yet is given geographical referents by Pentecostal churches. Images 
of success are intimately connected to the ability to transcend localness. The 
breaks with the past are also breaks with local cultures, but in ways that 
entail engagement through confrontation. The local is thus part and parcel 
of practices that envision positive change towards becoming global. Pente-
costalism’s engagement with the indigenous through combating it enables 
easy adaptation to local circumstances whereas the religion remains deter-
ritorialized (Casanova 2001). From its inception more than a century ago,
migration has been a main vehicle through which Pentecostalism has spread 
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Nigerian Migration to China 
The advent of Nigerian migration to China was conditioned by the two 
countries’ colonial histories and their places in the global economy. In the 
1990s, young Nigerian men who were unable to find jobs in the domestic 
manufacturing sector, which was brought to its knees by structural adjust-
ment programs, turned towards East and Southeast Asia. Their first port 
of call was Hong Kong, where they were secured visa-free entry through 
Nigeria’s membership of the Commonwealth of Nations. From the British 
colony they traveled to South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and other indus-
trializing economies to take up factory employment. Many worked without 
formal documentation, and deportations to Hong Kong—the nearest terri-
tory which Nigerians could legally enter—were common.
A group of deportees formed the first Nigerian settlement in South China.
Living costs in Hong Kong were exorbitant and, by moving across the bor-
der to mainland China, Nigerians could sustain themselves cheaply. They 
continued to provide services to visiting African traders in Hong Kong and 
waited for job opportunities in Asia. The first Nigerian to set up a business 
in China is said to be Ike Okane, a mechanic who became infirm after get-
ting his arm trapped on an assembly line in South Korea. While visiting an 
Igbo friend in Guangzhou in 1997, Okane discovered a depot for seized 
motorcycles. He solicited the help of a compatriot graduate from a Chi-
nese university to convince the depot management to sell him the vehicles 
for export. Soon, he brought unemployed Nigerians from Hong Kong to 
help dismantle the motorcycles, and the Nigerian population in Guangzhou 
counted 200 persons within a year. Okane and two other Igbo men secured 
the exclusive right to buy motorcycles from the depot, effectively forming a 
cartel. The Nigerian workers, who were excluded from the trade in motor-
cycle spare parts, invested their salaries in other products manufactured in 
China. They also helped African traders to procure goods directly from the 
mainland rather than via agents in Hong Kong. As more of these traders 
visited Guangzhou in person, Chinese and resident Africans set up accom-
modation, catering, and logistics services to cater to their needs.
Young men remain the main demographic group among Nigerian immi-
grants in China today. They leave Nigeria in search of the proverbial greener 
pastures. Increased economic interaction between the two countries has 
conjured up the impression that employment prospects in China are good: 
Chinese consumer goods are now ubiquitous in Nigerian markets and large 
amounts of Chinese investment capital flow into Nigeria.Whereas structural 
disparities represent an important underlying cause of migration, specific 
instances of departure from Nigeria are often precipitated by idiosyncratic 
events—an unwanted marriage, a failed football career, business bankruptcy.
China is below Europe in a spatial hierarchy of destination countries but is 
considered an acceptable alternative, as opportunities to enter Europe are 
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Europe that ended in deportation. Others highlight the physical danger of 
traveling to Europe by land and sea, and regard migration to Asia as a less 
perilous (and therefore morally superior) option.
The emerging infrastructure for visa brokerage to Asia contributed to the 
increase in Nigerians heading to China. Access to a credible broker offering 
to organize the journey to China has initiated migration for people who 
were not actively searching for opportunities to leave their home country 
(see Alpes 2011 for a discussion of this phenomenon in Cameroon). Bro-
kers speed up the decision process. Potential migrants are forced to make 
a rushed decision about whether to accept a rare access to intercontinental 
mobility, and have few opportunities to learn more about the situation in 
China. Furthermore, many migrants in China did not think that more infor-
mation prior to departure would necessarily prevent people from travel-
ing. They described potential migrants, themselves included, as reluctant to 
assess their prospects of success based on other people’s experiences. Conse-
quently, they were reluctant to warn against others going to China. A song 
written by Ferdblack, an Igbo musician who regretted moving to Guang-
zhou, illustrates this mindset. In the lyrics of ‘Let our hearts be strong’, he 
describes the hardships which Africans encounter in China: going hungry,
having no place to live, and being in want of a job. Yet, the ensuing text does 
not discourage others from trying to succeed in China. Instead, Ferdblack 
proposes that only God can tell people what to do and encourages fellow 
Nigerians to travel and pursue money ‘because money is the head of this 
world’ (Ferdblack 2009).
The relative ease with which Nigerians could initially enter China was not 
the result of deliberate policy choices. Until the turn of the millennium, there 
was no pressing need to regulate immigration at the national level because 
China received few intercontinental migrants (Pieke 2012). This changed 
as the presence of foreigners grew larger and more visible. In Guangzhou,
riots staged by Nigerian migrants to protest at the deaths of compatriots in 
police custody and the disquiet expressed by Chinese inhabitants of areas 
with many undocumented foreigners prompted government concerns about 
immigration as a source of social unrest (Chinese People’s Political Consul-
tative Conference 2008; Yan 2012). Whereas  ad hoc measures to restrict 
immigration were introduced on the ground, the central government decided 
to draft new immigration legislation. After a decade of preparations, China’s 
first comprehensive immigration legislation—the Exit and Entry Adminis-
tration Law—took full effect on 1 July 2013. The law embodies a tension 
between the need, on the one hand, to promote economic development and,
on the other, to protect national security and social stability (Ministry of 
Public Security 2012). High-profile official campaigns, organized to crack 
down on ‘illegal foreigners’ in China’s major cities, have accompanied these 
legislative changes (Lefkowitz 2014).
Legal permits to stay in China have always been more difficult to obtain 
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visa, prospective Nigerian migrants are faced with a momentous decision: 
to return before their visa expires or stay on undocumented. Those opt-
ing for the latter must maneuver within an intricate legislative environment 
that was initially designed to manage internal migration in China through 
the household registration ( hukou) system (Haugen 2012). Foreigners are 
required to register their place of residence within 24 hours and provide 
information about their visas in the process. Landlords face fines if their 
tenants are not registered or lack valid documents, and hotels are obliged to 
check their guests’ papers. This drives up the price of housing for undocu-
mented migrants. Local governments deliberately manipulate the residential 
pattern of foreigners by declining to register their housing in certain areas 
(Haugen 2015). Furthermore, the 2012 Exit–Entry Law obliges anyone 
aware of foreigners who have entered, who reside, or who work in China 
illegally to notify the Public Security Bureau.
Some of the difficulties which African migrants face in China can be illus-
trated by the story of Abel, a Nigerian who was brought to The Tower by a
friend when he arrived in Guangzhou. As the youngest son in a politically
well-connected family in Eastern Nigeria, Abel faced less pressure to provide
for his relatives than most of his peers in China.When he grew up, his paternal
grandfather wanted him to become a priest, but he landed a managerial job
through family connections instead. Despite his comfortable life, Abel wanted
to go abroad to prove that he could fend for himself and was, in his words,
‘no longer a kid’. Migration was an adventure he desired in order to prove his
ability (cf. Bredeloup 2008). He complained that his brother, who worked at a
European embassy in Abuja, was ‘too righteous’ to assist him in getting a visa.
One day, a man who courted Abel’s sister offered to get him a Chinese visa
through a connection. ‘It’s good to go somewhere else to gain more experience
before going to Europe’, Abel reasoned. The aspiring brother-in-law paid the
visa agent US$2,000. Upon receiving the travel documents, Abel bought a
plane ticket, called his mother to say goodbye, and left for China.
Abel reached Guangzhou shortly after the 2008 Beijing Olympics. He 
immediately realized that managing a state of illegality in China would 
be tough, and gave his passport to a new agent along with RMB 9,000 
(US$1,440) to get his visa renewed. The agent disappeared with the money,
but returned Abel’s passport. The landlord allowed Abel to stay on without 
a visa, but asked him to move into an unofficial guesthouse in response to 
rumors of an upcoming police raid. As this is a common phenomenon for 
undocumented tenants, Abel did not suspect anything wrong at first, but the 
landlord never allowed him to move back and refused to refund the deposit.
‘He knows I cannot go to the police because of the paper problem. That’s 
why they can treat Nigerians like that’, Abel said. Establishing a business 
also proved harder than he had expected. He rented a wholesale store in a 
trading mall frequented by Africans, but had to ask the Chinese wife of a 
friend to put the contract in her name and manage the store when police 
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The shame of having to hide was, for Abel, the most disturbing aspect 
of living as an undocumented migrant. ‘I would not complain about the 
hardship here if it weren’t for the harassment’, he said upon recounting 
the various ways in which his status made him vulnerable. ‘If you can live 
here, there’s no place you can’t stay. People here are too primitive. But I 
have learned a lot’. His comfortable financial situation and extensive social 
network helped Abel to manage the situation and eventually leave China.
In December 2009, the Public Security Bureau announced the first and only 
amnesty in which exit visas were granted to foreigners who paid an RMB 
2,100 fine for overstaying. Abel decided to use this opportunity to return 
home, and solicited my help as a Chinese speaker to complete the necessary 
formalities. When he was finally granted permission to leave China, Abel 
strode lightly and confidently out of the Exit and Entry Bureau, relieved to 
no longer hide from anyone. He was ready to celebrate Christmas in Nigeria 
before trying to go to Europe. ‘You have been doing God’s work’, he told 
me as we parted, indicating not only that his freedom to leave China was 
the result of divine influence but also that my assistance did not place him 
in debt to me because I would be rewarded by God. In Pentecostal Chris-
tianity, ‘doing God’s work’—that is, giving Born-Again principles concrete 
application—is a means of accessing personal wealth and transnational con-
nections (Marshall 2009), as we shall see below.
African Churches in China: Spiritual Warfare 
in a Pugnaciously Secular Country 
The early Nigerian migrants to Guangzhou established Christian fellow-
ships that were run in much the same way as Chinese house churches: small 
groups of people gathered in apartments to pray and invoke the presence of 
the Holy Spirit. The first Nigerian pastors in China soon realized that the 
experientially oriented Pentecostal services appealed to a Chinese audience 
and they baptized new Chinese followers every month. But the limitations 
imposed by the secular Chinese state soon became apparent. Religious gath-
erings outside the state-sanctioned places of worship are prohibited for for-
eigners and Chinese nationals alike, but the subversive potential is seen as 
much greater when Chinese believers assemble and are led by a foreigner.
In order to remain tolerated by the government, the Nigerian churches were 
forced to grow mainly through attracting African followers. Some set up 
smaller, discreetly run congregations exclusively for Chinese believers. The 
Chinese participation in the African churches was largely limited to the 
wives and children of their migrant members.
By 2014, there were around a dozen Nigerian-headed Pentecostal churches 
in Guangzhou, as well as congregations preaching in Lingala, French, Por-
tuguese, and other languages spoken by Africans from across the continent.
None were registered with China’s Religious Affairs Bureau, which is a 
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Guangzhou are well aware of the existence of the underground churches,
and occasionally even communicate messages to undocumented migrants 
through the African pastors. The churches are tacitly tolerated as long as 
they do not become too visible or assertive. Church leaders rent spaces in 
office buildings, hotels, and restaurants, and are routinely forced to move 
by the police.
The Nigerian churches in China are either founded as branches of churches 
in Nigeria or set up independently by Nigerians living in China. The only 
Nigerian church in China that has welcomed media attention, the Royal 
Victory Church, was established in Guangzhou, and expanded from main-
land China into Nigeria, as well as into Hong Kong, Cameroon, and the 
Philippines (RVC 2015). The names and aesthetics of the Nigerian churches 
parade their global connections and aspirations. In The Tower, the national 
flags of Israel, the United States, and Nigeria are placed on one side of the 
pulpit, with the flags of three other African countries on the other side.
A mixture of Nigerian religious tunes and globally consumed Pentecostal 
songs fills the services, and the sermons are strewn with references to inter-
national travel and links with churches on other continents.
If The Tower had ever been effective as a network of support for vul-
nerable migrants, its capacity to assist congregants had been exhausted by 
2009, when I joined the church. One congregant had stayed in prison for 
more than a year without receiving assistance to repatriate, while several 
others had been incarcerated for months. The size of the ministry fluctuated 
greatly. The Tower was established in 1998, and was at one point home to 
the largest African church in Guangzhou, attracting hundreds of people.
However, many members abandoned the church following a dispute about 
money. By 2009, there were only a few dozen regular attendants, and Pastor 
Paul instructed congregants not to bother the remaining prosperous mem-
bers of the congregation. The decline spurred tension. For example, Nigerian 
members criticized newly arrived Cameroonian congregants for expecting 
support from the church—‘They use the church as insurance’, one Nigerian 
complained.
Mobility, while celebrated during the church services, represents a chal-
lenge to the day-to-day running of the ministries. A high turnover of African 
migrants produces unstable congregations, often leaving positions of trust 
empty. The organizational volatility depletes the effectiveness of pastoral 
care. Without discounting the help occasionally extended between individ-
uals in The Tower, the church barely qualified as a network of support for 
most migrants. Furthermore, many saw no advantage to conducting business 
with other church members and even deliberately avoided such transactions,
as the ministry proved ineffective in negotiating in business disputes between 
congregants. In short, one must look beyond the practical utility of the Pen-
tecostal churches in order to understand their appeal to African migrants 
in China. The churches are societies where hope is not only enabled, but 
constructed as a duty. It is to this hope that I now turn.
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Moral Value Assigned to Hope 
Pentecostal theology insists that hope has a moral dimension. Hopefulness 
is portrayed as virtuous; despair is regarded as degenerate. In the Pente-
costal moral universe, problems are not understood as structurally rooted 
or accidentally inflicted but, rather, cast in a narrative of good and evil.
Overcoming trouble is equated with fighting the devil. In The Tower’s Sun-
day services, Pastor Paul started to address the congregation’s problems by 
naming them: the police forcing undocumented migrants to hide, shipments 
seized by customs officers, business partners in Africa ‘eating your money’,
and the lack of resources enabling people to marry and establish a family.
Sometimes, congregants testified publicly about overcoming such troubles 
and the pastor reinforced their testimonies by rephrasing them in ways that 
emphasized the importance of spiritual vigilance to secure worldly success.
For example, the owner of a business called  Grace Logistics testified about a 
fire that was quenched just before it reached his own warehouse. Pastor Paul 
then repeated the central elements of the story, praising the business man for 
his spiritual acumen.‘Grace Logistics was formed in The Tower and the devil 
cannot stop it from moving’, he said, suggesting that the owner had saved 
his business by making the right spiritual choices.
Subsequent to the generic labeling of problems in the church services,
congregants identified the sources of their specific afflictions. Problems were 
often traced back to their relationships with people who wished to inflict 
harm. The Tower, like many other African diaspora churches, retained a 
belief in wizards and witches who do the work of the devil and hinder people 
from achieving the success that God has in store for them. Evil spirits were 
combated through prayers and offerings, and the church services encour-
aged vigilance in everyday life against evil entities. The fight perceived to be 
going on between good and malicious forces affected migration and business 
decisions. For example, a church member who had traveled back and forth 
to China over a period of ten years said that he overstayed his one-month 
visa for fear of returning to his home town, where somebody was perform-
ing witchcraft on him. Another congregant canceled a business deal with 
a trader from Haïti because he believed she was a witch who would bring 
trouble if he took her money. In both cases, concrete business conflicts were 
assigned moral meaning which, in turn, affected how they were acted upon.
African migrants in China commonly face expectations for remittances 
that they are in no position to meet. By encouraging breaks with local cul-
tures and kin, Pentecostal theology provides moral support to struggling 
migrants as well as business people who need to retain resources for rein-
vestment. Pastor Paul ended a prayer to free the congregation from ancestral 
spirits with a reminder that church has replaced family, calling out ‘Mr Debt 
must die!’ That particular service was missed by Prince, a young Nigerian 
who came to China to launch his football career and had disappointed his 
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to go to church without any money to offer as ‘seed’. For Prince, the emanci-
pation from social obligations vis-à-vis relatives at home came at the expense 
of new debts to the church, which he was unable to honor. Furthermore,
the comfort and familiarity offered by a Pentecostal spiritual universe with 
perpetual warfare between good and evil impedes integration into the host 
society. Whether or not the African ministries actively proselytize among the 
Chinese, individual believers are discursively positioned in a territory demar-
cated to be conquered for Jesus. Proselytization discourses in Pentecostalism 
have entailed a demonization of the object of conversion. As Ruth Marshall 
has put it, ‘Underlying the bid to convert the other is the need to  convict and 
overcome him, to identify him with the demonic that needs to be destroyed 
for salvation and redemption to occur’ (2009, 14, emphasis in original).
Both Christian and Muslim African migrants in Guangzhou cited the hea-
then nature of Chinese people as a reason for not learning the language or 
having a local girlfriend. By keeping the Chinese at a distance, they forewent 
resources that proved beneficial to the businesses and personal lives of their 
compatriots who were better integrated in China (Haugen 2013).
Once misfortune is inscribed with meaning, combating it becomes a moral 
obligation rather than a matter of choice. In The Tower, present problems 
were fought through the generation of prospective moments that pointed 
towards a utopian future. The production of hope was not just acts that 
created visions; the acts were also seen as the means to actualize these visions 
by enabling the work of the Holy Spirit. Yet, problems persisted in the lives 
of most congregants. In the face of such entrenched hardship, The Tower 
promoted patience and persistence through the notion that God ‘works 
with time and season’. In other words, it is up to God to decide  when to 
allow people to reach their goals. Phrases such as ‘God’s time is the best’ 
were popular business mottos among Christian Nigerians in China. How-
ever, demonic influence could make congregants lose their faith in the pos-
sibility of turning things around for the better: ‘Discouragement is Satan’s 
best weapon against the believer’, Pastor Paul preached. Reproducing hope,
therefore, was equated with fighting with God against the devil.
The strong confidence in God’s power to assist believers in reaching their 
goals affected migration decisions. Pastors encouraged migrants to remain in 
China even after years of economic failure. ‘[The migrant] should not return,
because the money will come soon, and he will be able to fulfill the wish of 
his family’, one pastor said. He presented returning to Africa with nothing 
to show for the stay abroad as an act of blasphemy. Whereas communal 
encouragement to retain faith in success in China inspired migrants to keep 
going, it also narrowed the range of morally acceptable choices.
The moral value assigned to hope may explain the negative reactions 
when Abel chose to leave China without having attained his objective. I had 
found his choice wise: he assessed the situation and confronted its implica-
tions head-on by returning home. However, I learned from the responses of 
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in God’s ability to turn desperate situations around. Abel was criticized for 
giving up, and I was reproached for accommodating his weakness rather 
than encouraging him to keep trying. Expecting these reactions, Abel left 
China without saying goodbye to the church members.
The ways in which Pentecostal pastors instill migrants with hope was 
not universally condoned by Nigerians in China. Some avoided the Pen-
tecostal churches and blamed pastors for giving their compatriots unreal-
istic expectations that inspired bad behavior and damaged the reputation 
of all Africans. Nigerian migrants who had exhausted their funds regarded 
drug-dealing as a real and dangerous temptation. A number of Africans have 
been convicted and imprisoned for drug offenses in Guangzhou (Guangzhou 
People’s Court Reports 2012). Drug crimes were a source of community 
mistrust. ‘If I stay with people, I cannot know who is who. This place is 
China. It is not good to stay with people here’, Chidike, an undocumented 
migrant, said with reference to the danger of being associated with narcot-
ics trafficking. Three years after Chidike made this statement, in 2012, the 
police raided Liuhua Hotel, a center for the Nigerian-controlled drug-trade 
in Guangzhou (Li 2012). Several Nigerians jumped out of the windows to 
escape—rumor had it that a young man who was active in one of the African 
churches died in the fall. Chidike was among those who blamed the pastor 
of the deceased. ‘If you tell people they will have a lot of money, some will 
do bad things to make it. The blood of this young boy is on the hands of 
the pastor’, he asserted angrily. He had attended a non-African international 
church to avoid contact with other Nigerians and escape from the focus 
on the prosperity gospel. However, after the police checked passports at a 
church meal in 2010, the American pastors said they would no longer pro-
tect Chidike. He felt unwelcome and left the congregation.
Hope without Restraint 
In the moral universe promulgated by The Tower, unconstrained hopes and
desires for astonishing success were valued more highly than realistic aspira-
tions for incremental improvements.The congregants understood bold prayer
requests as signs of strong belief in God’s power, and church leaders condoned
and encouraged this attitude. ‘Just because you have some few thousand [dol-
lars] does not mean that you have arrived’, Pastor Paul said. ‘You cannot get
what you cannot see. You must see it to get it’. He often cited Ezekiel 37, a
Bible passage where God gives life to piles of skeletons in the valley of dry
bones. Churches across Africa interpret this tale as an attestation of God’s
ability to turn the most desperate situations around (Asamoah-Gyadu 2005).
To believers in The Tower, the valley of dry bones symbolized China—a place
of great hardship where sweeping improvements were imminent.
Pentecostal Christianity requires individuals to break with the past in 
order to access the boundless possibilities that come with being Born-Again.
‘[To be Born-Again] means you are free from the burden your family has 
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brought upon you. [. . .] You have a new DNA. Nobody will ask who your 
parents are and judge you by it’, Pastor Paul explained. Deliverance from 
the past is a long-term process rather than a one-off event. Believers must 
continuously create distance between themselves and their backgrounds,
searching their souls for remnants of the past and evil intrusions. The dialec-
tic practice of forgetting and remembering invokes the possibility of failure,
together with the potential for improvement. Pastor Paul’s sermons and his 
congregants’ prayers and testimonies defined success as the appropriation 
of control over global flows, including one’s own mobility across borders.
Examples of achievements mentioned in the church were phone calls from 
wealthy people ordering goods, friends in high office, business branches in 
new countries, container-loads of goods shipped to Africa, residence permits 
for China, and visas for Europe and Australia.
In Guangzhou’s trading malls, African migrants passed the time by relay-
ing stories about people who resolved tough problems in spectacular ways.
Their accounts described implausible and audacious escapes from difficult 
situations that involved the police, customs officers, or immigration officials.
Such narratives were also incorporated into the church services. For exam-
ple, Pastor Paul told the story of a migrant in China whose visa application 
was rejected by the British Embassy. The applicant had wept and said that he 
had no more hope left. The pastor then prayed for him and declared that the 
visa would be granted. The man went back to the embassy. Accompanied by 
cheers from the congregants, Pastor Paul described how the visa application 
eventually was successful: 
The visa officer said ‘Why are you here?’ The man then replied ‘God 
said you must give me [a] visa’. The woman looked at him. ‘God has 
said I must give you [a] visa?’ she asked. He replied ‘Yes’. And then the 
woman told him ‘Come and collect your visa tomorrow!’ And he went 
and got the visa.
Similarly, migrants provided testimonies about being saved from deporta-
tion through supernatural intervention: One man became invisible when the 
police did passport checks in a trading mall; a woman was captured by the 
police, showed signs of violent illness, was released by scared police officers,
and immediately recovered her health.
The generic promises of wealth and success made in plenary in The Tower 
took on more concrete expressions as they were interpreted by the congre-
gants. For example, a Kenyan woman, who lived from hand to mouth as a 
guide for visiting traders, planned to tap into global capital flows by buying 
vast amounts of land outside Nairobi and growing fresh strawberries to be 
airlifted to Europe. A Nigerian church member envisaged building schools 
that would serve as models for a better education system in his home coun-
try. These dreams were kept alive long after it became clear that life in China 
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The predictions of upcoming achievements presented in The Tower were,
to some extent, real in their consequences. Promises of business success 
inspired people who had been unsuccessful for years to continue devising 
new plans and calling prospective customers at home to solicit orders. Proph-
esies about visas coming through encouraged congregants to put up with the 
hardship they experienced in China for a little longer. Hope was deferred,
spatially and temporally—it was placed in new migration destinations, for 
which China was expected to serve as a springboard, and postponed, as 
migrants expected heavenly promises to be shortly fulfilled.
In Nigeria, Pentecostal churches give the not-yet geographical referents 
through the construction of self-contained towns. In these towns, the minis-
tries express their visions for the future by providing the public infrastruc-
ture which most Nigerians lack: roads free of potholes, safe transport, clean 
water, electricity without power cuts, and premium health and education 
facilities. The website of the world’s largest Pentecostal city, which was 
founded outside Lagos by the Redeemed Christian Church of God, presents 
the place as a spatial manifestation of the future: 
A billboard outside the gate shows a mother smiling down at her baby. It 
is a picture of complete satisfaction from both. [. . .] The prayers of the 
residents may have already been answered. [. . .] Unlike many Nigerian 
towns and cities where existence is dreary, nasty and often extremely 
disorganised, the Redeemed Camp is a town that works.
(Redeemed Christian Church of God 2015) 
In fact, these ‘towns that work’ house very few people except during spe-
cial events. More than vehicles for concrete improvement in people’s living 
conditions, the towns are effective as utopian visions. They project images 
of supreme fulfillment that are unfettered by the limitations of the present,
representing, in Miyazaki’s (2006) terms, ‘prospective moments’.
African ministries have created spaces through which hope can be produced
in Europe and the United States as well, albeit at a smaller scale than in Africa.
The physical structures erected by Christian migrants allow them to put their
economic resources and organizational capabilities on display, thus challenging
the stereotypes of Africans in their host societies (Garbin 2010, 2013; Knibbe
2009). In China, by contrast, the strict regulation of religious activities denies
foreign churches the opportunity to spatially manifest their presence. The
African churches are shut down unless they show discretion. The churches’
restrained mode of operation thus contrasts starkly with the uninhibited expec-
tations and uncompromising attitudes which the pastors promulgate.
Hope as an Embodied Practice 
‘Only God can save Nigeria’. ‘If the immigration police come, I am covered 
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above, Nigerians in Guangzhou understand such statements not as figures 
of speech but as examples of concrete ways in which divine forces intervene 
in their lives. The claims do not represent a fatalistic attitude; they call for 
action. Upon placing things in the hands of God, one must exert vigorous 
effort to combat the devil and promote the work of the Holy Spirit. Main-
taining a sense of possibility—an expectation that God will ensure that the 
objectives that prompted migration to China are realized—requires both 
speech and movement.
In the Pentecostal tradition, the physical is valued higher than the cerebral.
Conjuring belief in radical improvements requires the suspension of rational 
thinking. ‘The voice of reason is the enemy of the Holy Spirit’, Pastor Paul 
preached. At one of The Tower’s ‘miracle services’, a visiting pastor singled 
me out to eject rational belief and to insert, in its place, true experientially 
based faith. He put his palm on my forehead and threw it backwards, as if 
physically pushing rationality out. To share the prospective momentum pro-
duced through Pentecostal services, reason must be suspended and a phys-
ical approach adopted in its place. The guest pastor guided me to use my 
body to summon what has not-yet-become rather than rationally assess the 
future based on past experiences (cf. Bloch 1986). The synchronic perfor-
mances that invoke the future in The Tower represent a way of employing 
hope as method (Miyazaki 2006).
The African-run churches in Guangzhou demand energetic participation 
from their members. This form of worship is contrasted with the subdued 
and ritualized services of mainstream Catholicism. The congregants of Pen-
tecostal churches confirm the pastors’ words as they are spoken by repeating 
key messages and spontaneously utter ‘Amen!’ and ‘Hallelujah!’ Pastors invite 
believers to articulate what they want to achieve and, in narrative terms, these 
statements are completed the moment they are uttered (Coleman 2006). Pas-
tor Paul asked that church members address each other as ‘son of a rich man’ 
and ‘daughter of a king’, thus declaring that the wealth and success to which 
congregants aspire have already arrived. The atmosphere became increas-
ingly charged as the services progressed, and people variously fell down on 
the floor, walked around, and manifested the Holy Spirit by breaking into 
glossolalia.When the services ended, many congregants were soaked in sweat 
from the verbal and physical expressions of their spiritual agency.
The agency exercised in the Pentecostal services contrasts with the migrants’
experiences outside their ministries. The churches provide congregants with 
the means to take charge of their own lives, thus with a sense of control over 
situations the outcome of which would otherwise depend on forces beyond 
their reach. Furthermore, congregants encourage each other to be loud and 
use their bodies expressively whereas, outside the church, migrants try to 
behave inconspicuously to detract attention from themselves.
A range of bodily techniques to be employed individually complement the 
collective exercises in the church. The core of these efforts is prayer, where 




















Prospective Moments, Eternal Salvation 109 
back. Fasting of various lengths of time can be added to improve the effec-
tiveness of the prayers. The witches and demons that have the incentive and 
power to block the migrants’ progress are located in the congregants’ home 
countries, often among close relatives. Relations with Chinese people are not 
seen as arenas for spiritual combat, although evil forces can  use the Chinese 
as a means to harm their victims.
Individual congregants may request help from their pastor to increase 
the potency of their prayers. Pastors pray and fast on behalf of others. If 
they have prophetic gifts, pastors can foresee in dreams whether the specific 
aspirations will be achieved. ‘I have seen most of your faces in my dreams 
and visions’, Pastor Paul assured his congregants. Because the actions of 
pastors are important mediums for advancement, worshipping with ‘false 
men of God’—that is, leaders who lack divine connections—is dangerously 
obstructive. African pastors in Guangzhou cautioned against believing in the 
false promises of their rival churches. ‘They will manipulate, tell you they 
will fast for you a lot of days’, Pastor Paul warned people. ‘They say the same 
to many others. It’s not humanly possible to fast that much! [. . .] You must 
guard your heart! Deliver yourself from the hands of manipulative spir-
its!’ The Tower frequently lost members to other churches. In Guangzhou’s 
fiercely competitive religious landscape, Born-Agains easily find new places 
of worship when promises of success no longer feel effective. The pastors of 
the abandoned churches go from being trusted as agents for cleansing soci-
ety of immorality to becoming targets of accusations of corruption them-
selves. The ability to induce hope is therefore a  sine qua non for the success 
of the African churches in Guangzhou.
Conclusion: The Paradox of Hope 
Pentecostalism is an intensely future-oriented ideology. The ability to incite 
hope for material and social advancement has been central to its rapid global 
expansion. The concept of being Born-Again carries the promise of start-
ing afresh without the afflictions of the past. Pentecostal theology provides 
migrants with certitude and ways of making sense of the world while facing 
circumstances beyond their control. However, the hopes mediated through 
a Pentecostal theology represent constraints as well as opportunities. The 
moral value assigned to hope shapes the migrants’ relationship with the host 
society and the ways in which migration choices are assessed, making some 
options more accessible while constraining others. For those who eventually 
opt to return to their home country empty-handed, the choice represents a 
final failure in their migration endeavor: the failure to retain hope.
Despite the setback experienced by most Nigerian migrants in China,
migration continues to be regarded as a path to improvement. The migrants 
maintain their faith in a better future by suspending it, projecting their 
expectations onto future points in time or new destination countries. The 
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active participation and the exertion of great physical effort. Thus, the pro-
duction of hope is an embodied as well as a collective process; to maintain 
aspirations requires both the hard work of the individual and the institu-
tional support of the churches.
Participant observation is a particularly apt approach for studying hope 
produced through corporal and communal practices. However, there is also a 
need for an epistemological device that can capture the forward-looking ori-
entation and ideology of discontinuity in Pentecostalism. As I have described 
in this chapter, Pentecostal practitioners often take a fiercely anti-intellectual 
stance and value fantastic expectations. The ‘method of hope’ proposed by 
Miyazaki (2006) provides a way for the researcher to reorient knowledge 
production so as to better understand hopeful practices. It represents a 
means to take religious belief seriously without explaining away its unknow-
able features.
African churches, as well as the migrants attending them, face a unique 
set of challenges in China. The migrants’ religious practices have thus far 
been readily accommodated to the situation, and Pentecostalism has again 
proved extremely adaptable to local circumstances. Pentecostal institutions 
provide material optimism and promises of instant blessings in times of dis-
ruption, and seem to thrive off the contradictions they create rather than 
being undermined by them. There is no reason to believe that the hardship 
borne by Nigerian migrants in China will lead them to abandon Pentecostal 
faith and practices. Rather, the setbacks they experience in their migration 
projects sustain the need for methods of performing hoped-for achievements 
as facts of the present.
Note 
1. The names of persons and churches have been changed to protect the anonymity 
of the research participants.
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7 Hope and Uncertainty in Senegalese 
Migration to Spain 
Taking Chances on Emigration but 
not Upon Return 
María Hernández-Carretero 
During fieldwork in Spain in 2010–12, I asked Senegalese migrants to 
recount their initial decision to migrate to Europe and their thoughts about 
returning to Senegal. Their accounts revealed a striking contrast in atti-
tudes to uncertainty and taking chances with regard to emigration and 
return. Most had felt optimistic that, by emigrating, they could improve 
their lives and assist their families, and seemingly accepting of, or with 
limited concern for, the uncertainties that migration might entail in terms 
of unknowns or unforeseeable eventualities (see Williams and Baláž 2012,
169). When they discussed return, by contrast, they generally did so with 
a more cautious, even hesitant, attitude. Although virtually all wished to 
settle back home eventually, they stressed the need to first achieve certain 
financial objectives—reaching a particular level of savings, building a house 
in Senegal, or investing there—to ensure their own and their families’ pros-
perity after leaving Europe. They were wary of going back unprepared, lest 
they return to a situation of livelihood uncertainty, shattering their families’ 
hopes for a better life, and losing face for not succeeding through migration.
In recounting their initial decision to migrate, my interlocutors commu-
nicated a sense of positive anticipation and confidence, largely expressed 
with a language of opportunity, hope, chance, and fate. By contrast, when 
discussing return they stressed concerns about preparedness and the possi-
bility of failure and shame.
In this chapter I argue that the contrast in migrants’ attitudes to uncer-
tainty upon emigration and return lies in hope’s power to mediate uncer-
tainty: uncertainty related to migratory transitions may be approached with 
positive anticipation and a proactive disposition or elicit apprehension,
depending on whether the transition inspires hope. Uncertainty and hope 
are both inherently temporal, connecting an individual or group’s present 
with the future (Anderson 2006; Bloch 1986; von Benda-Beckmann and 
von Benda-Beckmann 1994). The interplay between hope and uncertainty 
affects migrants’ willingness to take chances, by which I mean to engage 
with the uncertain with a sense of positive anticipation. An undertaking 
that entails uncertainty may inspire optimism when it implies opening one’s 
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of stagnation (see Di Nunzio 2015; Horst and Grabska 2015). Yet in the 
absence of hope for positive change, uncertainty may only elicit a sense of 
insecurity. Overall confident that they could reach a better future through 
migration, my informants may consequently have been willing to take steps 
that involved confronting unknowns or unpredictability on the path towards 
this goal. By contrast they were more reluctant to return to Senegal—a set-
ting poorer in opportunities and where others would be awaiting their suc-
cessful homecoming—before having the necessary resources and plan to 
ensure a sustained, improved situation there.
My interlocutors shared their reflections about return at a time when pre-
cariousness in living and working conditions was no longer only an endur-
ing characteristic of the Senegalese context but was gradually becoming, as 
a result of the sudden economic crisis, a new feature of life in Spain. Henrik 
Vigh (2008) distinguishes between crisis as context and crisis as temporary 
abnormality and argues that, in situations of uncertainty, hope ‘does not 
necessarily die out but [.  .  .] becomes temporally or spatially transposed 
and related to other places or times’ (Vigh 2009, 105). Following Vigh, I 
argue that persistent livelihood uncertainty may result in hope being placed 
elsewhere, prompting spatial solutions (migrating), whereas uncertainties 
considered temporary—such as lacking a job, residency permits or a sudden 
financial crisis in Europe—may be confronted and endured with temporal 
solutions (waiting) as hope for improvement is placed in future times.
Senegalese migration to Spain provides a rich case for examining ideas 
of hope and uncertainty at different points of migration trajectories and 
under changing contextual circumstances. Many people in Senegal dream 
of emigrating (Carling et al. 2013) but, as was the case among most of my 
informants, Senegalese labor migrants in Europe generally channel home 
much of their foreign earnings and intend to eventually return to Senegal 
permanently (Riccio 2002; Sinatti 2011). Spain, as a destination country, has 
undergone important transformations in recent years. In the early 2000s its 
booming economy attracted many immigrants, including Senegalese, who 
quickly became the largest sub-Saharan African group (Bernardi  et al. 2011; 
INE 2014). With the financial crisis and consequent soaring unemployment 
from 2008, many migrants faced dilemmas over whether or not to stay,
return, or migrate onwards.
Methodology 
My chapter is based on empirical data collected during eight months of eth-
nographic fieldwork in Spain and Senegal between April 2010 and October 
2012. I conducted interviews and semi-participant observation with Senega-
lese migrants in Spain and with returnees, visiting migrants and non-migrants
in Senegal, but here focus on migrants’ perspective. My informants were a 
heterogeneous group, with different backgrounds and ages, who had emi-
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range of journey-related uncertainties. Most of them were men, although I 
interacted with both male and female migrants during fieldwork in Spain.
Men have historically taken the lead in emigrating and represent the major-
ity of the Senegalese population in Spain (INE 2014). The number of women 
is increasing steadily, but they were less accessible and more reluctant than 
men to be interviewed.
I used Spanish, French, and Wolof to communicate with my informants,
and write in English. This entails several layers of translation and adaptation 
of vernacular terms. Informants used terms signifying luck, chance, prog-
ress, patience, suffering, endurance, success or hope, which sometimes bear 
different meanings across languages. Chance in French refers to both ‘luck’ 
and ‘chance’. In addition to adopting these terms in their vernacular sense,
I also use some of them in a broader, analytical sense, as with the expres-
sion ‘taking chances’, as I explain below. The contextualization provided by 
semi-structured, qualitative interviews and ethnographic fieldwork is essen-
tial to this process of analytical interpretation.
I use ‘uncertainty’ as a purely analytical term denoting unforeseeability, in 
relation both to general livelihood conditions and to the migration process.
My understanding of the term is closely aligned with Marco Di Nunzio’s 
definition (2015, 152–153): 
Uncertainty expresses the unpredictability and indeterminacy of what is 
going to be next, both immediately and in the long term. Living through 
uncertainty thus implies living in a state of contingency, that is, being 
dependent on courses of actions and events we cannot predict or know.
I write about uncertainty, on the one hand, referring to conditions of liveli-
hood instability, precariousness, or stagnation that migrants had either expe-
rienced before emigration (contributing to their desire to emigrate) or feared 
encountering upon an unprepared return. The unpredictability and instabil-
ity caused by such conditions affects individuals’ ability to foresee how their 
life might develop—including whether or not they will be able to establish 
and adequately provide for a family—and to respond to contingencies.
I also refer to uncertainty in relation to the unknowns and unpredictable 
elements which my informants faced in relation to emigration. Williams and 
Baláž (2012, 168) write that, in the migration context, uncertainty arises 
from ‘imperfect knowledge’ and ‘the unpredictability of the future’ (see also 
Horst and Grabska 2015). Yet the fact that migrants had limited informa-
tion or could not know exactly what they would encounter does not mean 
that they emigrated with a sense of uncertainty about migration overall. In 
fact they expressed a sense of determinacy, or certainty, about what they 
expected from Senegal and Europe, and were convinced that (or willing to 
find out whether) migrating to Europe would bring them greater prosperity 
than staying. I argue that it is from this positive confidence in—or hope on— 
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to confront any intervening uncertainties: unknowns and unforeseeable ele-
ments along the path to their envisioned goal. Uncertainty thus exists at 
two different but related temporal horizons or scales: emigrating may entail 
engaging with uncertainty in the short term, with the expectation that this 
will eventually allow one to reach a more stable state of socioeconomic 
certainty.
I use the expression ‘taking chances’ to conceptualize what I interpret 
as migrants’ proactive engagement with uncertainty, or their willingness to 
confront situations entailing unknowns and unpredictability out of a posi-
tive anticipation that a favorable outcome will probably result. The phrase 
‘taking chances’ resonates with and encompasses the range of vernacular 
expressions which migrants used (such as intentar or probar in Spanish 
and tenter or tenter sa chance in French, or leaving  à l’aventure) that all 
translate into trying something and venturing into the unknown. I interpret 
migrants’ willingness to take chances (or not) as depending on their having 
a hopeful disposition in the face of uncertainty. Hope, which was also a ver-
nacular term, here analytically conveys a positive, anticipatory disposition 
towards a better future condition (cf. Bloch 1986) with which my infor-
mants approached emigration.
The Spatial Distribution of Hope and Uncertainty 
Migration aspirations reflect how individuals unevenly allocate hope across 
settings: hopelessness regarding imagined futures at home is often expressed 
in contrast to the hope that migration will broaden one’s range of possible 
futures (Mains 2012). ‘I decided to come [to Spain] because over there, in 
Senegal, I no longer had any . . . hope, I had no more hope, so I told myself I 
had to leave, to go looking for a better life’. Like Babacar,1 other informants 
expressed their original desire to migrate to Europe in terms of a differen-
tial assignation of hope for the future in Senegal and abroad. Pape more 
generally communicated a sense of stagnation at home that he expected to 
overcome by migrating: 
There was no work [in Senegal]. The good jobs, in the country, it’s like 
an inheritance: I’m a minister, I hire my relatives. I run a company, I hire 
my relatives [. . .] or acquaintances, or someone who’s recommended.
But they don’t hire qualified people . . . that’s Africa. [. . .] There was no 
transparency. That’s the problem! And me, who doesn’t have a relative 
who is a minister, or who runs a company, I cannot access [those jobs]! 
And I don’t want to stay . . . like that, living in poverty till I die! No. I 
had to do everything, everything, everything to go find another place.
Pape’s frustration illustrates that of many others who highlighted the limita-
tions imposed by structural circumstances in Senegal: scarce and badly remu-
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responsibilities towards family and friends. These combined factors generate 
a condition of socioeconomic uncertainty in which young people, especially 
men, are unable to transition to socially respected adulthood by gaining 
financial independence, establishing and providing for their own families,
and assisting others (Buggenhagen 2012; Hernández-Carretero and Carling 
2012; Melly 2011; Ralph 2008). This is common to youth elsewhere in 
Africa (e.g., Christiansen  et al. 2006; Cole 2008; Hansen 2005; Honwana 
2012; Masquelier 2013).
In contrast to the sense of stagnation many felt at home, migration offered 
a way to reach a more enabling environment, offering greater opportunities 
for progress and the possibility to reclaim control of one’s future rather than 
resigning oneself to socioeconomic stagnation at home. Other young people 
around the world similarly yearn for a more promising future elsewhere 
(Bal 2014; Horváth 2008; Jeffrey 2010; Masquelier 2013). Imagining a bet-
ter future attainable through migration is a way to reorient hope spatially 
instead of giving it up entirely (Vigh 2009). Migration may be seen as a 
solution to feelings of existential immobility: ‘It is when people feel that they 
are existentially “going too slowly” or “going nowhere”’, Ghassan Hage 
(2005, 471) argues, ‘that they begin contemplating the necessity of physi-
cally “going somewhere”’. Migration is thus ‘an inability or an unwilling-
ness to endure and “wait out” a crisis of existential mobility’ (Hage 2009a,
98). Where waiting does not resolve existential immobility, migration—by 
widening the range of possibilities for progress—offers a spatial fix to a 
temporal problem (Mains 2012, 135).
My informants’ expectations that migration could accelerate socioeco-
nomic progress largely developed from witnessing previous migrants’ accom-
plishments (see also Fouquet 2007). Seeing others who, as several noted,
were no more qualified than themselves improve their living standard in 
Senegal—building houses, buying cars, running businesses—and their ability 
to care for their families by working abroad convinced them that they could 
achieve the same. ‘I thought that, if I myself managed to come to Europe, I 
could be like them’, Modou said, recalling how he used to think of migrants 
as wealthy before he himself emigrated. ‘I’d been working for years, and still 
hadn’t managed to have my own house—I lived in my family’s house, my 
father’s house’. Relatives also sometimes encourage young men to migrate.
Alpha recounted how, concerned about the possibility of an unsuccessful 
migration, he had initially hesitated to agree to his brother’s idea to finance 
his emigration with family funds but eventually accepted, wary of being 
seen as not wanting to ‘progress’ if he turned down an offer intended to help 
improve his prospects.
Confronting Uncertainty through Hope and Chance 
Seeking a prosperous future, many Senegalese migrants left knowing little 
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they might encounter, or how they would ensure a sustainable return, even 
though virtually all intended to settle back in Senegal eventually. Confront-
ing a degree of uncertainty need not be discouraging, however, if one is 
hopeful that the path chosen will bring positive results. ‘Hopefulness’, Hage 
(2003, 24) writes, ‘is above all a disposition to be confident in the face of the 
future, to be open to it and welcoming to what it will bring, even if one does 
not know for sure what it will bring’. My informants did not indicate that 
they had been overly concerned or frustrated by imperfect information and 
unpredictability prior to emigration. This may have been due to the hopeful-
ness with which they approached migration, encouraged by the prospect of 
emulating previous migrants’ achievements and leaving stagnation behind.
Hope for positive change may be a motivating force with which to con-
front uncertainty by taking risks to overcome a condition of vulnerability 
(Hayenhjelm 2006), or by persevering in situations of uncertainty where 
imagined futures seem elusive (Pedersen 2012). ‘[Reimagining] the pres-
ent from the perspective of the end’, Hirokazu Miyazaki (2006, 157) sug-
gests, allows hope for the future to shape actions in the present. Drawing 
on Miyazaki, Morten Pedersen (2012, 146, 148) argues that perseverance 
in the face of apparently unrealistic prospects can result from ‘the work 
of hope’, which prevents an individual from becoming ‘imprisoned by the 
present’ and succumbing to fatalism or ‘passive resignation.’ Similarly, Sene-
galese migrants may have confronted migration-related uncertainties driven 
by hope, ‘leaping’, like Pedersen’s (2012, 144) informants, into futures they 
could not picture in detail—for they remained unknown—but which they 
did not for that reason consider any less promising. This resonates with 
Di Nunzio’s (2015, 153) argument that individuals may regard uncertainty 
or ‘the unforeseeability of existence’ in a positive light when they see it as 
offering the possibility for change with respect to the present, and therefore 
bearing the potential to inspire action and hope.
In understanding migrants’ willingness to confront intervening uncer-
tainties in order to prosper through migration, we should also take into 
account that, before emigrating, most were mainly concerned with leaving 
stagnation behind and succeeding in entering Europe. Limited avenues for 
legal migration and tighter migration controls since the early 1990s have 
increased the difficulty and cost of entering Europe (Suárez-Navaz 2005),
so for most Africans, the main perceived hurdle to succeeding through 
migration is leaving in the first place. Those who cannot afford safer means 
sometimes expose themselves to the risks of unauthorized border crossings 
(Hernández-Carretero and Carling 2012; Spijkerboer 2007).
Once abroad, my informants were confident that they could easily make 
a living, both because they believed that they were headed to a place with 
plentiful job opportunities and because they counted on being helped by
fellow-migrants. Alpha explained that, although he left Senegal without spe-
cific ideas of what he would find abroad or the kind of work other Senegalese 
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the most: ‘I wasn’t leaving just like that . . . into the unknown’. Migrants’ 
expectation of receiving solidarity and guidance from friends, relatives, fel-
low Senegalese, and religious brotherhoods abroad thus mitigates concerns 
about beginning anew in Europe (cf. Babou 2002; Castles and Miller 2009,
29; Diouf 2000; Massey et al. 1998, 43).
Cultivating Fortune by Taking Chances 
Through a language of chance, luck, or fortune, migrants expressed a pos-
itive engagement with uncertainty before and during migration. Some had 
barely contemplated the possibility of not succeeding through migration; 
others had been tentatively hopeful, regarding migration as an opportu-
nity worth pursuing but counting on being able to resume their lives in 
Senegal if disappointed. Some, like Alassane, had left a job to which they 
expected that they could return. He recalls saying to himself: ‘If, in a year 
from now, I have not found something certain, I’ll have to go back, take up 
my job again’. Expectations of an unproblematic return might have made 
these migrants feel that they had nothing to lose by exploring opportu-
nities abroad, encouraging acceptance of migration-related uncertainties.
This ‘try and see’ attitude suggests an engagement with uncertainty through 
chance. ‘In life, if you don’t take chances, you will have nothing’, Babacar 
explained:
You have to try your luck. It’s like a poker game: you win or you lose.
If you lose, at least you know you played. It’s like a football match. You 
can play well and lose. But at least, you’ll feel proud that you tried. At 
least you tried something in your life.
Through these sentences Babacar expressed the idea, not unique to him,
that trying one’s luck or taking chances was intrinsic to any entrepreneur-
ial undertaking and necessary for progress. This attitude reflects a posi-
tive, proactive orientation towards engaging with outcomes that cannot be 
entirely predicted and connects uncertainty with the possibility of success 
(cf. Hernández-Carretero and Carling 2012).
It has been suggested that the connection between migration, taking 
chances, and seeking progress relates to a broader trend towards individu-
alization in Senegal. There, Caroline Melly (2011, 368) claims that ‘migra-
tion is increasingly imagined as an individualized activity, as a matter of 
chance or luck, and as involving a personal engagement with risk’. This 
framing of migration in terms of individual entrepreneurship and invest-
ment has evolved, she argues, with the rise of a national neoliberal orienta-
tion. Relatedly, Havard (2001) argues that today’s Senegalese youth express 
their desire for emancipation through the individualizing ethos of the ‘bul 
faale’,2 which places personal effort and work at the center of personal 
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divorced from social expectations and encouragement which, as I discuss 
below, reflect the collective dimension of migration hopes. Migrants’ desire 
to prosper is, moreover, intrinsically connected to their wish to fulfil inter-
personal obligations and gain a socially respected position (Blanchard 2011; 
Hernández-Carretero 2015).
Informants’ references to luck and opportunity shared a sense that luck 
had to be chased and mobilized. Biram explained that luck cannot be 
allowed to pass by—it must be seized. Referring to ‘chance’ as opportunity,
Fadel indicated that opportunities must be sought, insisting that one had to 
be willing to be geographically mobile to find them: ‘You can’t stay arms 
crossed, thinking “It will work out, it will work out”—until when? You 
have to move! If you move, you’ll find chances!’ These assertions suggest a 
view that luck and opportunity need to be actively cultivated, not waited for.
Fortune is to be attained through the ‘bold deployment’ of luck, requiring an 
‘active will, a display of bravery, an act of subjective determination’ (da Col 
and Humphrey 2012, 4).
Relying on luck allows an optimistic interpretation of uncertainty as 
offering the possibility of positive outcomes. This might explain migrants’ 
readiness to confront uncertainty in order to prosper through migration.
Asked about his constant references to luck, Biram said ‘I trust luck a lot.
If I didn’t trust it, I wouldn’t have come here’. Others, too, insisted on their 
positive outlook before emigrating, suggesting that they would not have left 
if they had been overly concerned with the possibility of failure.
While insisting on the need to cultivate fortune by making moves that 
entailed confronting uncertainty, migrants also expected that their fate would 
ultimately be determined by a greater agency (cf. Hamayon 2012). Through 
locutions like ‘Everyone has their luck’, or ‘If it is your luck that . . .’ they 
suggested that the outcome of their attempts to progress depended on the 
fate assigned to them by God.Asked what would happen if, after investing in 
migration, he failed to reap the desired returns, Abdou matter-of-factly said: 
If it doesn’t go well, it doesn’t go well. It’s a question of trying. [. .  .] 
Whether it ends well or badly depends on . . . it depends on God. My 
things . . . a lot of my things, I put in the hands of God. I do what I have 
to do, but I can’t know how it will turn out. What will happen, I leave 
in the hands of God. If God helps you be lucky and recover your money,
good. If not, tough luck. [.  .  .] No problem, you go back to work [in 
Senegal] again! 
Attributing one’s ultimate fate to the work of a greater agency need not 
result in passivity: migrants tried their luck while accepting that the outcome 
was ultimately determined by divine will. Subjugation to the fate allotted by 
God provides an explanation of causality and may help in coping with unfa-
vorable outcomes (see Hamayon 2012; Horst 2006; von Benda-Beckmann 
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Uncertainty and the Unexpected Difficulty of Return 
The boldness with which informants appeared to have approached emigra-
tion gave way to a more cautious attitude when they spoke about returning.
Most expressed concern over facing uncertainty upon return, including those 
who had originally thought that they would simply go back if disappointed 
abroad. Having migrated to improve their livelihoods, migrants were now 
wary of returning precipitately, without a job or the resources and strategy 
to subsist and invest. Alpha emphasized the importance of readiness: 
If I had the means, I would return to Senegal tomorrow. Forever. [But] 
I don’t have . . . enough money to return to Senegal and invest there in 
order to stay definitely. [. . .] I could go back, and with the connections 
I have in my family, start working there. [. . .] I want to return, but . . . I 
don’t want to  rush it. I don’t want to  rush my return. I will go back, but,
maybe in . . . I don’t know.
What do you mean by ‘rushing the return’?
Going back home . . . just like that. From one day to the next, taking 
my luggage and going back to Senegal without  .  .  . without thinking 
about it, without preparing, without . . . without anything.
Alpha’s quandary illustrates the distinction between  willingness and readi-
ness in migrant preparedness to return (Cassarino 2004). Among Senegalese 
migrants, expectations of returning successfully are very often tied to the 
motivations behind seeking one’s fortune abroad (Sinatti 2011). The return 
that migrants work towards and that their relations expect is thus a return 
ahead, to an improved socioeconomic position, so the stakes are high for 
migrants to return displaying—and partly redistributing—the fruits of a suc-
cessful time abroad. Despite the generalized wish to return eventually, hardly 
any informants felt that they had accumulated enough resources to live off 
or to run a business in Senegal. Rather than expressing a willingness to take 
chances vis-à-vis the uncertainties which a precipitate return would entail,
most therefore spoke of the need to plan ahead and avoid a failed return 
ending in shame and ostracism.
The Spanish financial crisis has affected many migrants’ employment, finan-
cial and administrative situation, and considerations of return. Unemploy-
ment, reduced salaries, higher costs of living, and assistance to fellow-migrants
in a worse situation slows down migrants’ capacity for accumulation and 
investment, which also delays their plans to return. Any uncertainty sur-
rounding premature return is compounded if it implies relinquishing access
to employment in Europe, as with those who do not yet have residence
and work permits abroad and who would be unable to re-enter Europe
if they traveled back to Senegal, or who could not meet the requirements
for renewing a temporary permit if they left for an extended period.
Greater unemployment as a result of the crisis has also increased migrants’
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vulnerability to remaining in or lapsing back into irregularity, since renew-
ing temporary work permits or accessing regularization requires, respec-
tively, staying employed or having an employment offer (Bruquetas-Callejo 
et al. 2011).
Nevertheless, some migrants accelerated their return plans as a conse-
quence of the crisis, especially if they had enough financial security or a per-
manent permit abroad, both of which reduce the uncertainty associated with 
an early return. Savings, investments, a house or a source of income such as a 
family business in Senegal ensure the family’s subsistence after the migrant’s 
return. With a long-term permit or Spanish nationality, migrants can more 
easily make a tentative return to assess the viability of settling back in Sen-
egal, permanently or temporarily, as they are still able to re-enter Europe.
Indeed Sinatti (2011, 161) describes how Senegalese migrants in Italy, wary 
of others’ failed return attempts, ‘play it safe’, returning only after obtain-
ing permanent residency abroad and maintaining overseas connections that 
facilitate commercial activities after returning.
The Affordability of Taking Chances 
Seeing emigration and return as stages in the same project of socioeconomic 
prosperity rather than distinct processes helps to understand migrants’ con-
trasting attitudes to uncertainty. Confronting uncertainty and the possibil-
ity of failure entails different consequences at each stage. Taking chances 
may seem necessary and justifiable when emigrating, but make less sense 
upon return which—even if not permanent—closes the cycle initiated by 
emigration. At that point, migrants are expected to show the success reaped 
through the migratory project and ensure their family’s continued subsis-
tence. It is thus not despite, but precisely  because of, the chances taken on 
emigrating that return is not considered the right time to confront further 
uncertainty. ‘I don’t think many will risk going back of their own choice’,
said Lat, and explained: 
[We] have taken risks in coming here, because we didn’t come with a 
job offer in hand. We went into the unknown,3 so that’s taking risks. We 
didn’t know what we would find here. And when you return to Senegal,
too, you don’t know what you will find there. Because, if it’s the same 
situation as you left behind . . . it could be worse than here.
An unsuccessful return could result from going back empty-handed or mis-
managing one’s assets and losing the gains made through migration. This 
could entail regressing to one’s pre-migration situation, going ‘back to zero’,
which could mean livelihood uncertainty—with the added shame of not hav-
ing achieved something better through migration. Asked whether he might 
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largely without work and unable to accumulate any money, Pape strongly 
rejected that scenario: 
Noooo . . . I know that, it would be a failure for me! It’s a failure! I have 
nothing! I have nothing, four years . . . outside of Senegal! Four years 
outside of Senegal, and you go back, to  zero!? No, not that! [. . .] And 
when I return, if the people I meet there do not guide me . . . I won’t 
know where to go. Because, after four years, I’m disconnected from 
Senegal! I don’t know what’s going on there! [.  .  .] But coming there 
with some money . . . I’ll have the confidence that, even if disconnected,
I can . . . get by with the little I have. But, arriving there, disconnected,
and with zero euros? No way.
Earning a living as an immigrant abroad can be easier than as a returnee at
home, because migrants are generally flexible in accepting jobs abroad but face
limited opportunities back in Senegal. Most intend to become self-employed
after return, so insisted on the extensive capital needed for investment. Com-
paring migration to a well, Abdou claimed: ‘If you have no money to invest in
your country, then what? You don’t get out of the well’. He assured me that
it is virtually impossible to uphold the standard of living attained through
migration by other means than developing one’s own business, as returning
migrants from rural areas would no longer be physically capable of working
in agriculture, and salaried jobs in industry or construction are scarce. Older
returning migrants would, besides, probably have difficulty competing with
the numerous unemployed youths in the Senegalese labor market.
Those who were living in a precarious situation in Spain felt strongly that 
they could not afford to take chances in relation to return. Babacar, without 
money to establish a business in Senegal or any certainty of finding a job 
there, explained: 
Even though you didn’t find what you were looking for here, you can’t 
go back just like that! [If you do], what are you going to do with your 
life, then? [. . .] Going back now without certainty [wóorul]. And you’re 
at an age when you no longer have the right to make mistakes. You 
shouldn’t make mistakes. Do you understand? Since you made a mis-
take by coming here, don’t make a mistake in your return! 
Babacar, who had been willing to take chances on emigrating, highlights 
both the notion that taking chances on emigration and return are connected,
and that doing so is justifiable at certain life stages—e.g., youth—but less 
so when one is expected to show results. His words also illustrate how 
migrants who had achieved little abroad would generally avoid returning 
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Interpersonal Aspects of Hope and Uncertainty 
In Senegal, hope in the power of migration to bring about socioeconomic 
progress is borne collectively: young men are often encouraged to migrate 
by others who already have or by relatives who expect to benefit from their 
successful migration. The weight of interpersonal responsibilities to and 
expectations from non-migrants in Senegal also influences migrants’ expe-
rience of hope and uncertainty in relation to return which, if unsuccessful,
would affect not only migrants’ wealth, status, and reputation but also their 
dependents’ livelihoods and hopes.
Migrants may therefore experience the return decision as not being theirs 
alone. Relatives may voice reservations about what the migrant’s return may 
mean for them, as Lat illustrated: ‘I was talking with my wife [. . .] and I 
said “This country [Spain] is not looking good. I think it’s time to go back 
home”. You know what she said? “Yes . . . that’s OK. But as far as we’re 
concerned, we don’t envy the wives of those who return”’. Lat explained 
that his wife’s wariness stemmed from having seen that others gradually lost 
their wealth after returning. Concern about maintaining the living standard 
achieved through migration can create pressure to not break the migration 
cycle. Adama explained that it is difficult to go back ‘because when you 
have [migrated], you place the standard very high. So, if you return to your 
country, you have to bring the standard back down. [. . .] in order to main-
tain the standard, you need to stay abroad’. Sinatti (2011, 163) has similarly 
observed Senegalese in Italy who feel ‘trapped in migration’ because of their 
interpersonal responsibilities.
A migrant’s unsuccessful return affects not only others’ livelihoods but 
also their hopes: migrants become repositories of hope for relatives and 
friends who count on them to improve their situation or assist them when 
they become wealthy. Hope for the future helps relatives to cope with hard-
ship in the present, for instance, when a migrant is abroad but not yet able to 
adequately provide for them. As Pape explained, families support migrants 
and sometimes rely on solidarity networks, encouraged by the conviction 
that their hardship is temporary: 
What I was looking for, right now . . . there is none of it: work. There 
is no work. But . . . Africa is always difficult. Here, it’s difficult, I know.
But Africa is always difficult. Because over there, your family is there,
you’re seen, you’re surrounded by ten people . . . and they see you, and 
you have nothing to give them. [ He pauses, then chuckles] But when 
you’re here, they don’t see you. But you can talk to them and relieve 
them. Give them hope. For . . . yes, give them hope to wait . . . that one 
day things will be good. And  they can feed on that hope.
Pape’s suggestion that his family can ‘feed on the hope’ for a better tomorrow 
highlights the relationship between hope and coping, and the significance of 
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Shattering others’ hopes and generally failing to succeed through migration
carries implications for the migrant’s social status and authority (see also Cole
2014). Hope embedded in social networks connects individuals who expect to
extract favors or profits one day (Pedersen 2012). Failing to live up to others’
expectations results in them ceasing to believe in the individual’s capacity as
a provider and benefactor. For young men who had migrated to Europe to
escape the shame of being unable to fulfil gender- and age-specific roles and
to rectify this situation, failing through migration represents an additional dis-
credit. ‘The fact alone of leaving is already in itself a solution to worry, shame,
distress and disarray’, writes Mamadou Mbodji (2008, 310). Migration pro-
vides not only a path to restoring one’s dignity, but also a way to preserve it by
shielding one’s shortcomings. Abroad, migrants are alone with their financial
troubles whereas, in Senegal, they are exposed to the critical gaze of others.
The social repercussions of failing to meet expectations of a successful 
time abroad create a strong motivation for avoiding an unsuccessful return.
Migrants fear being confronted with the discredit and shame of being 
unable to provide for their families and regarded as having failed to succeed 
through migration. Returning empty-handed therefore requires exceptional 
emotional strength and courage, as Alpha explained: 
Since it’s going into the unknown [ à l’aventure], it means .  .  . you go 
exploring. You don’t have to stay. If you go, and you find something that 
can keep you there, you stay, otherwise . . . if you’re brave, you make the 
decision to return to Senegal. Because it’s very difficult to  leave Senegal,
and then return. That, that’s a very touchy question in Senegal. From 
the moment you leave Senegal to come to Europe, those who are in 
Senegal say ‘Ah! Alpha is gone’. Well, they start counting the years. ‘He’s 
been there two years, three years, four years. Ah! He must have money,
eh? Certainly when he returns, he will . . .’ With these hopes that peo-
ple place in you, you don’t dare return to Senegal without succeeding.
It’s embarrassing! To leave, emigrate, and return without succeeding.
That’s why . . . there are people here who’ve spent . . . more than ten 
years without returning to Senegal, because they have failed.And they’re 
ashamed of returning home.
Shame results from moralizing judgments that hold the individual migrant 
personally responsible for not achieving success, allegedly as a result of 
having been undisciplined, lazy, or wasteful while in Europe. This stands 
in stark contrast to migrants’ reliance on luck and fate upon migration,
which implies a belief that causality is partly beyond individual control 
and, therefore, responsibility (see Giddens 1999). Research in other settings 
has also found migrants feeling shame and distress at failing to achieve 
the success expected from migration and consequently losing touch with 
their home communities or avoiding return (Dünnwald 2010; Kleist 2017; 
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stay in a difficult situation in Spain and suffer away from their relatives and 
acquaintances than endure hardship amongst them, unable to help them or 
themselves.
Stuck in Europe 
Most migrants indicated that it was only when they were abroad that they 
became fully aware of the hardships of migrant life and the obstacles to 
accumulating the wealth necessary for a successful return. Several even 
described migration as a kind of entrapment: a ‘hole’, a ‘well’, an ‘addic-
tion’, a cycle easier to enter than to exit. Having emigrated to break out of 
socioeconomic stagnation in Senegal, they now felt trapped by a new set of 
factors. Entrapment metaphors often arose as migrants told how they tried 
to explain to others back home why they persevere abroad despite unfavor-
able conditions. ‘Migration is so tempting’, Lat explained,
But once [someone] leaves, and sees, for example, that over there it isn’t 
paradise either, that it isn’t El Dorado, once he sees the difficulties that 
exist, then he begins to say ‘Ah, if only I could go back’. But by that point 
you can’t! And, why can’t you? Because, it’s very simple: there’s a social 
sanction. [. . .] What’s the social sanction? It’s that so-and-so has left,
and he has achieved this. [ He pauses]. You tell yourself, ‘I too, am going 
to leave to achieve it’. So once here [in Spain], on the ground, you have 
to struggle to achieve this. [. . .] Then when you fail, when things don’t 
work out . . . people over there [in Senegal], they’re going to think, why,
why haven’t  you put in all the courage necessary to achieve it? That is 
the social sanction.
Migrants’ metaphors of entrapment encapsulated a sense of both socio-
economic and spatial immobility. Many felt unable to progress at their 
desired pace and blamed factors beyond their control: migration regula-
tions, financial responsibilities to and expectations from others in Senegal,
or macroeconomic conditions in Spain—all of which affected their capacity 
to earn and save for their return. Although they may not have envisaged a 
specific duration to their migration, many said it had already been longer 
than they had imagined: ‘Before we know it, we’re going to retire here!’ Lat 
exclaimed, only half-jokingly. Those without residence permits experienced 
additional dimensions of entrapment: their financial and social mobility was 
constrained by their limited capacity to seek work in Spain or elsewhere in 
Europe, earn some money, and travel to Senegal to start or add to a family.
Waiting and Patience 
The unexpected onset of the financial crisis compounded many migrants’ 
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process and others considered moving onward. Most, however, stayed in 
Spain, either believing in a future recovery or having scant hopes of better 
prospects elsewhere. The impossibility of re-entering Europe for those with-
out residence permits or the financial and social implications of returning 
unsuccessfully complicate the decision to return, even if staying brings little 
apparent benefit. Those who stayed out of hope were waiting for positive 
change. Waiting ‘may be considered both as a gap and as a link between the 
present and the future’ (Gasparini 1995, 30). It is also ‘a consciousness of 
time embodied, of time endured’ (Schweizer 2005, 782).
Migrants’ waiting reflects a specific, comparative articulation of the tem-
poral, spatial, and interpersonal dimensions of hope in relation to different 
settings. It can be interpreted as passive or active (Brun 2015). As indicated 
by their metaphors of entrapment, migrants often spoke of waiting or plans 
delayed, expressing frustration at their immobility or inability to control 
their own progress. This is reminiscent of settings where individuals are 
described as burdened with an overabundance of time, resorting to ‘time-
pass’, ‘killing time’ or ‘sitting’ as they wait to be able to migrate or oth-
erwise emerge from stagnation (Jeffrey 2010; Mains 2012; Melly 2011; 
Ralph 2008). In general, however, migrants did not present themselves as 
idly waiting for better times to come. Although they acknowledged the force 
of structural circumstances beyond their control, they strove to make the 
best of their situation, struggling daily to make a living while hoping for 
macroeconomic stability to be restored.
Those who were hopeful that circumstances would again improve found,
in this, the motivation to endure difficult conditions in the present. When 
talking about waiting for the time when the crisis would end or their goals 
would be accomplished, they recurrently used the Spanish locution  aguantar
(to hold on, endure) and the Wolof  muñ (to exercise patience, endure). One 
migrant explained that many told themselves that, even though things were 
difficult, they would eventually improve and, being already abroad, it was 
better to stay and see the better times return. ‘They simply live on hope’,
he concluded. This sentence parallels the notion, introduced earlier, that a 
migrant’s relatives back home could ‘feed on the hope’ that he would one 
day improve their situation. Together, they illustrate how hope may help to 
endure hardship in anticipation of better times to come.
In explaining that one could not and should not ‘rush one’s luck’, some 
presented patience as a requirement of fortune, suggesting that, although 
luck may be cultivated, it will come in its own time. Patience can therefore 
be seen as a form of actively nurturing hope—rather than giving up—while 
simultaneously submitting to luck’s own temporality. As Crapanzano (2003,
6) writes, hope depends not only on the individual’s desires but also on ‘some 
other agency—a god, fate, chance, an other—for its fulfilment’, and there-
fore requires ‘expectation, constraint, and resignation’. Using expressions 
like ‘before the good times must come hard times’, ‘bad times are followed 
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described in holy scriptures, migrants regularly indicated that hardship and 
fortune were interrelated and neither was everlasting. Their determination 
to endure hardships was nourished by the expectation that conditions would 
change.
My informants furthermore described patience as a virtue related to the 
cultivation and display of faith, closely connected with faith in God’s inter-
vention in bringing about a better future (see Gasparini 1995, 37). Some 
spoke of enduring hardship as a test of faith, or part of their God-given 
destiny. ‘God is with those who are patient. If you hold on, God will reward 
you’, Babacar assured me. Reflecting on his difficult situation in Spain, he 
confidently explained: ‘If God loves you, you will struggle. The way I see it,
God loves me. That’s why I’m having a hard time, because God loves me.
But the hardship is only temporary’. Patience thus implies submitting one’s 
fate to divine will, and carries the expectation of an eventual divine reward 
for faith and endurance. Fortune is cultivated through the patient endurance 
of everyday struggle.
Many also stressed the connection between endurance and masculin-
ity, explaining that men were expected to endure hardships that would be 
unbearable for women. Several admitted that they feared they would be 
perceived as cowardly if they returned empty-handed, running away from 
hardship instead of confronting it stoically. Whereas returning in such con-
ditions requires considerable psychological strength, staying on does, too: 
someone who is not mentally strong might just give up and leave the hard-
ships brought on by the crisis behind, one veteran migrant affirmed.
Migrants’ hopeful waiting may be viewed as active engagement with 
their circumstances, involving a state of anticipation  and the exercise of 
patience (see Lakha 2009, 122). Refusing to give up, migrants’ display of 
endurance in times of hardship conveys hope and agency in a challenging 
situation of uncertainty (see Hage 2009b). They were not merely waiting: 
they were expecting a particular event or transition. As Gasparini (1995, 31) 
argues, the difference between ‘merely waiting’ and expecting ‘that an event 
will take place at a given time [. . .] is represented by the state of anticipa-
tion implied in the latter which, to a certain extent, gives an actor control 
over the situation’. Although migrants could not know exactly when things 
would change, they were confident that they eventually would. Whereas 
they regarded crisis in Senegal in the sense of livelihood insecurity as a per-
manent condition, they saw the crisis in Spain as a ‘temporary abnormality’,
a rupture with the regular state of affairs that would end someday (Vigh 
2008, 6, 7). It is this distinction in the perception of crisis that gave migrants 
hope for the future in Spain, and encouraged them to wait for that change.
Theirs was a particular form of waiting, the kind of ‘waiting out’ that entails 
waiting not for something to happen but, rather, for something undesirable 
to end (Hage 2009a, 102). This kind of waiting, Hage argues, entails an 
ambivalent passivity that involves simultaneously subjecting oneself to, and 
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Patience is thus not only different from idle waiting, but the opposite 
of giving up—a demonstration of agency and tenacity under uncertainty.
As Hage (2009a, 101) notes, the idea of endurance implies ‘asserting some 
agency over the very fact that one has no agency by not succumbing and 
becoming a mere victim’. Discussing agency with respect to waiting, Peter 
Dwyer (2009, 23) makes an important distinction between the availability of 
‘options for choice’ and the ‘capacity to choose’. Under difficult conditions,
migrants may have little room for choosing between giving up and enduring,
and may even come to question the hope that motivates their patience: 
When I thought of coming to Spain, I thought I’d get a good job—I don’t 
have one. I thought I’d obtain residency—I don’t have it. Still. Three 
or four years pass. I always keep on hoping. I always keep on hoping.
Well, why don’t I go back now? I always think that, alright, by the end 
of this or that year, I might have my residency, and I can go back. [. . .] 
The worst part of being a foreigner is this: you always keep on hoping 
for a time in the future. That’s the worst part. [He pauses] I am young,
but every day I’ve lost a day, every week I’ve lost a week, every month 
I’ve lost a month. Every year . . . I’ve lost a year. And always, it’s the 
fault of being hopeful.
Blaming hope for his investing time in waiting for a better future that may 
never come, Mbaye points to the motivating power of hope and to the fact 
that, as Gasparini (1995, 31) notes, waiting does not imply certainty: ‘Wait-
ing is at the crossroads not only of the present and future, but also of cer-
tainty and uncertainty. One can wait for an event, the occurrence of which 
is either certain (although not always determined in time) or completely 
uncertain’.
Conclusion: Uncertainty, Hope and Taking Chances 
Hope, I have shown, mediates uncertainty: individuals may be willing to 
confront uncertainty and take chances when hopeful that this will yield 
positive change, but may prefer to minimize uncertainty in the absence of 
hope. This can explain migrants’ contrasting attitudes to uncertainty and 
taking chances with respect to emigration and return—with many willing 
to accept some uncertainty when seeking fortune through migration, but 
preferring to delay return until they feel ready to undertake it successfully.
The interaction between hope and uncertainty in relation to migration pro-
duces different temporal and spatial responses: moving, when hope is placed 
elsewhere; staying or waiting, when it is placed in a future time. Patience, in 
the face of crisis and hardship, emerges as a response to uncertainty when 
taking chances seems unaffordable: it represents an active, brave engage-
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Personal circumstances, contextual factors, and interpersonal dynamics 
shape the interplay between hope and uncertainty in migration trajectories.
Macroeconomic, political, and social conditions in different geographic 
locations may inspire hope for the possibility of socioeconomic progress— 
or instill a sense of unavoidable stagnation. Hope and the availability of 
perceived alternatives affect one’s sense of affordability with respect to 
taking chances. Individuals may feel they cannot afford to stay put in a 
situation of livelihood stagnation without taking action to alter their cir-
cumstances, or feel comfortable taking chances because they have alter-
native options in case of failure. Financial and social resources, access to 
international mobility, and one’s stage in the migration and life cycles— 
with differing responsibilities and expectations from others—affect possi-
bilities for reversing one’s actions, the expected costs of failure, the ability 
to handle contingencies, and consequently whether individuals feel they can 
afford to take chances—or to not take them (cf. Hernández-Carretero and 
Carling 2012).
Individuals might feel more hopeful about trying their luck in settings that 
they perceive as enabling—relative to others where they feel constrained in 
their possibilities to progress. In migrating to Europe, migrants felt confident 
in the likelihood of succeeding and left the final outcome in the hands of fate.
When considering return to Senegal, associated with limited opportunities 
and livelihood uncertainty, they were less willing to take chances, stressing 
the importance of a well-prepared return. The context of financial crisis in 
Spain highlighted the salience of the sense of affordability with respect to 
engaging with uncertainty: migrants with a relatively secure financial and 
administrative situation were better positioned to take chances in making a 
tentative return.
Taking chances in relation to emigration and return are thus related: if 
emigration fails to bring success, migrants may be more reluctant to make 
an uncertain return, perhaps opting to wait for circumstances to improve.
The consequences of an unsuccessful return, in terms of unfulfilled respon-
sibilities to others, loss of status, and shame, combined with greater hope in 
Europe than in Senegal, may help to explain why many postpone return even 
in times of crisis in Europe.
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Notes 
1. All names are pseudonyms. 
2. Translated by Havard as ‘T’occupe pas’ or ‘Don’t meddle’.
3. ‘À l’aventure’ in the French original which, as he explains, implies not knowing 
what lies ahead.
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The term ‘adventurer’ is sometimes used as an analytical category with 
which to classify migrants who have overcome risks and dangers to traverse 
the various barriers and borders introduced to curb migratory movements.
Yet it also resonates with  emic descriptions common among sub-Saharan 
people of various origins, living in different places. Migrants from the Sahel 
in West Africa, for example, who settled in Brazzaville in the 2000s, describe 
their travels and migratory choices as adventure and characterize themselves 
as adventurers (Whitehouse 2012). Likewise, migrants from Guinea Bissau 
living in Lisbon speak of adventure (aventura) to describe their experiences 
of migration and migrant life (Sarro 2009). This emic usage is not new; the 
desire for adventure has a history. Thus, it is important not to essentialize 
what we understand by adventure. It is, above all, a social construction 
offering insights into societies and their imagined utopias. By tracing the 
history of the category, we discover that it has been used for a long time 
by migrants from the Senegal River Valley engaged in diamond smuggling 
between the two Congos, Angola, and Belgium. Through studying their tra-
jectories we begin to appreciate that the term adventurer covers not only 
a particular form of migration but, more importantly, a particular lifestyle 
that allows migrants to escape their predictable, and possibly gloomy, every-
day lives and pursue their dreams (Bredeloup 1994; 2007).
Elsewhere I argue that the emic notion of adventure expresses a deeply felt 
desire to live in another way, one which is not possible where the migrants 
come from or where they currently are (Bredeloup 2008; 2013; 2014). Thus,
migration is not just determined by misery and danger. Individual ambitions 
and motivations are important catalysts for people who are planning to set 
off on the migration journey in order to radically change their everyday 
lives. This may, or may not, result in what would be deemed rational behav-
ior from a micro-economic perspective. In other words, migratory choices 
are not entirely economic—migrants also travel to explore far-away places,
real or imaginary, and to invent new ways of life. It is thus important to 
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adventure. Is it a generic expression of migrants’ aspirations for the future? 
Is the desire for elsewhere also the desire for otherness? Through this lens,
migration is similar to a moral experience.
Through an exploration of desires, dreams, and subjectivities among 
West African migrants at different historical times, this chapter examines 
the symbolic dimensions of migratory adventures. In particular, I explore 
the dialectic between hope and faith and between dignity and shame. First, I 
highlight some of the recurring patterns of adventure in African migrations 
and show that adventure is not only a shared emic label across West African 
cultures but also a social construction shared and reiterated by migrants, the 
regimes governing migratory movements, and media representations alike.
Second, I examine how faith and religion impact on the construction of hope 
among adventurers, especially in circumstances where the hope for a better 
life might compel migrants to take the initiative and make decisions instead 
of awaiting their destiny. Finally, I investigate the trajectories of adventurers 
deemed successful and of those deemed failures to examine the effects of 
such views on their status in the community of origin.
A Longitudinal Study 
My analysis is based on longitudinal field research conducted with West 
African migrants in Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Libya 
who migrated in search of employment in Europe and North Africa, or who 
went to look for diamonds in Central and Southern Africa.1 Many of the 
latter became involved in diamond smuggling and it is the reconstruction 
of their trajectories that has allowed me to demonstrate how the multi-
ple twists and turns on their migratory paths foster their insertion into an 
international circuit of diamond trade and facilitates their management of 
the permanent insecurities integral to fraudulent activities such as smug-
gling. Additionally, this research has helped to foreground the individual 
dimension of the migration project more objectively, without losing sight 
of the ways in which individual and collective strategies intertwine at the 
family and village levels. Thus, I have shown that individuals’ search for 
economic independence does not necessarily imply existential autonomy.
It can, when failing, lock an individual into perpetual dependence and col-
lective heteronomy. Across several field sites I have drawn attention to the 
heterogeneity among African migrants and the fluid identities forced upon 
them structurally—e.g., through drawing links to the hardening of immi-
gration politics in a study carried out in Marseille, France (Bertoncello and 
Bredeloup 2004) and through exploring the effect of increasing migration 
from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa in a study carried out in Sebha,
Libya (Bredeloup and Pliez 2005). By taking a longitudinal and multi-sited 
perspective, these studies document the different forms of migratory adven-
ture and the logic underpinning them which, in turn, allows us to see how 

















136 Sylvie Bredeloup 
families, village communities, and the ‘communities of circumstance’ built 
along the migratory path.
My methodological approach involves a combination of interviews, nar-
ratives, and observations. Moreover, I also turn to literary accounts of migra-
tory adventures because they examine many of the same questions as those 
posed by social scientists. Novels focusing on African migrants, even if the 
main characters are invented, offer critical insights into representations of 
migrants and the expectations their societies have of them at a given moment 
in time. This approach is not aimed at validating existing social theories; 
rather, it is a methodological step to tease out new elements in migratory 
strategies, and even new fields surrounding migration, that would otherwise 
escape the sociological gaze. Thus, it is interesting to compare and interro-
gate further the divergences and similarities between the singular discourses 
presented in fiction and those presented by migrants in interviews. Migra-
tion becomes adventure as soon as the migrants’ practices are re-enchanted 
and highlighted through the accounts; in these conditions, writers and  griots
(praise singers, musicians, poets, and story-tellers who maintain oral history 
traditions in West Africa) as well as migrants can be considered as potential 
‘adventure makers’.
African Adventure or Adventure in Africa? 
In the West,2 literary accounts have traditionally given life and consistency 
to images of exceptional fictional persons, turning them into adventurers.
The term adventure has different connotations in Africa than in the West; it 
follows a different set of rules and mechanisms. In the West, today, the term 
is primarily used to invoke a particular set of images of African migrants.
Adventure used to be shrouded in mystique, enhanced by the fact that early 
adventures were the privilege of colonial explorers. Since the nineteenth cen-
tury, the African continent has become a favorite location for Westerners 
seeking adventure containing exotic elements and a measure of authenticity.
Thus, in the Western perception, the idea of the adventurer has changed 
from ‘the man who came from somewhere else’ to ‘the man who went some-
where else’ (Venayre 2002).
This contrasts with the way in which contemporary adventurers from 
Africa think about elsewhere. In Africa, today, going (to the Western) else-
where is not necessarily linked with the ideas of strangeness and exoticism 
but with ideas of opportunity and membership of a globalized world. Europe 
occupies a central place in migratory imaginaries among most Africans and 
the ‘European elsewhere’ is far from being a  terra incognita. Televised images 
diffused across the globe flow into the very villages that are often deemed 
the most backward by the media and, through television series and sitcoms,
African villagers discover intimate details about everyday life in Europe and 
America. Even if these places are distant physically, they are not necessarily 
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in the processes of globalization that create new connections while simulta-
neously exacerbating marginalization (Ferguson 1999; 2006; Salazar 2010).
For instance, for young Guinea-Bissauans from the Bijago Islands, migration 
to Europe appears to supplant all other possibilities and be elevated as the 
only viable means to escape isolation and become reconnected with the rest 
of the world (Bordonaro 2009). Similar motivations are found among Gha-
naian fishermen, who have a strong sense of being disconnected. As they can 
no longer earn a living from fishing, they take tremendous risks in order to 
migrate to Italy and escape the shadow of globalization (Lucht 2011).
Finally, Europe constitutes a place of reference that is associated with 
colonial legacy and the collective historical memory shared by African peo-
ple. Without necessarily being experienced directly by all individuals, this 
collective memory is, nevertheless, passed on from generation to generation.
This is what Abdourahman A. Waberi3 reminds us of in his novel Transit: 
I have an old debt of memory to settle with France: people think migrants 
arrive naked in a new land at the end of their odyssey; yet migrants are 
loaded with their own personal stories and heavier still with what is 
called collective history.
(Waberi 2003, 6) 
Adventure: The Spice of Life 
Philosophers and sociologists have shown less interest in adventure as an 
event than as a process. Georg Simmel was the first scholar to consider 
adventure as an object of study. According to him, the intensity with which 
an event is lived determines whether or not it can become an adventure.
The adventure allows people to feel the  spice of life (Simmel 1912). It is not 
necessarily an unexpected or extraordinary event, mixing danger with the 
pleasure of discovery, but part of the collective life experience. For writers 
such as Jean-Paul Sartre (1972) or Pierre Mac Orlan (1998), the adventure 
exists first and foremost in the mind of the subject who lives it or talks about 
it. The risks taken, the trials endured, and the achievements are transcended 
by the importance of recounting them.
Adventures are found in books [. . .]: to transform even the most banal 
event into an adventure, it is necessary—and it is enough—to recount it.
This is what dupes people: a man is always a story-teller.
(Sartre 1972, 61–62) 
Thus, an adventure ensuing in silence or in solitude remains an episode with-
out future. It is not enough to leave or to take risks; it is necessary to make 
known how the adventure unfolds. Essentially, an adventure only stands 
out because of the way in which it is narrated and how particular twists and 






















138 Sylvie Bredeloup 
Among African migrants interviewed in Senegal, Burkina Faso, Libya, and 
France, ‘adventure’ thus signifies migrants’ aspirations to try different ways 
of living that involve fewer constraints and are more intense and more dig-
nified. The young men I interviewed explained that their lives as migrants 
were more turbulent and fast-moving than those they led at home. Instead 
of meeting up with their friends at home every day to discuss what had 
happened during the day while being bored and dreaming of a better life,
they find themselves in the midst of action as migrants. They constantly have 
to be on the alert in order to negotiate border crossings, avoid having their 
papers checked, and, as explained by Alioune, who was deported back to 
Senegal: 
All my life, I’ve felt the pressure daily, even in France. I didn’t have 
papers. Pressure when you leave, pressure when you come home! Even 
at the borders, you think about that, about control. Everything can fall 
apart one day—no, that is just too difficult. Ah, this is the reason why 
I feel so tired! 
Alioune returned home because he felt he was growing old, not because he 
felt he had earned enough money. Whereas he had been excited about taking 
risks in the early days of his adventure, he had now begun to feel that risks 
made him tired.
Among Francophone migrants, ‘ chercher la route’ and ‘chercher la vie’ (to 
look for a better path, to look for a better life) are expressions commonly 
used to describe their own practices and reasons to depart. These meta-
phors have been used by several generations of African migrants, despite 
them being a heterogeneous group and originating from different places 
and social classes. Before their departure for Europe, Ivorian migrants want 
to ‘look for their life’, to sublimate their life—that is to say, to break the 
monotony of daily life and become authors of their own destiny (De Latour 
2001). The adventure is undoubtedly the opposite of both boredom and seri-
ousness (Jankelevitch 1963). To leave equates with mobilizing ‘a philosophy 
of action’ that gives priority to the intensity of each moment in time. Thus,
the departure connotes abandoning everything in order to find oneself and 
to open up new and more stimulating horizons.
The Time of Youth? 
An interesting question to explore is how youth are defined and repre-
sented when the focus is on the figure of the adventurer. Are the defini-
tions grounded in notions of chronological or social age? Invariably, both 
researchers and migrants alike present the taste for adventure as a desire of 
youth that disappears with the onset of maturity. For Georg Simmel, as well,
‘Adventure does not square with the lifestyle of old age . . . it is par excel-
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to adventure lies in the intensity of the tension with which it allows us to feel 
life, the ‘spice of life’. A youthful disposition facilitates taking risks and is 
open to adventures. In return, the adventure has an element of locking peo-
ple into an eternal youth. In several of the adventure novels for young people 
published in Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century, adventure was 
described as a youthful folly which ended as soon as the heroes married and 
thereby entered adulthood and gained social recognition. ‘First and foremost 
the adventurer is a bachelor’, André Malraux enthused in his  Antimémoires
(1967, 378). His idea was that, at some point in life, a young frivolous man 
would leave behind his adventures and undergo a complete transformation 
to become an orderly man for the sake of the good fortunes of marriage! 
Another interesting issue relates to the question of whether migratory 
adventures are also associated with youth. The media systematically rep-
resents migratory adventures as the behavior of youth in the Global South 
who dream of living better lives in the Global North. Such representations 
are quite hard to verify, considering the difficulties of collecting statistical 
data of pathways marked by their fluidity and, to a large extent, by hap-
pening clandestinely. Even based on the empirical material collected in the 
course of my research, it is difficult to assess whether the migrants considered 
all or only some of their migratory pathway as adventure. However, migrant 
diamond miners born in the 1930s to 1940s, whose journeys I have followed 
over several years, were very clear. They unmistakably associated adventure 
with youth. Whereas they spoke in nostalgic terms about the golden age of 
diamond mining, which corresponded with their own entry into the world of 
risk-taking at the time of decolonization, they no longer spoke about them-
selves as adventurers. Those whom villagers in the Senegal River Valley label 
as adventurers today are a new wave of young people who engage in the 
smuggling of precious stones in Angola, but who do not maintain strategic 
relationships with their ageing countrymen. From the point of moving into 
new careers, the earlier generation of adventurers has been relabeled from 
‘diamond smugglers’ to ‘big men’ (Bredeloup 2007). ‘Nothing says that an 
adventurer remains one throughout his life, we live out our youth’ recounts 
Jean-Daniel Gandoulou, who studied Congolese migration in Paris in the 
1970s and depicted their arts of getting by between ‘Paris and Bacongo’ 
(Gandoulou 1984; 1989).
Links between Adventure, Hope, and Faith 
Adventurers look for something better. Central to the migratory adven-
ture is the fact that it is appreciated as a lifestyle allowing one to escape a 
gloomy and predictable everyday life and to find fulfillment. It is premised 
on the hope of going elsewhere, the hope of returning with the Western 
modernity attributes of accumulating wealth and exhibiting the achieve-
ment of success. The time of adventurous projects must be followed by a 
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counterpart  .  .  . Desire is effective. It presupposes human agency’, argues 
Vincent Crapanzano with reference to the work of Walter Pater, a Victorian 
novelist (Pater 1911). In contrast, hope depends on a god, fate, or chance for 
its fulfillment; ‘Although desire presumes a psychology, hope presupposes a 
metaphysics’ (Crapanzano 2003, 6).
In potential migrants’ deliberations, the migratory adventure is elevated to 
an antidote to boredom and seriousness (Jankelevitch 1963). This is rooted 
in migrants’ biased portrayal of their journeys, in which they underline 
the most extraordinary elements. They prefer to talk about how they have 
crossed deserts or lived rough in forests and how they have managed difficult 
relationships with the police and the military in different places rather than 
to talk about their everyday lives, the repetitiveness and the boredom while 
waiting to move on. In other words, they prefer to talk about the journey 
rather than about the temporary settlement in between the different legs of 
the journey—amongst other reasons in order to keep their audience dream-
ing. Thus, everything becomes possible when focusing on hope. Expulsion,
theft, imprisonment, and assassination were considered as occupational 
hazards by the diamond smugglers I met. During a longitudinal survey con-
ducted between 1994 and 2004, twelve of the 376 diggers and traders from 
the Senegal River Valley died a violent death before the end of our study, a 
much higher mortality rate than I have come across in the other sites under 
study (Bredeloup 2007). All the life stories gathered make mention of dan-
ger. Some speak of danger shamefully, others evoke it in a romantic manner,
intending thereby to defuse their uneasiness about the inherent dangers or 
hoping that their adventures might be immortalized by the researcher who,
in this context, is perceived as a modern-day poet who glorifies the daily life 
of the Senegalese diggers. Such ideas are linked to the history of diamond 
smugglers. In the past, griots followed the richest diamond smugglers and 
sang their praises in the countries they traversed, as well as at home. In their 
performances they compared the migratory and professional trajectories of 
diamond smugglers to those of the traditional Tukulor4 heroes, thereby rein-
serting the hope of glory in those who had already begun their migratory 
adventure and motivating those who had not yet set off from home.
Mystic Journey 
Phillip Mar has shown that the concept of hope is strongly embedded in Mus-
lim and Christian religions, due to its long association with faith, hope, and 
love, and thus with discourses of salvation and redemption (Mar 2005). To 
the majority of the migrants I interviewed, the migratory experience appears 
to take on the meaning of a mystic journey. Their actions are grounded in 
an interminable hope of being able to change their fate, by themselves and 
by the grace of God. This sentiment of hope gives them the strength to face 
the high expectations others have of them and to meet the dangers with 
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explaining their luck in avoiding prison or death but also when rationalizing 
their capability to support the agony of separation or the pain and anguish 
endured physically. On the one hand, they wanted to describe the ways in 
which they were fortunate: ‘I never fell into the hands of the police. It’s a 
work of God! I cannot say that it’s because I know the road well. No, that is 
God’s work! Because nobody has his luck’. On the other hand, they wanted 
to emphasize their ability to tolerate suffering: 
When you leave here [Burkina Faso] to arrive in Niger, the trip after 
Niger, it’s not a small pain. As soon as you’re on this part of the journey,
you ask God that he leads you and that you arrive in Libya in good 
health . . . It’s thanks to God, otherwise the journey isn’t easy. The walk-
ing in the desert is a story which we can’t tell to anybody.
In the course of their migration, both Christian and Muslim migrants from 
sub-Saharan Africa draw on religious ideologies in their most general sense as 
well as on much narrower discourses embedded in particular denominations 
to better endure the waiting, instill meaning in their suffering, invigorate 
their migration project, and, where required, obtain material or symbolic 
assistance (Bava and Capone 2010). When the migrants feel discouraged,
the appeal of collective prayer in churches or mosques is that it helps to give 
meaning to their migratory quest. Thanks to the transformation of dangers 
into ordeals, the migratory route can then be converted into a spiritual route.
Muslim migrants tend to construct exile as an experience similar to that of 
the Prophet Mohammed, who was in exile in Medina for ten years. For the 
devotees of the Murid Brotherhood, the imprisonment in Gabon for more 
than a decade of their spiritual leader, Sheikh Amadou Bamba, has a similar 
value. Every year they commemorate the magal de Touba,5 the idea that 
going into exile is connected with unavoidable ordeals. To travel far away 
from Senegal, confront the unknown to increase one’s resources, progress,
and demonstrate one’s faith is an integral part of the Murid spiritual trajec-
tory (Bava 2005). To migrate, then, symbolizes the devotees’ pursuit of the 
same path as their spiritual leader, and they contribute to the reproduction 
of the myth about exile as a path to personal enhancement. Such religious 
discourses also work to reinforce the devotees’ faith, their confidence, and 
their capacity to act and to endure the ordeals along the migratory routes 
and temporary stops.
Similarly, Pentecostal churches offer their adherents encouragement to 
tolerate the separation from home and maintain the hope for a better life in 
the near future (Bava and Picard 2010). When seeking to make the migra-
tory experience of the adherents easier to endure, the Pentecostal discourses 
refer in particular to the Exodus and to the reassurance of having chosen a 
good path when turning to the preaching of the gospel (Maskens 2008). Pen-
tecostal devotees believe that their migratory paths are strewn with pitfalls 





















     
 
 
142 Sylvie Bredeloup 
faith in God and in the manner in which their pastors encourage them in 
collective prayer.
In other words, religion helps migrants who begin to deviate to bolster 
their faith, regain hope, and envisage new possibilities. As a contrast, we find 
that those who have sunk into despair have lost their faith and no longer 
believe in the power of God. Writing about clandestine Moroccan migrants 
in Europe, Stefania Pandolfo presents examples of such migrants: 
The risk of madness in despair is paralleled by a risk of doubting the 
foundation of faith or even challenging God, therefore entering her-
esy . . . The person in despair has thoughts of being abandoned by God.
(Pandolfo 2007, 349) 
Epic Journey 
In addition to religion, the epic story is an important cultural element in 
rousing hope in migrants across West Africa. The history of diamond smug-
glers reveals that the epic story incited the hope for change harbored by 
peasant sons who left to enrich themselves in Central Africa, far away from 
their region of origin (Bredeloup 2007). In Fulbe societies, the epic story or 
fergo is defined as emigration and, at the same time, rebellion or dissidence.
The Fulbe princes who went into exile opposed the hierarchical heritage sys-
tem or the political system in their region. Ousmane Kane describes vividly 
how a prince called Sammba Booyi began an open rebellion against one of 
his relatives, Siree Sawa Laamu, who reigned over the Fuuta Tooro6 in the 
eighteenth century, to contest his conciliatory politics with the Moors. When 
falling in disgrace, Sammba Booyi followed the example of Samba Gueladio,
who had gone into exile in Gadiaga7 and lingered in anticipation of making 
a glorious return to his country (Kane 2004, 408).
The first generation of diamond smugglers from the Senegal River Valley 
reinterpreted their trajectories across Africa in the light of these famous  fer-
gos. Throughout their migration, they drew on oral heritage to legitimate 
their search for moral independence, to justify their elation, and to main-
tain hope for a better future. According to El Hadj Omar Tall, the famous 
Fulbe leader and military commander who founded a short-lived empire,
exile was the condition for success of all Fuuta Tooro migrants. Rejecting 
colonial domination, the young descendant of a large and very religious 
family left the Senegal River Valley. Owing to his journeys to contempo-
rary Sudan, Niger, and Egypt, he perfected his knowledge of Islam before 
being imprisoned by the King of Ségou. He was obliged to go into exile in 
the Fouta-Djalon (a region of what, today, is Guinea), where he began to 
preach the doctrine of the Tidjaniya8 and plan the Jihad9 (Robinson 1988).
His well-known conquests later permitted numerous marginalized groups 
within the fuutanke society to seek revenge in order to gain entry into the 
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left Fuuta accompanied only by his griot after his uncle barred him from his 
legitimate role as leader of the country upon his father’s death. With the aim 
of regaining the throne, he gathered an army in Mauretania. Samba Guéla-
dio returned to his country to fight his uncle and take his rightful place.
The epic story emphasizes the individuality of the person who seeks to take 
charge of his destiny and, at a more general level, seeks to liberate himself 
from the confinement of Fulbe society.
The two epic stories presented elate the liberty of African heroes to take 
initiatives, insist on the heroes’ courage, and justify exile as the only means 
of recapturing one’s place in society. Through associating migratory adven-
turers with the conduct of heroes, migrants indicate that they are not just 
puppets controlled by fate but, in fact, actors shaping their lives. In this sense 
they feel that they have the right to break off family relations temporarily in 
order to construct or consolidate their lives. Numerous migrants from the 
Senegal River Valley identify themselves with these heroes, who knew how 
to overcome the dangers and prohibitions on returning home triumphantly.
Thus, the epic stories work to legitimize adventures (Lahire 1998), but they 
also imply certain outcomes. The trials along the route must be overcome 
convincingly if the migrants are to return triumphantly to their country.
Contrary to the heroes who were led by awe-inspiring ideals, the adventurer 
is partially released from the world of the gods and is left to decide on his 
own what he ought to do and what he can refuse. In this situation his deep-
est desire is to know his destiny and to be able to direct it. In short, even if 
the commencement of the journey and its many trials is common for both 
adventurers and heroes, their relations to death differ. The adventurer plays 
with death but seeks life, whereas the hero must die to become famous and 
the object of particular cults.
Similarly, the literature on Mandinke cultures shows that some social 
markers are antagonistic. For example, contrasting markers such as the  bad-
enya and the fadenya are part of the social construction of life as a migrant 
as much as they structure everyday life for Malian villagers (Jónsson 2007).
The fadenya, which generates an opposition among children of the same 
father but of different mothers, drives young men to engage in heroic acts to 
stand out among their brothers. Jealousy thus becomes a powerful motor in 
the drive to rise out of anonymity. The badenya, on the other hand, which 
is a metaphor for harmony, is more likely to stimulate people to accept 
their situation and the constraints imposed by the authorities. The notion 
of fadenya reflects, in the same way as adventure, an act of rebelliousness.
Youth are incited to lift themselves out of their disadvantaged situation, to 
migrate to find their own path in life. ‘Fadenya spins the head-strong youth 
into the world of adventure’ (Bird and Kendall 1980, 22). So, once again,
the hope of a better life and a superior position in their society drives young 
people to see a journey to other places as the only means to achieve this.
It is this deeply internal conviction that helps them to endure the ordeals 
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hope for a better life and a different social position that stimulates migrants 
to stand out from the crowd, to distinguish themselves and to seek mate-
rial wealth. However, this quest for difference does not mean that migrants 
necessarily impact on existing social norms upon their return. In my study 
of diamond smugglers, I demonstrated how those who had left their com-
munity at a very young age in a challenge to the gerontocratic hierarchy,
accepted and used this hierarchy upon their return some years later.They put 
aside upon their return whatever provoked their challenge to the hierarchy 
and subsequently their migration, in order to reintegrate themselves socially.
The material wealth gained through migration could not emancipate them 
from being subjugated by the social hierarchy in the village. In fact, existing 
social hierarchies were strengthened in that return migrants ensured their 
reproduction, because rejecting them would be at the returnees’ expense.
Dialectics of Dignity and Shame 
Dignity in Foreign Places? 
In the introduction to his book about Malian migrants from Togotola liv-
ing in Brazzaville, Bruce Whitehouse points to the everlasting actuality in 
Soninke society of the Bamanan proverb tunga te danbe don— exile knows 
no dignity (Whitehouse 2012, 21). In a study focusing on Malian migrants 
from another Soninke village—Kounda—who have left for France, Gunvor 
Jonnson comes to the same conclusion: ‘A foreigner has no value in foreign 
places’ (Jónsson 2008, 45). Those who go abroad lose their  danbe or dig-
nity, and they can only recover it once they return home. Migration, then, is 
perceived as an alternative route via which an individual can find his or her 
social place at home. While abroad, migrants do not need to worry about 
shame, they have no social obligations and no expenses. This allows them 
to engage in physically degrading jobs and endure social humiliation with-
out this having any durable negative consequences for their social status at 
home. This dynamic is the reason why the Dogon, who are of a noble caste,
can allow themselves to work in the metallurgy industry once they have 
migrated to Cameroon, despite the fact that, in Mali, such work is reserved 
for the caste of blacksmiths (Cisse 2009). Likewise, Malian and Senegalese 
migrants of noble Haalpulaar and Soninke descent sweep the streets of Paris 
without repercussions for their gentry.
Glorious Return or Shameful Return? 
Migrants’ return to the country of origin must either stand out gloriously 
or not happen at all. Whether migrants return voluntarily or as a result 
of expulsion, their family and community cannot conceive that they might 
return empty-handed. ‘The adventure is not without charge; it is surrounded 








   


















Migratory Adventure as Moral Experience 145 
(De Latour 2003, 187). In other words, migrants need to manage the end of 
their adventure carefully. The return home must be triumphant: what is at 
stake is the achievement of social fulfillment after having ‘repaid the debt of 
life’ (2003, 186) to all the people who contributed to the migrant’s upbring-
ing and education and helped to finance the adventure. Thus, it is equally 
important for the returning migrant to support his relatives upon his return 
and to expect favorable consequences of this support.
In the Senegal River Valley, we were told regularly about adventurers who 
had left for Zaïre or Nigeria in the 1960s and were never heard of again.
Just as often, the story went on to describe how the brothers attempted 
to follow in the adventurer’s footsteps to draw them back into the family 
circle. Whitehouse also shows that some of the Malian adventurers in Braz-
zaville find themselves in a dire economic situation but nevertheless deem 
an empty-handed return to be out of the question (Whitehouse 2012, 89).
In the film Le cri de la tourterelle [The Dove’s Call] a female griot invites 
Nigerien migrants, who for years have been lost in Côte d’Ivoire, to return 
home. ‘The dove has called out that it wants to go home’. This  griot was 
the one to incite them to take migratory paths and seek adventure through 
her songs in the 1960s; now she once again seeks to influence their paths 
by calling them home, using exactly the same discursive means but this time 
focusing on the shame of leaving: ‘Fleeing is cowardice’.10 
Contrary to the received wisdom, migrants’ desperate actions cannot only 
be interpreted as a consequence of a lack of knowledge or of criminality.
From their perspective, social death is far worse than physical death. Rather 
than losing face, many migrants prefer losing their mind or losing their life.
In the transit countries, and in particular in Libya, I met migrants who had 
completely lost contact with their family and friends, who were homeless or 
who had sunk into madness. They no longer counted on their family, and 
they no longer seemed to be counted on by their family. They had lost all 
awareness of time.
This kind of sentiment is reflected in the novel Paradis du Nord [Northern 
Paradise]: ‘Shame! I feel too ashamed’, exclaims a Cameroonian migrant: 
I can already hear them whisper behind my back: ‘See Anselme, he went 
to France but came back poorer than when he left’. You know very well 
that, in the popular belief in my country, those who don’t get rich while 
in this country [France] where you only need to bend down to pick up 
money, are good-for-nothings.
(Essomba 1996, 120) 
Thus shame is an extremely effective emotion in driving migrants to take 
enormous risks, to cross deserts and the sea, to push their boundaries beyond 
previous limits in order to avoid social death. As Essomba suggests in his 
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‘Failure on the Journey is Worse than Immobility at Home’ 
Deportation often leads to the denigration of the deportee, who may be 
deemed a disgrace to the family. Relatives never see deportation as an injus-
tice orchestrated by a repressive political apparatus but rather as an indi-
vidual failure. The culpability of the migrants is foregrounded and their 
morality is challenged. In one interview, a Senegalese migrant who had been 
deported from Italy ten years earlier and who had still not found stable 
employment, described his experience of returning involuntarily.
Some people say you’re a loser, that you had all the opportunities in 
the world but didn’t know how to exploit them. If you go to Europe,
you must succeed. It’s mandatory . . . But you, you keep your calm, you 
manage to control yourself, you let them talk, but in the evening you are 
alone . . . Maybe one day they will understand. But you can’t begin to 
discuss these matters, you can’t convince them that their ideas of Europe 
are wrong. I just can’t, but one day, I’ll be proven right! The first thing I 
would like to set right is why people like myself get into their heads that 
going to Europe is the only option.
Relatives think that the migrants have done something wrong, that they 
have strayed off the right track—read: that they have committed a crime— 
although often they are deported after a random control of identity papers.
Migrants are thus blamed for not knowing how to benefit properly from the 
abundance of opportunities they are believed to have from the moment they 
arrive in the destination country. Moral judgments are measured out quickly 
and migrants find themselves ostracized by their relatives and labeled as 
good-for-nothings, lazy, vagrants, delinquents, and, even worse, murderers,
without having the means to challenge such devastating prejudice.
‘Failure on the journey is worse than immobility at home: poor at the 
outset, the warrior becomes a loser’ (De Latour 2001, 174). Some deportees 
prefer to disappear as soon as they have been expulsed rather than to make 
contact with their family and face the disgrace of returning empty-handed.
Some who could not escape the empty-handed return have become the 
laughing-stock of their community and have subsequently sunk into silence,
alcoholism, or madness, or have tried to take their own life. I remember 
a young man lost in the suburbs of Dakar and dressed in rags, who drew 
circles on the pavement in ink. Unlikely to respond in an intelligible way, he 
nevertheless described how he had lost his footing in the trade in emeralds 
in Zambia. He had not been able to endure repeated detention in the prisons 
of Kitwe. Contrary to what Suzanne Roth (1980) has argued, even if adven-
turers recoil from misfortunes, they are nevertheless harmed by them. In the 
streets of Dakar and Saint-Louis in Senegal, one regularly meets men who,
according to rumors, have lost their senses and have gone mad after a failed 
migration because they could not cope with others’ prejudice.
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Not everybody has the psychological and physical resistance necessary to 
retain their composure in the face of the extraordinarily high frequency of 
humiliations, imprisonment, and abuse they experience along their way, the 
renouncement by their family and the rejection by their community of ori-
gin. Mamoutou Tounkara describes how a Malian migrant deported from 
France, after having worked there for more than ten years, was brutally 
pushed away by his mother when he wanted to embrace her. ‘Whether a 
child has succeeded, has gone mad or something else, the child usually is 
loved and respected by his mother. My mother, however, quickly made me 
understand that I lived in another world’ (Tounkara 2013, 288). Behind the 
anguish of returning empty-handed is the anxiety of facing others and their 
views, and of humiliating one’s relatives because of one’s failure. How a 
person is judged reflects on his mother and, as soon as he fails, the reliabil-
ity of his mother is challenged. In some of the communities in which I have 
conducted my research, returning empty-handed can result in the migrant 
being considered irresponsible and, in some cases, being rejected by his or 
her community, like the migrant described by Tounkara. Such rejection also 
excludes the migrant from participating in community meetings and from 
speaking up in public.
Words Describing Failure 
The words used by migrants and their relatives to describe the different 
categories of failed migrants are informative for understanding the sym-
bolic violence in relation to this ostracism, to this social killing. If migrants 
express their shame at not being able to fulfil their part of the migratory 
‘contract’—this implicit and moral contract according to which family 
members back home benefit from migratory adventures whether the family 
was implicated in the decision or not—the open acknowledgement of fail-
ure may even reiterate the shame (Vermot 2015). According to Mamoutou 
Tounkara, all deported migrants in Mali are treated as vagrants by their 
relatives; this is a radical way of expressing the perception that deported 
migrants have messed up their lives. Despite having had the family’s bless-
ing on their migratory project, the migrants fail to fulfil their obligations 
towards the family when deported and they therefore become danga-den
(Tounkara 2013, 286). On the other side of the Senegal River Valley, the 
Halpulaaren use a similar extensive vocabulary to describe the situation for 
failed migrants. Generally, they distinguish between those who return suc-
cessfully after accumulating material wealth (jajaade) and those who have 
lost their way and do not return (luttude). Failure can be further nuanced 
in distinctions between those cursed because they no longer remit money 
to the family but do not return (kudaado), those deemed irresponsible 
because they did not foresee their deportation ( ala haaju) and those return-
ing empty-handed, described in terms of nudity ( bolo) to humiliate them 
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During one interview, a migrant who had been deported from France 
described how he and his friends always had a suitcase ready in case of 
deportation. It was packed with new clothes which could be distributed 
to the members of their family to circumvent shame in case of an untimely 
return.
One day I was deported. Before being sent back to Senegal I was accom-
panied by the police to my room, where I quickly packed my things. I 
was prepared. I’d got this idea because I knew that, as an undocumented 
migrant, I could be deported any day, especially since the control of papers 
is frequent. Thus, as soon as I earned a bit of money, I bought jeans to 
pack away in my suitcase. I didn’t want to return to Africa without nice 
clothes because, at home, they say that you returned empty-handed and 
that you are a loafer if you don’t have nice clothes to wear. But as soon as 
you are well dressed and use a nice after-shave, they will say that you’ve 
succeeded and that you’ve become someone, even if you were deported.
By preparing for an unplanned return, migrants are better equipped to cope 
with the reality of deportation by making them look like they returned vol-
untarily. The permanent insecurity with which migrants are faced incites 
them to engage in all kinds of illegal activity, to experiment with new strat-
egies to make their everyday lives more endurable, and to preserve their 
dignity amongst their own people.
The notions of sutura (dignity, tact) and koyera (shame) are not only 
mobilized by migrants from the Senegal River Valley who have traveled 
to Europe or to the diamond mines across the African continent, they are 
also part of the vocabulary used by Burkinabé migrants interviewed during 
their migration or upon their return, after having been expulsed from Libya 
or Côte d’Ivoire (Bredeloup 2014). The importance for them of return-
ing with dignity has burgeoned with the many obstacles they have had to 
overcome. Failure can be interpreted differently depending on whether the 
unlucky candidate is viewed as a strong or a weak person in his community 
of origin. Accordingly, the person who is considered weak is often judged to 
be responsible for his own failure whereas the person who is perceived as 
resourceful is perceived to be the victim of bad luck. Scrutiny of the prev-
alent vocabulary used to describe migrants who are unable to materially 
honor the expectations of their relatives should be more systematic if we are 
to understand how norms of solidarity within the family and among peers 
function in contemporary societies.
Fiction Describing Shame 
Shame rarely surfaces in verbal communication. Often researchers need 
to interpret articulations of shame a posteriori through analyzing a larger 
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shame to a foreign researcher, and especially one coming from the coun-
try from which the migrant was deported, is not easily done. This diffi-
culty often creates silences during the interview, leads to the omission of the 
parts of their story that are just too painful to describe or to adaptations 
of the truth so that they do not lose face but can preserve a less-devalued 
self-image. This is why it is interesting to turn to the literature and ana-
lyze how writers address these difficult emotions. The novel  L’Impasse [The 
Dead End] published in 1996 by the Congolese author Daniel Biyaoula 
recounts the everyday battle of an African split between nostalgia and the 
desire for elsewhere. The author stresses the shame felt intensely by his main 
character during a vacation in his home country. The Congolese community 
ostracizes him because he refuses to adhere to the canonical representations 
of success in the West and thus to comply with the demands of his family.
All that rested on me were disapproving and inquisitive eyes. I didn’t 
hear anything but silences and overwhelming words. My father’s voice 
and that of uncle Titémo relegated me to the bottom of the abyss where 
one is blind. They restrained me, criticized me. I’m a disgrace to the 
family, I’m told. [. . .] Foregone dead that I am.
(Biyaoula 1996, 141) 
Several other African authors evoke the symbolic violence associated with 
an untimely return; migration then becomes a metaphor for existential social 
and cultural anxiety among Africans. In the novel  Le Ventre de l’Atlantique
[The Belly of the Atlantic] by Fatou Diome, a young Senegalese author, one 
of the leitmotivs is ‘Every scrap of life must serve to win dignity’ (Diome 
2006, 63).The main character, Moussa, is young football hopeful who, after 
failing his trial in a French club, is deported. His dignity is undermined when 
his father sends him a letter ending ‘Spare us this shame among our people.
You must work, save money and come home’ (2006, 69). Moussa disappears 
in the waves of the Atlantic, close to his village, when trying to escape the 
intolerable guilt that torments him and the humiliation at the hands of his 
peers. To preserve one’s dignity through thick and thin when experiencing 
one humiliation after the other requires an extraordinarily strong character 
and distinctive strategies to preserve one’s identity. Not to be stripped of 
their social dignity spurs migratory destinies.
Finally Vincent de Gaulejac’s 1996 study of the sources of shame and 
‘social suffering’ demonstrates the pertinent links between concrete living 
conditions and their consequences for individuals. His work merits being 
highlighted for its insights into the ways in which being (shame) and doing 
(culpability) differ and can be mobilized differently by migrants. If the cul-
pability can be lessened by confession, compensation, or punishment, shame 
on the other hand ‘requires a transformation of oneself. It is the being in its 
most profound sense that is at stake, as if something irreversible had hap-
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Conclusion 
In this paper I have tried to clarify the underlying moralities and beliefs of a 
new category of migrant, the adventurer. I have shown that, among African 
migrants, the word ‘adventure’ is not just a generic expression of their aspi-
rations for the future nor is ‘the adventurer’ an analytical category invented 
by researchers to group migrants who overcome various risks and dangers 
to transgress the barriers and borders which have been put in place to stem 
the flow of migrants. The notion of adventure, of being an adventurer, is an 
emic label that expresses a deeply felt desire to live in another way than is 
possible where the migrants come from or where they are. ‘Adventure’ thus 
signifies migrants’ aspirations to try different ways of living that involve 
fewer constraints and are more intense and more dignified. The migratory 
adventure is indeed envisioned as a stage in the life of a man, as is his settling 
down. The adventure would be a passage, a transition.
As soon as the symbolic dimensions of adventure are considered, it is 
necessary also to take into consideration the desires, dreams, and subjec-
tivities. Migration adventures are, first and foremost, a moral experience, a 
way of existence. Religion, as well as the epic stories of the past, is invoked 
in migrants’ legitimation of their trajectories and choices to reconfirm their 
faith in a better future far from their home. Besides this dialectical relation-
ship between desire and hope, I have endeavored to better understand the 
subtleties in the enunciations of dignity and shame which are at the heart 
of migration adventures. The migrants are prepared to risk their lives for a 
precarious future, in order to know the present-day misery of emigrants, to 
put up with shame in the hope of being recognized at home once they return 
to their country, and recover their dignity. But their migration adventures 
do not always turn out the way they had anticipated, nor do they necessar-
ily end at their own initiative. Despite the hope which emigrants nourish,
the new ways of living and being that they experience as migrants are very 
different to those which they had imagined before they left home. Notwith-
standing that migrants’ desires change throughout their uncertain and tur-
bulent journeys, the outcome of migration is appraised upon their return 
and comes at a high price. The ideal exit from migration adventures is expe-
rienced by the few who have succeeded in accumulating sufficient money 
or skills to reclaim a space—more or less prestigious—in the community of 
origin. At the other end of the scale are the numerous migrants who have 
exhausted the possibilities of a dignified return to their country or who, after 
having been deported, experience general humiliation. These migrants pay 
the heavy price of social relegation for having failed in the task which they 
had been assigned by their family or which they themselves had instigated.
Notes 
1. This study began in 1992 and is still ongoing. Whereas the key questions have 
remained the same, additional themes have been introduced over the years,
reflecting changes in migration flows and regimes.
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2. Novels describing adventure have always existed but they have had different 
functions in the popular imagination over the course of time. Only in the nine-
teenth century did they develop into a literary genre in Europe.
3. Waberi is a Francophone writer from Djibouti. His 2003 novel  Transit is a suc-
cession of monologues addressing the agony of exile related to the civil war in 
Djibouti (Djibouti was the last French colony to gain independence in 1977).
The theme of separation is the fil rouge connecting the characters presented in 
the novel.
4. Tukulors belong to a sedentary group related to the Fula of West Africa. However,
contrary to the pastoralist Fulbe, the Tukulors have farming and fishing as their 
main activities.
5. Sheikh Amadou Bamba was born in Touba, Senegal.
6. Fuuta Tooro was the generic name which Fulbe people used to describe the area 
between present-day northern Senegal and southern Mauretania, where they 
lived.
7. Gadiaga was a medieval kingdom founded by the Soninke (Galam).
8. The Tidjaniya is a Sufi brotherhood within Sunni Islam that prioritizes culture 
and education. Originating from North Africa, it has become the largest Sufi 
order in West Africa. Ahmad Tijani Ali Cisse was the spiritual leader of this 
brotherhood, founded in 1781 in reaction to the Qadiriya order, which was 
judged as too conservative.
9. Umar Tall conquered several non-Muslim regions in present-day West Africa,
then constructed fortifications near Kayes (Mali), before declaring war on a 
number of smaller Islamic states nearby.
10. For an analysis of the semiology of this film, see Marina Lafay and Carola 
Minck (2014).
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9 Death of a Gin Salesman 
Hope and Despair among Ghanaian 




Based on three months of fieldwork in 2010 among Ghanaian migrants 
stranded in Niamey, Niger, the principal transit country for African overland 
migration to Libya, this chapter discusses the notion of hope and its connect-
edness to migrant sacrifice and death on the desert migration routes. Each 
year, tens of thousands of young people travel from West Africa through the 
desert towns of Niger towards Libya and some further to Europe. Although 
little is known about the trans-Saharan route from Niger into Libya—and 
even less is known about the routes connecting the Horn of Africa with 
Libya via Sudan—it is clear that it represents a massive risk for undocu-
mented migrants and refugees (Simon 2006, 54) and results in a substantial 
number of deaths each year, deaths that are most probably unaccounted 
for due to the lack of monitoring and absence of security in this vast and 
largely ungoverned area. Often migrants run into problems on the route.
Perhaps the old trucks taking them across the desert break down, or they 
are cheated or robbed by the smugglers or they simply run out of money (see 
Lucht 2011, 160–176). In many instances, they will relocate to Agadez or 
Niamey or other transit points, and wait for another opportunity to go to 
North Africa. For many, however, the waiting becomes permanent and they 
end up doing menial work, sometimes cutting off connections with their 
families out of shame.
Focusing on the unexpected death of a Ghanaian migrant stranded in Nia-
mey, this chapter explores how hope is understood and maintained under 
such stressful and dangerous circumstances. Hope, I argue, is a belief in a 
sense of continuity between an individual’s efforts and the responses they 
generate in both the here-and-now and in death, whereas a sense of despair 
represents a breakdown of this moral economy of human lifeworlds, i.e., the 
experiential sense that a person’s actions matter and are responded to, even 
if the response is delayed or transferred to other times and places—even if 
the individual will not prosper her/himself. Hope is underpinned by a notion 
of existential reciprocity (Lucht 2011; 2015), a fundamental belief that, in 
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Hope and Existential Mobility 
Migration is an expression of the hope that one’s needs and desires will be 
accommodated elsewhere, Ghassan Hage argues; migrants, like all human 
beings, need to feel that ‘they are going places in life’ and, if they cannot 
obtain that sense of existential mobility at home, they will travel to obtain it 
(Hage 2005, 470, see also the Introduction in this volume). Seeking the fleet-
ing warmth in promise, and in a near future or in a different location alto-
gether, where ‘losses are made good, injustices redressed, patience rewarded,
and knowledge achieved’ (Jackson 2011, 197) is a fundamental trait of the 
human imagination. It speaks of the eternal existential unrest of human life 
that, according to Schopenhauer, resembles 
the course of a man running down a mountain who would fall over if 
he tried to stop and can stay on his feet only by running on; or a pole 
balanced on the tip of the finger; or a planet which would fall into its 
sun if it ever ceased to plunge irresistibly forward.
(1851/2004, 52) 
In fact, running downhill without stumbling appears to be a relevant anal-
ogy for the kind of human struggle that migration represents in the global-
ized world because how to keep moving, both physically and existentially,
in spite of the many obstacles on the road, appears to be a recurrent theme 
of migrant life. During fieldwork in Naples in 2005, for instance, I noticed 
that my Ghanaian assistant carried a golden key around his neck, a gift from 
his sister. He explained that it was the key which would unlock the doors of 
opportunity (Lucht 2011, 92). In spite of the many challenges and setbacks 
in Naples or, perhaps, because of them, he was constantly concerned with 
clearing the channels for his continuous migration trajectory.
The immediate barriers and suffering that so many migrants experience 
en route, or after their arrival in Europe, seldom extinguish hope that they 
can find another place in which to express themselves, however unlikely it 
sometimes appears from the outside. Henrik Vigh, for instance, records how 
Bissauan migrants who find themselves down-and-out in Lisbon, exchang-
ing one kind of stasis with another, say that Portugal is just a ‘trampoline’ for 
their next move; hope opportunistically migrates ahead of the migrants to 
new destinations. It becomes ‘temporally or spatially transposed and related 
to other places or times’ (Vigh 2009, 105). Hope, Jarret Zigon argues, is 
both the motivation to endure times of hardship or ‘breakdowns’ where a 
person’s life and existence is called into question as well as a continuous 
motivation ‘for persevering through the life into which one has been thrown.
In this way, hope is not necessarily aimed at the future good, but primarily 
at the perseverance of a sane life’ (2009, 258). Michael Jackson, drawing 
on Gabriel Marcel, describes hope as the belief that there is still time left to 
change one’s circumstances (Jackson 2011, xii) or, one might add, that there 
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This, to me, is an approach that appears close to the experiential truth 
of hope—namely that hope is a vernacular term for the sense of existential 
continuity between a person’s efforts and the responses they generate; a 
sense that one’s desires will somehow be accommodated in due time and in a 
shape appropriate to the intensity and extent of the struggles. Hope, and the 
continuous desire for existence, is constantly formed, and transformed, and 
fixed to new objects, ideas and routes, and challenged by social and political 
reality. Yet, sometimes hope becomes impossible to believe in or disappears 
or can lead to stasis or even ‘paralysis’, as Vincent Crapanzano has argued,
‘One can be so caught up in hope that one does nothing to prepare for its 
fulfilment’ (2003, 18). Hope can also be substituted by another form of 
future management, a kind of  defeatist agency— that is, a form of proactive 
fatalism or despair that consists in playing down hope and aspirations and 
elaborating endlessly on the many pitfalls that wait around the corner, to 
the extent that nothing unfortunate the world has in store for you comes as 
a surprise. Again, this is a way of predicting or even collaborating with one’s 
continued negative trajectory and is, therefore, in principle, empowering,
even if psychologically demanding, in the sense that one stage of life substi-
tutes another in predictable ways (Lucht 2011, 82). Despair, in this sense, is 
not necessarily a passive attitude but a negative grasp of the social world,
ensuring that one moves nowhere fast. The complexity of the situation is 
that, among African migrants in Niger, hope and despair are interchanging 
modes of managing the future that both belong to the human repertoire of 
struggling for whatever makes life worth living, and seem to substitute each 
other constantly.
Hope in the Globalized World 
Perhaps Pierre Bourdieu is right to argue that the dispossessed are a lot more 
resigned than we usually imagine—resigned to the impossibility of radical 
social and economic change—and that, ‘Having adapted to the demands of 
the world which has made them what they are, they take for granted the 
greater part of their existence’ (2000, 231). To Bourdieu, the hope that still 
lingers—in its more fantastic and unrealistic forms—is an effect of a per-
son’s marginal position in the world system. In other words, below a certain 
threshold of power, where social and economic mobility are unobtain-
able, fantasies such as lotteries and other almost occult promises of instant 
wealth and social prominence—that have little or no ‘objective chance’ of 
realization—flourish because, if nothing is possible, everything is possible 
(2000, 226). Yet there is still a margin of freedom. Individual hope and the 
desire for existence are, of course, informed by socioeconomic and political 
forces but they are not mere expressions of these constraints. Even nega-
tive, fantastic, or unrealistic forms of hope are important and should not be 
ignored or pathologized in that, even if they do not change a person’s objec-
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make a real difference to individuals. To grasp this perpetual intersubjective 
tension between structural constraints and human subjectivity, Robert Des-
jarlais has coined the term ‘critical phenomenology’ (1997, 24), with a view 
to linking the political and the phenomenal. In migrant studies, Sarah Willen,
working with undocumented migrant workers in Israel, has elaborated on 
the notion of critical phenomenology to address ‘the conditions of structural 
inequality and structural violence that shape migrants’ positions’ and, at the 
same time,‘the impact of these contextual factors on migrants’ individual and 
collective experiences’ (Willen 2007, 13). Indeed, even in the most difficult 
circumstances, people have the sometimes emancipating force of hope.
One example of this is anthropologist Morten Axel Pedersen’s perspec-
tive on hope among marginalized hustlers in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. Draw-
ing especially on Miyazaki (2006), hope to Pedersen is not conceived as a 
flight into fantasy but a ‘multi-temporal attitude’ of ‘pre-experiencing’ the 
‘tiny but innumerable cracks through which the promise of another world 
shines’. Hope, in this context, creates a kind of sought-after irregular life 
on the margins that is not unwanted but represents a ‘systematic unwill-
ingness to plan’ (2012, 10, 13). In the same vein, Joel Robbins (2013) has 
recently argued for an ‘anthropology of the good’, a strand of anthropology 
that challenges, according to Robbins, the dominating focus on the ‘suf-
fering subject’ and seeks to reinstate human agency and play in the face of 
seemingly insurmountable difficulties—i.e., to explore ways in which ‘peo-
ple come to believe that they can successfully create a good beyond what 
is presently given in their lives’ (2013, 458). In this connection, a focus on 
hope could be one avenue to understanding—especially but not only—poor 
and disenfranchised people’s resistance to their circumstances or, at least,
their experiential lack of acceptance of the undesirable status quo. Yet, to 
Pedersen and others, the insistence on the ‘surprisingly hopeful’ dimension 
of life among the marginalized and the continued hope that ‘tomorrow will 
be a better day’ are not only forms of future management or a recasting or 
playing with a difficult situation which has no desirable alternatives but ‘a 
continual colonization and expansion of the present’ (2012, 2, 6). It offers an 
alternative reality or ontology that is chosen and lived by the marginalized 
to the extent that they abstain from making long-term plans.
Although I sympathize with the effort to reclaim and rehabilitate hope, I 
want to take this chapter in another direction. Perhaps informed by field-
work among ‘the floating population’ of the EU–African border zones (Bay-
art 2007, 272), it appears to me that any perspective on hope needs to be 
grounded in but not determined by socio-economic and political reality, to 
a greater extent than Bourdieu’s many critics appear willing to admit. A 
critical phenomenological position does not entail that people are some kind 
of robot, passively enacting their fate but in a constant struggle for a life 
worth living. The death-defying journeys in the desert and the Mediterra-
nean, for instance, are ways of transgressing the borders imposed on them 
in more than one way. Although not political acts per se, migrant suffering 
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and sometimes death are forms of iconoclasm that question the moral 
legitimacy of the system (even though, to a growing extent, likely to be 
received as unfortunate but inevitable in Europe). More than seeking to cre-
ate another or a better world, West Africa migrants experientially seek to 
drag the globalized world that is so unresponsive to their lives and longings 
into their sphere of influence via disproportionate sacrifices with great risks.
It is an attempt to pollinate the global political economy that has doomed 
some people and places to oblivion. Hope, in this connection, speaks of the 
existence and continuity of a morality that is based on exchange—a world 
where a person’s actions matter and the brutality of life on the margins is 
understood to be a prelude to better times. Sometimes, however, the stressful 
running downhill comes to an abrupt and painful end when a migrant dies 
and the futility of subaltern life is brought out.
Life and Death in Niamey 
During fieldwork among Ghanaian migrants and deportees in Niamey,
Niger, I had the possibility of attending the funeral of an acquaintance,
Dominic, who unfortunately passed away before I could sit down and talk 
with him about his migrant trajectory. It was a critical event (Das 1995, 6) in 
the lifeworld of stranded Ghanaian migrants in the sense that, here, the indi-
vidual struggle for life, the fragile and vulnerable struggle of undocumented 
migrants en route, was overwhelmed by ungovernable circumstances and 
the ultimate loss conceded. As such, his death became both a focal point of 
practical attention, concern, and collective action, and a sinister promise of 
dark things to come. It was the enactment of a probable future that was the 
antipode to the hopes and dreams of his stranded colleagues: to die without 
having achieved anything, in a strange country, far from friends and family.
The death of Dominic, and how he ended up in Niamey as another 
stranded Ghanaian migrant, hustling through life, became a social event 
that brought together the perhaps most unfortunate section of the Ghanaian 
community in Niger. Methodologically, talking about his life with his fellow 
migrant hustlers became a way of paying tribute to a deceased colleague 
and an interesting insight into the lives of migrants who shared in Dominic’s 
fate. They, too, were struggling with the haphazard distribution of life and 
death that characterizes life among the stranded. To this group of strangers,
his death did not appear to come as a great shock but constituted a term 
of life under these circumstances, on the bottom of society, far away from 
home; everybody understood the risk of ultimately yielding to such a term 
of life unless they kept moving forward one way or the other. The hope that 
existed, that they would make it out somehow, was just about enough to 
keep them persevering although, in some cases, the constant breakdowns led 
to great psychological strain. This was, for instance, the case with Mr. James,
the plastics repairman, whom my two informants, Bobby and Kantinka,
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Bobby and Kantinka worked as migration brokers and hustled at a bus 
station in Niamey. Their position as observers and facilitators of migrant life 
on the road, combined with their own failed adventures, became in them-
selves an interesting story that I have written about elsewhere (see Lucht 
2013). But on that day they took me to see Mr. James. He lived with a dog 
in a wooden shed surrounded by what looked like a plastic junk heap, with 
small stinking fires burning all around him. In those fires he kept glowing 
iron rods that he used to burn and melt plastic and reconstruct and fix bro-
ken chairs or even whole car fronts. He was an expert on various types of 
plastic and demonstrated their qualities to us in both hard and liquid form,
reminding us that plastic may be considered a low-quality product to people 
in more affluent societies but has real value in other places. To manage the 
smell of and the headaches from the ever-burning plastic, Mr. James drank 
hot spirits, he explained with a laugh; a filthy bottle filled with moonshine 
was permanently placed underneath his chair.
Bobby and Kantinka warned me that, on bad days, he would suddenly 
shout at imagined intruders, although this never happened when we met 
with him. Although he was fearful of strangers and unwilling to fix a time 
for an interview—because he was always busy, he explained—we managed 
to exchange a few words. From our brief conversation I understood that,
‘due to financial difficulties’, he somehow lost his way in the desert, ended 
up in Niamey and had lived here for so many years that his children were,
by then, grown up. I asked him if he wanted to go home, then immediately 
regretted asking such an insensitive question. He shook his head as if almost 
disgusted. Of course he wanted to go home, he said, but not before he had 
managed to save up a little money to take back to the family in Ghana. And 
when might that be, I asked him. Shaking his head in frustration, he put his 
hands into his empty shirt pocket and turned it inside out, and said peevishly 
‘Only my pocket knows’. He excused himself because a big man was coming 
to pick up an important job, a Toyota bumper, and he wanted to get back 
to work.
They Love to Travel too Much 
To better understand the situation of the stranded we met with Mr. Frimpong,
one of the leading figures in the Ghanaian diaspora, and former president of 
the Ghana Association in Niamey. Mr. Frimpong found nothing extraordi-
nary in Dominic’s narrative except the unfortunate story of so many young 
Ghanaians who set out to search for greener pastures but lose their way. We 
met Mr. Frimpong one night at the outside bar of La Tombée, close to the 
Ténéré bus station where travelers depart for the desert. A former profes-
sional footballer in Burkina Faso and currently employed as an electrician at 
the U.S. embassy, Mr. Frimpong initially welcomed the appointment to head 
the association after meeting with the Ghanaian ambassador to Burkina 
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boys became too much’.The Niger police would call him in the middle of the 
night to come and pick up deportees, and arrange for them to travel back to 
Burkina Faso, where the embassy would handle the rest. One time he had 
to charter a whole bus. Although the Ghanaian Embassy would refund the 
money for the transportation, he still had to put up the money first, and had 
to pay for the deportees’ food and drink out of his own pocket. He asked 
the embassy for an office or a house where the stranded migrants could sleep 
until transportation was ready, so that he did not have to take them to his 
own house but, when that, too, was turned down, he decided to step down 
as president. Although he had left the position six months earlier, he still 
received calls from the Nigerian police in the middle of the night—‘President,
your people are here!’—when stranded or deported migrants came back 
from the desert. Mr. Frimpong was fiddling with his two mobile phones 
on the table—one phone was his own and was constantly ringing with the 
Ghanaian national anthem, and the other was a work phone paid for by 
the American Embassy. He also had a walkie-talkie where he apparently 
answered to the codename Elmina. ‘Ghanaians’ he said, shaking his head 
and smiling, ‘They love to travel too much’.
Taking Care of the Dead 
Basically, the group that came together to arrange Dominic’s funeral were 
all lost migrants—most were chronically lacking any financial means and 
living from hand to mouth, whereas some, like Bobby and Kantinka, had 
turned their exile into a livelihood. Arranging a funeral for someone in their 
own unfortunate situation was an unwelcome and expensive obstacle—yet,
morally and religiously, it was unthinkable not to conduct the proper rites 
and secure the passage of Dominic’s soul to the spirit world of the ancestors.
Broadly, this responsibility—taking care of people with even less money than 
oneself—however unwanted, was a common theme of life on the margins in 
Niger. To Bobby and Kantinka, assisting would-be migrants in transit and 
guiding them along the desert routes, the handling of such matters was a cur-
rent topic of conversation and worry. They would, for instance, receive back 
migrants who had had accidents in the desert because, since they ‘pushed’ 
them, they felt that it was their responsibility. Moreover, unnecessary atten-
tion from the local police was not desirable to the brokers. If a migrant, for 
instance, wandered about, mad or injured, and told his story to the author-
ities, it could be a problem not only for the brokers but also for the drivers 
and the station owners. Once they had a young boy who was sitting on the 
wrong side of the four-wheel drive in the desert when the car hit a landmine 
and both his legs were badly injured from the knees down. On the way back,
his colleagues had to spray him with perfume to cover the smell of gangrene.
Bobby and Kantinka took him to the hospital and covered the expenses 
themselves. They also had to dip into their own pockets when, another time,
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they had ‘pushed’ to Libya was badly burned on his back. He came back 
almost naked, Kantinka explained, and covered in iodine to keep him from 
‘rotting’; his friends were covering him with a piece of cloth that they made 
sure did not touch his skin. They also had a couple of mad people, ‘shouting 
and misbehaving’, who lost their minds in the desert because of ‘the pres-
sure’; normally they would tie them to the seats, Kantinka explained, and 
send them back to Ghana. For this reason they were skeptical about helping 
would-be migrants who looked sure to fail the journey, and were always 
weighing up the expected profits against the possibility that a migrant could 
represent a future loss. But other concerns than business played into it, also.
They were not monsters but failed migrants themselves, trying to make ends 
meet, and they appeared to have real pity for compatriots going through the 
same events that had so severely dented their own future plans.
Migrant Brinkmanship 
One such case was Muhammad, a young Ghanaian migrant on his way 
to Libya, whom Bobby and Kantinka had advised to turn back to Ghana 
instead because the amount of money he had was ‘too small’ to see the 
journey through. When we sat down and talked about his now shattered 
hopes and dreams, Muhammad’s disappointment and sense of injustice were 
considerable. He explained how he had to leave school because the family 
struggled and it hurt him deeply, because he loved schoolwork and was even 
good at it. Before, he was working on odd jobs in Accra while his former col-
leagues were ‘moving ahead’, even though he was a better and more serious 
student than they were, as he bitterly remarked. His dream was simple. He 
would travel to Libya and make money, go back, set up a small shop, and 
then finish school. He had all the details worked out.
I will study in the morning then, in the afternoon, after school and after 
taking my bath, I will go to the shop and go over the accounts with my 
friend. He will get the key and run the shop when I am in school. This 
way I will finish my education. That’s my dream.
But his father, who sold sugar, could not help him with money, his mother
was ‘weak’ and in the house, and his uncle had left for the Ivory Coast long
ago and was never heard of again. So it was up to him, and him alone, to
change his life around. But now, clutching his ticket from the station, he
had to give up those plans. The next day, Muhammad announced that he
had decided to travel into the desert anyway, which came as no surprise to
the brokers. He explained that he believed that, when he reached Agadez,
God would help him and his friends in Libya would come through some-
how and send him more money. ‘He will suffer’, Bobby said later, ‘he thinks
when he reaches Agadez he’s almost there, but that’s only the beginning of
the journey’. The next morning, Muhammad left on the bus for Agadez,
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and Bobby and Kantinka had another client hanging on to life by a thread
in the desert.
Yet Muhammad’s decision was understood and sympathized with, even if it
did not represent the recommended course of action. It denoted a necessary 
form of migrant brinkmanship and perhaps a deep-seated understanding 
that advances are not distributed in any predictable order and that disaster 
travels along anyway, however well one prepares. It also spoke of the power 
of hope in a future where wrongs would be corrected and where Muham-
mad would be able to continue his disconnected education and lead the 
kind of life that he felt morally belonged to him, to the extent that risking 
his life in the desert to obtain it was a risk worth taking. Bobby, himself,
caused ‘fire damage’ at home before leaving—he sold something that did not 
belong to him—whereas Kantinka suffered greatly on the road and almost 
lost his bearings. So the brokers understood well that difficult and danger-
ous choices are a feature of undocumented migrant life in transit, and some-
times hope is all there is, in the sense that, even with all the evidence stacked 
against you, there is still a sense that one’s unfortunate circumstances can be 
changed for the better. Moreover, they were resigned to the fact that, what-
ever they said, people went anyway, and only when they came back did they 
really understand what was asked of them in the desert or on the sea. It was 
like joining a secret society of members who had experienced shameful and 
undignified events that could only be discussed with those who had already 
been there. But most often the details were suffered in silence.
This conspiracy of silence, and its positive counterpart—the confidential 
sharing of important information about the mesmerizing life in the big cities 
of Europe—has an important effect, John Berger posits. His argument is 
based on labor migration to Europe in the 1970s, an effect that has a parallel 
in today’s current African labor migration. The migrant ‘visualizes himself 
entering their conspiracy. Then he will learn their secrets. And he will come 
back having achieved even more than they, for he is capable of working 
harder, of being shrewder and of saving more quickly than any of them’ 
(Berger and Mohr 2010, 33). To understand Muhammad’s choice, one has 
to take into account the fragile hope that somewhere else one’s talents and 
efforts will be given the attention and respect they deserve; that somewhere 
else will be a ‘launching pad’ for one’s existential self (Hage 2005, 470). And,
if not, so be it. This is the gamble of migrant brinkmanship in the desert; it 
literally boils down to life or death. The reality in Europe is therefore often a 
big disappointment, too, because surviving the journey is not a voucher that 
can be cashed in. Instead, another kind of stoppage awaits.
Selling Gin 
The only time I met Dominic was one evening when we were heading for a 
Ghanaian street kitchen across from an empty bus station, where the street 
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of then-deserted stalls that surround the station—allegedly ‘like to stab peo-
ple too much’. Bobby said he had something special in store for us as we 
passed a roadside motorcycle repair shop—where a group of mechanics 
were sitting under a thatched roof, smoking cigarettes in the darkness—and 
then turned down an unlit corridor that cut between the mud walls of the 
neighborhood houses. The corridor led to a kind of small square where 
others corridors met, with a couple of large trees and five or six cars parked 
outside the gates of the houses; a boy with a table top, selling cigarettes 
and bonbons, appeared out of nowhere. Bobby knocked quietly on a large 
green iron gate before pushing it open with two hands. We stepped into a 
compound of three terraced houses. Bobby knocked on the door of the first 
house, and there was a mumbled response from inside as Dominic slowly 
got to his feet, having apparently been lying on a mattress on the floor,
watching television, and wearing only shorts. He was a big man, probably 
in his late thirties. We exchanged greetings, and Bobby explained that we 
were on our way to eat at Bobby’s wife’s food stand, and that we would like 
something to whet our appetite beforehand. Dominic nodded, disappeared 
into the backroom and came back with a string of gin shots wrapped in 
plastic, like lollipops. They were contraband goods that he imported from 
Ghana. Tommy, my assistant, and I took one each; it was really strong 
and warm and did not go down all that easily. Bobby knocked back two 
and also took two for the road, whereas Kantinka rarely touched alcohol.
We sat for a while in Dominic’s bare room and talked about Ghana, and 
about the photo poster on his wall—as in any decent Ghanaian migrant 
home at the time—celebrating the Ghanaian national football team winning 
the 2009 World Cup for players under 20, beating Brazil in the finals and 
becoming the first African team to win the competition. We agreed to go 
back and see him soon and take down his long migration story. Dominic 
smiled and warned us that we would need a lot of notepads but said we 
were always welcome and walked us to the gate.
Unfortunately, the interview failed to materialize, as Dominic lost his 
life only ten days later. The official story that was given at the funeral, and 
that nobody believed, was that his leg suddenly swelled up and he went 
to the hospital for treatment. They apparently managed to solve the prob-
lem but, after having been discharged from hospital, Dominic suffered a 
massive heart attack, collapsed in his home, and somehow almost severed 
his right middle finger as he grabbed at the window bars for support. Mr.
Frimpong, for instance, had a different version. He said that one would 
have to consider the fact that Dominic was a ladies’ man, and that he was 
taking a big risk by chasing a certain married lady. Mr. Frimpong pointed 
to the strangely severed finger as proof that he been attacked by a jealous 
husband with a knife or a cutlass: ‘He was trying to protect himself but they 
got him’. Whichever story happened to be true, in this hostile environment 
it appeared that all the Ghanaian migrants had a small amount of fear to 
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The Wrong Medicine 
Seeking to know what really happened to Dominic, we sat down with a num-
ber of the Ghanaian dignitaries who came together to arrange the details of 
the funeral, and they all gave a small part of his story. We never came close 
to fully understanding what led to his death except that he, like most of his 
compatriots, had plans to go to Europe but had met ‘difficulties’ on the way 
and for one reason or another had ended up in Niger, where he was waiting 
for a new chance when fate caught up with him. One of the senior figures in 
the community, Mr. Francis, an accountant who nurtured a dream of return-
ing to Ghana and playing a part in the political life of the country, explained 
to us that Dominic was from the Volta Region; his father was dead but his 
mother and sisters were still living there. ‘They should have been here [for 
the funeral] but, because of financial problems, they could not come. Now,
the sister says she’s coming next Friday . . .’. Prior to Niger, Dominic spent 
time in Liberia and Cape Verde and later in Guinea and Nigeria, traveling 
for ‘many, many years’. But he wanted to see Europe, too, and was trying 
to reach Libya when something ‘unfortunate’ happened on the road and 
he ended up in Niamey, working as a part-time painter. Last year he was 
planning to go to Spain, Mr. Francis explained, but a brother ‘deceived’ him.
Later, an uncle in Lesotho told him to come down, and Dominic was mak-
ing plans to leave that very Christmas, when disaster struck. He had had a 
problem with the leg which had swollen up, and he went to the lorry station 
and bought some drugs from a local pharmacist, Mr. Francis said. However,
when he took the medicine he instantly felt ill, and his heart was paining 
him. He easily felt tired, and could not move around or work. ‘So that killed 
him; he was moving somewhere when he fell down. The medicine was not 
correct; you know, the Chinese, and the Nigerians too, they put anything 
inside a paper and sell us so maybe it was a wrong medicine he bought. It 
wasn’t a good medicine’.
‘Nobody Knows I’m Here’ 
It quickly became evident that, instead of obtaining meaningful information 
about what really happened to Dominic, his unfortunate death became a 
vantage point for other migrants in similar circumstances to open up. To 
Mr. Francis, the dream of making a name for himself in Europe, and his 
ultimate failure to do so, also underscored the story of his own life. An 
accountant from the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technol-
ogy, he traveled to Germany in 1978 and found work as a machine opera-
tor in a food-processing company on the river Rhine. ‘The people were so 
good, and so warm and generous, people who have not been there think 
the Germans are wicked but it’s not true, they are helpful and polite and, of 
all the countries I have been to, Germany is the place I loved the most’. He 
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six years later with money to invest, which is when things started to turn 
sour. While working for the government, he bought shares in a fishing com-
pany that operated out of Jamestown. ‘But those fishermen are not serious; 
you can’t rely on them. They’ll go somewhere and sell the fish and tell you 
there was no catch; they’ll really bring you down’. The fishermen cheated 
him and spent most of his money before he quit the industry and invested 
the remaining savings in an electronics shop, selling televisions and cassette 
decks. To concentrate on business, Mr. Francis quit his low-paying govern-
ment job. Yet his investment was not yielding sufficient profits, and, when 
the opportunity presented itself for him to travel to America and stay with 
a younger brother, he cashed in everything and made the fateful decision to 
buy gold. ‘I am an Ashanti, I know gold’, he said. Yet, at the time of Jerry 
John Rawlings, it was illegal to smuggle gold out of Ghana and, before he 
even reached the checkpoint at Aflau on the Togo border, Mr. James was 
arrested and brought up before a military tribunal in the city of Ho in the 
Volta Region. His plan had been to reach Nigeria and buy a ticket for the 
United States but, instead, he was sent to James Camp Prison in Accra. ‘It 
was terrible time; a very rough time. They took everything from me. There 
was no access to a phone, and I had no communication with my parents; 
even my wife didn’t know my whereabouts’.
Upon his release, two years later, he managed to raise enough money to 
go to Libya, with a view to somehow reaching Germany again. His stay in 
Libya was short-lived, however, since he could not accept the racism. ‘Things 
were so rough there; they don’t have any respect for human beings. Your 
heart cannot be at rest; always, you’re filled with fear’. He then relocated 
to Algeria and worked as a money exchanger at international hotels there,
making good use of his language skills. Once again, he managed to save 
enough money to make a new investment. This time he bought aluminum 
and powdered milk in Tamanrasset and chartered a truck for Niger where,
according to his calculations, he could sell the load and make a great profit.
However, a Tuareg gang who threatened to kill him if he looked back stole 
the milk powder. When Mr. Francis finally reached Niger with the alumi-
num, he was shocked to find that the price for the transportation from the 
mountains had suddenly risen, and was now greater than the value of the 
goods. Thus, cheated and penniless, Mr. Francis ended up in Niamey, where 
he has now been for 12 years, surviving on small business deals. ‘My parents,
my wife, my children—nobody knows I am here. They think I am dead or 
somewhere in Europe.’ 
‘I Cannot Go Back Empty-Handed’ 
Although he had now retired from traveling, having suffered such great 
misfortunes on the road, Mr. Francis sympathized with Dominic’s dreams 
and with the hopes of the young Ghanaian ‘boys’ coming through Niamey 
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from poor families, he explained, and there was no money to buy an airline 
ticket so they take to the dangerous road. ‘They know there’s an element of 
risk, but if they want to be rich, they have to do it. Unlike in Europe, for us 
here, in black Africa, just to feed yourself is a problem’. He put it down to 
the economy and the hunger for consumption: 
When people come back from Europe they bring so many things, so 
people in Ghana think it’s an economic paradise, a consumer wonder-
land, where everything you want, you can get, so they, too, want to go.
They know if they can make it to Europe or America they can become 
someone.
Although Mr. Francis’ own dreams of becoming someone—in the eyes of his 
family and the country that he loved and repeatedly talked about ‘serving’— 
had taken such a wrong turn, he had not given up. ‘My plan now is to open a 
bar and restaurant, gather money and go back to Ghana. I have a wife, she’s 
working as a civil servant but for a very long time there has been no contact’.
He thought of them often, and sometimes imagined what had happened to 
them during his long exile: 
If I go back empty-handed, I will be a burden to her. A civil servant in 
Ghana is not too rich—unless the person is corrupt—and looking after 
three children is not easy. I suppose she has been struggling but I don’t 
know.
He completely refused the idea of going back and explaining the truth to the 
family—that he had struggled but things just had not worked out.
I cannot go back empty-handed, that’s impossible. That’s the last thing I 
will ever do. I have three children whom I left so many years ago; imag-
ine if I go back and greet them with nothing. It would be so shameful; I 
will never do it. But I have to go; I have to find money and go and serve 
my country. Here, I can’t do anything.
Amazingly, having such bad luck and being in a tight spot for years had not 
erased Mr. Francis’ hope that, in the future, his ship would come in. ‘I am 
very hopeful that things will change for the better and that I can open a bar 
and get a little money’, he said.
The Prophecy 
The hope that still made Mr. Francis persevere in life was connected to a 
prophecy that had been given to him from an unexpected source. Indeed,
just as the negative forces in his life appeared to be so unevenly and unpre-
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at random. Yet these little enigmatic openings seemed to keep him from 
stumbling in his tracks despite the setbacks. During his time in Germany,
Mr. Francis worked closely with an Indian migrant from the Punjab; they 
became close friends and did everything together like ‘brothers’. If there was 
a social event at the workplace, they would always go together. The Indian 
was a Theosophist—a member of a religious society which celebrated eso-
teric knowledge of the world’s spiritual secrets—and one day he read Mr.
Francis’ palm and foresaw many of the things that had later come about 
and that would happen in the future. Through him, Mr. Francis joined the 
international Theosophical Society in Madras and, he explained, he knew 
today what the spiritual nature of his problem was, but he also knew that 
whatever happened to a man occurred for his own good: 
Any problem you face, there are certain things you can learn that will 
help your development. The important thing is to not lose hope but to 
strive and do good things and shy away from anything evil. Strive for 
anything you want and you can achieve it.
The Indian told him that what he had planned—to eventually go home to 
Ghana, build a house, and start a company—would one day materialize but 
that he would struggle initially and all his plans would come to nothing.
‘Later, I will become rich. That is what he told me, and that is what I believe’.
The Wretched of the Earth 
In Mr. Francis’ example we see that, even though ‘The lack of a future, previ-
ously reserved for the “wretched of the earth”, is an increasingly widespread,
even modal, experience’ (Bourdieu 2000, 234), hope still lingers among the 
lost migrants and plays an important part in the maintenance of a moral 
universe—that is, a universe where one has the attention and responsiveness 
of the powers one is sustained by. This universe is also where there is a belief 
that one’s fate is not entirely out of one’s hands, or ridden with arbitrariness,
but where there exists some deep grammar of reciprocity in the world that 
will, ultimately, receive a person’s sacrifices and, in due course, redress the 
losses he or she has suffered (Lucht 2011, 246). Despair, on the other hand,
appears to be a breakdown of this notion of existential reciprocity.
Among the Ghanaian migrants in Niger the risk of despair was ever-present,
as in the image of Mr. James, the plastic repairman, sitting in the black 
smoke of his open fires, talking to himself (although I had the impression 
that, to himself, however bleak his situation looked, there was still time 
for another throw of the dice). Even Kantinka, the most clear-headed of 
the brokers, suffered a breakdown prior to going into the broker business 
after losing his family’s money in the desert, and was literally and mentally 
lost on the streets of Niamey until Bobby found him and took him in (see 
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and at the complete mercy of circumstances. Hope in its most basic form, as 
Jackson, inspired by Alain Badiou, argues, does not necessarily include the 
idea that justice will be done or a person’s wishes granted but only that it 
is not the end, that the individual is not lost and that his or her subjectivity 
will persevere (Jackson 2011, 79). Like Mr. Francis, one must suffer and be 
patient and agree to yield to powers greater than oneself, or to resign from 
having control in order, paradoxically but according to the existential give-
and-take of life, to regain that control by a leap of faith. The obligation to 
give (or be forced to give up, which reciprocally demands a response, too) in 
order to receive what is vital to sustain life, often demands a sacrifice of the 
social world in order to reaffirm it (Lucht 2011, 246). Just like Mr. Francis,
who sacrificed the very life he longed for—to be with his wife and children in 
his own country—in order to secure his family’s sustained well-being, even 
to the extent that dying in Niger, like Dominic, would be a better option than 
returning empty-handed. This is because coming home with nothing would 
not only be his social death, it would spell a return to the grip of stagna-
tion that caused him to leave so many years ago. If Mr. Francis could give 
nothing else, he could at least not be a burden. But the desire for life is not 
easy to extinguish; it is ‘amorphous and volatile’, writes Michael Jackson,
and the imagination always travels beyond the immediate social world and 
experiments with new beginnings and the limits of what a person can actu-
ally become (Jackson 2013, 212). Mr. Francis, for instance, still had hope,
meaning that what the Indian friend saw in the lines of his palm caused him 
to believe that his suffering would eventually come to an end; in his exile he 
found in that hope the justification for continuing to sacrifice the present for 
a future which, from the outside, appeared hard to believe in.
Death is not the End 
On the day of the funeral, after Dominic had been lying in a freezer for a 
week, we all met up at the morgue to claim his body, Bobby and Kantinka 
appropriately dressed in black. There was quite an impressive group of peo-
ple there, taking into consideration that his family from Ghana had failed 
to appear. ‘That’s how it is’, my assistant Sammy said. ‘When you’re rich,
they’ll rush to the funeral, they will even sell their land to get there in time,
but when you’re poor nobody will show up’. Nevertheless, a large group 
of resident Ghanaians had come, among them the former president of the 
Ghanaian Association and Mr. Francis, the accountant. As we sat outside the 
white walls of the city morgue to await the arrival of the coffin, Dominic 
was, according to tradition, being washed down before his final journey. His 
wife borrowed a razor blade from Sammy, and Dominic’s hair, nails, and 
pubic hair were cut; the hair would be returned to Ghana and buried there 
when the family arrived. ‘Death is not the end’, Mr. Francis leaned over and 
said to me as we sat waiting outside, the slender and eloquent man smiling 
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Death is the beginning’. Then a beat-up truck arrived with a white coffin 
on the back accompanied by three young men in work attire, and began 
backing up into the yard of the morgue. The coffin was taken down and 
disappeared into the building, where suddenly the sorrowful screams of 
Dominic’s wife and her fellow mourners rang out, as they were given one 
last glimpse of the dead body. But Dominic was heavy, a big man—although 
perhaps not ‘obese’ as Mr. Francis rather coolly noted—and they had to put 
him down halfway to catch their breath.
In the end they managed to lift his coffin onto the back of the truck;
half of the funeral party joined him, standing up and singing as the truck
moved down in the direction of the river Niger, past the flower garden on
the river banks before arriving at the Christian burial ground. The caretak-
ers had been weeding the place and burning a pile of yellow grass, causing
the whole graveyard to be covered in a layer of smoke that—this being an
unusually quiet day—still lingered in the downtrodden paths between the
small mounds, with their tombstones and crosses. The pastor, who was a
young energetic Nigerian man, stood bareheaded under the hot sun, regu-
larly wiping his neck and forehead. He preached about the insignificance
of human life in the grand scale of things, and how easily we are blown
away, obliterated by circumstances, which led him to point out that, in
such a world, where life can disappear in the blink of an eye and, to our
confusion and frustration, continually does, there is only one solution.
Turn to God in order to save your soul, and better today than tomorrow,
for only the soul will have eternal life. This prompted the female mourn-
ers to begin singing a traditional Ghanaian funeral song, which touched
on the same theme: ‘Human being, you’re pitiful, human being, you’re
pitiful, when you die it’s finished, when you die it’s finished’. Bobby, who
had a dislike of pastors—who, he claimed, were the most corrupt big
men in terms of ‘chopping people’s money’—had withdrawn about five
yards away from the funeral party, watching everything and smoking a
cigarette. When Dominic was lowered into the ground, and the coffin cov-
ered with earth, Bobby shrugged his shoulders, flung away the cigarette
and said ‘Last, last’, meaning ‘That’s the end of it’. We then took a taxi to
Dominic’s house. Four rows of plastic chairs had been arranged under a
canopy in the yard, a very loud stereo had been rented, and soon the older
ladies—some intoxicated to a greater or lesser degree from the liquor that
was consumed around the corner—started dancing. We greeted the older
people among them, and went to Dominic’s semi-darkened room, where
the widow, as is customary, was sitting alone on the floor. Mr. Frimpong
informed us that he had advised the widow not to keep the hair and the
nails from the corpse in the house but to bury the whole thing in the back
yard until such time as his family could take it back to Ghana because, if
there was foul play, as he expected, you would not want the angry soul
of the dead person hovering about, seeking revenge over the living. The
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expenses, and then we went outside and sat in front of the gate, chatting
for a while before we left.
Conclusion 
The solemn, yet spirited nature of the funeral seemed to speak of a sense of 
acceptance of and resignation to the unpredictability of migrant life in the 
borderlands, even if this event, to many, served as an unpleasant reminder 
or even a rehearsal of the fate that loomed over their own futures. Indeed,
a year later, Bobby would suddenly fall sick with stomach pains and be 
admitted to hospital, where he died a few days later without his friends 
knowing or understanding what had happened to him. However, if Domi-
nic’s death was an example of the unsuccessful migrant brinkmanship that 
attempted to steer a course between the hope and need for growth and the 
dangers and death that awaited on the road and in the border zones, what 
did Mr. Francis mean when he said ‘Death is not the end’? Apart from the 
obvious Christian understanding that Dominic’s soul was now in the hands 
of God and his seat among his forefathers secured, as the priest said, there 
was perhaps also the deeper existential meaning. In this context a person’s 
subjectivity goes on, and death—the final boundary in life—is there to be 
crossed, too; a person’s struggles in the here-and-now may come to an end,
but the soul, unlike on earth, will be set free to pursue what was not possi-
ble in life: a free and dignified life among one’s peers. Indeed, the afterlife is 
characterized by liberation from the brutality, the insults, the waiting, and 
the nothingness that characterize life among the ‘floating population’—that 
growing class of people scattered on the edges of richer regions, suspended 
in a life of ‘expectancy’ (Bayart 2007, 274).
This sense of continuity, even on the margins, may be what Schopen-
hauer, the otherwise gloomy and misanthropic thinker, is pointing to when 
he argues that the reason why we are not ‘frantic’ at the idea of our little 
‘unacceptable’ lives ‘ebbing away’ is that we are ‘secretly conscious in the 
profoundest depths of our being that we share in the inexhaustible well 
of eternity, out of which we can forever draw new life and renewed time’ 
(1851/2004, 52). Beyond religious cosmology, I argue that hope draws 
strength from a notion of continuity or existential reciprocity which is not 
necessarily obliterated by loss but which inscribes loss in the logic of sacri-
fice as a giving up of that which cannot or should not be given up—one’s life 
proper. This is done in the hope that, by making this movement or leap, life 
will be reinstated in some form in the due course of time, and something new 
may appear, even if the individual will not him/herself prosper. This hope,
that life can be drawn into a relationship of exchange by way of sacrifice,
is a way of instituting what is missing in the first place, namely a moral 
horizon one can have trust in and, to some extent, exercise control over.
To many, this hope of responsiveness and mobility beyond immediate exis-
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death-defying journeys represent people taking action in the hope that the 
borders that confined them to a life of stasis can be transgressed—the very 
reason for traveling in the first place—and not just geographical borders but 
social and political borders, too, in the sense that, in this migrant brinkman-
ship of risking one’s life in the desert and on the sea, the prize is a complete 
reversion of one’s social status. In other words, becoming ‘someone’ at home 
by refusing to accept an order that otherwise appeared unchangeable, or as 
Bourdieu argues, ‘The symbolic transgression of a social frontier has a liber-
atory effect in its own right because it enacts the unthinkable’ (2000, 236).
Clearly, these journeys had a symbolic meaning; it was possible to challenge 
the impossible. For all the might and power of European nation-states and 
private security companies operating in the borderlands, it was possible to 
breach the borders—the geographical, social, and political borders—that 
impose limits and subordination on people in the Global South.
The resulting suffering and death on the borders, although not polit-
ical acts per se, are powerful acts of iconoclasm that challenge both the 
repressive geopolitical order and the sincerity of European commitment to 
humanitarian values. In fact, in order for this form of iconoclasm to appear 
legitimate at all, instead of being rejected as scandal (which, of course, is 
often the case in the alarmist discourse of media and politics), the structures 
that are contested must be in a state of uncertainty and crisis, argues Pierre 
Bourdieu (2000, 236). Perhaps the unease with which we witness people 
dying in the Mediterranean Sea speaks of such a potential insecurity in the 
system. However dangerous, and sometimes fatal, these journeys are, they 
represent to the migrants a margin of freedom to make more out of the lives 
into which they have been thrown (Zigon 2009, 258).
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10 Returning with Nothing but an 
Empty Bag 
Topographies of Social Hope 
after Deportation to Ghana 
Nauja Kleist 
Kwaku1 did not feel good, worried sick about how to provide for his family 
and secure their future. At night, he would pretend to be sleeping, closing 
his eyes to avoid his wife worrying about his insomnia. The days were not 
much better. A man in his thirties with little schooling, he could not find a 
job and spent most of his time in the rented room that he shared with his 
wife and their three children, ruminating about his life and avoiding con-
tact with townspeople, who would laugh at him. This kind of life was not 
what Kwaku had hoped for when he left his Ghanaian home town, one fine 
December morning in 2012, and headed to Libya to earn money to support 
his family and, in due course, travel onwards to Europe. It was not that he 
had thought that the journey would be easy, knowing how many townspeo-
ple had struggled on the way to Libya. However, he also knew that some of 
them had made it and sent money back home to take care of their families,
establish businesses, and build houses, and he could not face a life without 
a similar future. His journey did not go well: first he was first kidnapped by 
armed robbers, then he was detained by the Libyan authorities, and finally 
he was deported to Niger, from where he managed to find his way back to 
Ghana. Just two months after Kwaku had left, he was back with nothing 
but an empty bag in his hands. ‘I did not feel happy’, he bitterly explained,
‘because there was nothing in my pocket, and there are no jobs here, so I 
am not feeling lucky. My family is not feeling good either, they were not 
feeling good. Even the little money that I had, I have lost it’. Nevertheless,
Kwaku wanted to go to Libya again, perceiving it as one of the few options 
for progress in his life.
In this chapter I examine hope in the context of high-risk migration and 
restrictive mobility regimes, with a particular focus on life after deporta-
tion to Ghana. For many migrants and their families, deportation signifies 
the ultimate failure of migration projects, implying an enforced disruption 
of mobility and livelihoods abroad, the termination of (eventual) remit-
tance flows, economic problems, and shame vis-à-vis one’s family, peers,
and wider community. As several other chapters in this volume show (e.g.,
Lucht, Bredeloup, Hernández-Carretero), returning empty-handed is con-













   




174 Nauja Kleist 
costs. Whereas some migrants prefer—or put up with—destitute and pre-
carious living conditions rather than return empty-handed, deportees do 
not have this option. Based on fieldwork in Kwaku’s hometown, my aim is 
to analyze, first, the ways in which deportation and high-risk migration are 
embedded in conflicting notions of the good life and how to achieve it and,
second, how deportees perceive and cope with their situation. In this way,
I endeavor to shed light on two seeming migration paradoxes: first that,
despite widespread knowledge about the dangers of high-risk migration,
including deportation, migration continues to constitute a perceived path-
way to a better life in some contexts; second, that much migration is weaved 
around collective hopes for a good life abroad but, when migration fails,
as in the case of deportation, the individual migrants are blamed as having 
brought it on themselves. I suggest that, inspired by Ghassan Hage’s work on 
social and societal hope (2003) and Phillip Mar’s notion of topographies of 
hope (2005), analyzing the different modalities of hope is a productive way 
of exploring these paradoxes.
Methodological Considerations: Topographies 
of Social Hope 
Employing hope as an analytical framework, I analyze the simultaneous 
uncertainty and potentiality of an imagined or anticipated future (Mar 2005; 
Webb 2007) and what this means for people affected by deportation. I am 
particularly interested in the conditions of possibility for different modes of 
hope, and how these are negotiated and generated at different scales and by 
diverse groups. Hope, in this sense, is relational and embedded in historical 
and structural contexts; it is neither pure fantasy nor completely individu-
alized but refers to ‘a temporalized sense of potential, of having a future’ 
(Mar 2005, 365).
Ghassan Hage’s work on social and societal hope (2003) is a useful way of 
approaching such a sense of having a future and of distinguishing between 
different modes of hope. Social hope refers to social imaginaries and col-
lective visions of the good and meaningful life and future among particular 
groups, be they large or small—or, in Mar’s words, to the ‘“public” evaluation 
of possibility’ (2005, 365). Societal hope constitutes a more delimited form 
of social hope, focusing on how the state generates and distributes visions of 
the good life and possible achievement within society. Such visions may be 
related to upward social mobility, security, and prosperity. Whereas these 
visions may not be realized, they are based on—or are meant to convey—the 
confidence that this future is not beyond reach.
Societal hope may refer to the well-known tale of the newspaper boy (or 
the occasional small-business owner or computer-science student) rising to 
glory and riches or to the equally well-known promises of a better education 
and hence a better future for children and young people. It constitutes a 
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and the belief—be it patient or avid—that these scenarios can be realized in 
accordance with the overall political project of the state. Hence, distribut-
ing hope is not an unequivocal process whereby a pre-determined result is 
produced by the state and uncritically consumed by citizens, but, rather, one 
which attempts to install a belief in the future and in the ways of realizing 
or accessing this future which, again, is perceived and negotiated in different 
ways by diverse groups.
A focus on the distribution of hope in relation to migration and depor-
tation raises the issue of its spatial dimension and how different places and 
zones are associated with opportunities or stasis in a world of stratified 
globalization and inequality. I am here inspired by Phillip Mar’s notion 
of ‘topographies of hope’ (2005). Mar has suggested the term to capture 
how migrants map opportunities and principles for engagement with the 
world—e.g., accumulation, security, or pleasure—onto different places or 
regions, including migrants’ countries of origin and (possible) destinations.
Such topographies may originate in an experience of living in a place devoid 
of opportunities, marked by loss, insecurity, poverty or, simply, a lack of 
imaginable progress for certain groups (cf. Vigh 2009). In such cases, hope 
may be placed elsewhere, perhaps to be reached through mobility.
The word ‘topography’ is evocative in terms of implying distances and 
the density of imagined or experienced opportunities and stagnation, con-
stituting ‘mental’ maps of places. I propose that the concept can usefully 
be combined with Hage’s thoughts on social hope and hence a focus on 
how not only migrants but also states and other actors create, sustain, and 
(attempt to) govern topographies of societal or other kinds of social hope.
This makes it important to distinguish between the different topographies 
of hope in terms of who are hoping or distributing hope and, not least, who 
and what are included or excluded in these topographies. Not all parts of the 
citizenry or the national territory are necessarily included in the state topog-
raphies of hope and not all subjects share the same topography of hope. As 
Hage (2003) has pointed out, states do not distribute societal hope equally,
which creates differentiated scenarios of possible futures for different sub-
jects. Likewise, some subjects’ topographies of social hope may not reflect 
or include the state’s topography of societal hope.
Examining the tension between state and local topographies of hope 
among deportees allows me to explore how the different modalities of hope 
and the good life are related to high-risk migration and deportation. The 
argument I present is two-fold. First, I demonstrate that deportation implies 
social and financial problems, shame, and the (at least) temporary suspen-
sion of hope . Nevertheless, some deportees may be perceived as successful if 
they have managed to return with savings . This implies an individualization 
of migration success and failure which enables the continued social hope of 
migration as a means to a better life. Second, and in consequence, I demon-
strate a discrepancy between the distributions of societal hope in Ghana 
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Whereas the state emphasizes opportunities for the good life in Ghana 
through educational achievement and hard work and discourages irregular 
or ‘aimless’ migration, many aspiring and deported migrants and their fami-
lies still perceive high-risk migration as a pathway to upward social mobility.
I base this argument on a total of seven months of fieldwork, carried out 
between February 2012 and April 2015, on involuntary return to Ghana,
such as deportation and the emergency return of labor migrants from the 
civil war in Libya in 2011. Fieldwork took place in a rural town, here called 
Amanfo, characterized by much overland and high-risk migration to Libya 
and sometimes onwards to Europe or other destinations. I carried out obser-
vation, participant photography, informal conversations, and interviews 
with involuntary return migrants, their families, prospective migrants, local 
political and traditional authorities, municipal officers, representatives from 
institutions and NGOs working with migration, and government agencies.
Fifteen men and one woman among the interlocutors had been deported 
from primarily Libya but also from other North African countries, Israel,
Europe, and North America. Most of the deportees were in their twenties or 
early thirties and many were school drop-outs, although a few had finished 
senior secondary school. They all had relatively poor backgrounds although 
some had managed to earn good money during or after their migration. I 
also carried out interviews with national and international institutions and 
organizations in Accra and Tamale, such as the Ghana Immigration Ser-
vice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM). Finally, I draw upon data from a previous research project 
in Ghana on diaspora politics, a total of seven months of fieldwork in 2008 
and 2010 among policy-makers, government officials, and transnationally 
engaged return migrants from Western countries.
A Brief History of Societal Hope in Ghana 
Since the advent of the Ghanaian nation-state in 1957, the country has 
gone through periods of progress and crisis. The first sub-Saharan African 
country to achieve independence from its European colonizer, economic and 
political optimism in Ghana was widespread in the late 1950s and early 
1960s (McCaskie 2008). The situation changed in the middle of the 1960s 
with an economic and political crisis and a succession of coups d’état until 
the end of 1981, with the establishment of Rawlings’ left-populist military 
regime. During the 1970s, many Ghanaians migrated to Nigeria to work 
in the booming economy. However, following the economic crisis there in 
the 1980s, all irregular migrants were expelled from the country, including 
more than one million Ghanaian labor migrants in 1983 and about 100,000 
Ghanaians in 1985 (Van Hear 1998). The 1983 expulsion coincided with an 
unusually tough year in Ghana, with widespread bushfires, droughts, and 
bankruptcy as well as the adoption of IMF-induced structural adjustment 
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large waves of out-migration throughout the 1980s, with the opposition 
fleeing from political persecution and skilled and unskilled labor migrants 
looking for better economic opportunities and employment elsewhere.
Migration from Ghana has continued since then but within a changed 
political context. Constitutional rule and multiparty democracy were estab-
lished with the Fourth Republic in 1992. Changing governments have contin-
ued neoliberal policies since the 1980s with a range of economic liberalization 
programs. Despite challenges, since the late 1990s Ghana has slowly but 
steadily climbed the human development index, with the most dramatic 
increase in 2008.2 Oil was found in the Ghanaian territorial waters of the 
Gulf of Guinea the year before, spurring economic and political optimism 
(Darkwah 2013; McCaskie 2008). At a press conference in June 2007,
then-President Kufuor (NPP) exclaimed: ‘We’re going to really zoom, accel-
erate and, if everything works, which I pray will happen positively, you come 
back in five years, and you’ll see that Ghana truly is the African tiger, in 
economic terms for development’.3 
As Kufuor’s statement suggests, the finding of oil was evoked to generate 
societal hope. The president both targeted the Ghanaian nation in terms of 
general economic development—as his statement was widely quoted in Gha-
naian newspapers—and emphasized Ghana’s future competitive position 
vis-à-vis other states. At the more quotidian level, I witnessed an example of 
the local distribution of societal hope when I spent some time in 2008 with 
a Ghanaian politician in his rural home town.Visiting a school, he embarked 
on a long speech to encourage the pupils to be ambitious. ‘You can become 
an ambassador, an astronaut or rich’, he exclaimed, ‘because we have found 
oil. You study hard and pray’ (see also Kleist 2015). The focus on education 
as an avenue for a better and more prosperous future, funded by oil money,
has continued since then.4 The belief in a more promising future grew even 
greater when Ghana was ranked as a middle-income country in 2010, nearly 
ten years earlier than expected. By 2011 the growth rate was an impressive 
14 per cent.5 During the 2012 election campaign, education was the most 
salient theme, with the government focusing on quality education as the 
means to a better future, whereas the contesting party promised free Senior 
High School for all.
These statements send messages of societal hope about social upward 
mobility and wealth to the population. Whereas economic growth should 
not be equated with societal hope, it can be evoked in the narratives of a 
promising future, sustaining the idea that this promised future is likely to 
happen. The articulations of a promising future for Ghana as an African 
Tiger and of Ghanaian village children as ambassadors and astronauts are 
examples of how the Ghanaian state distributes societal hope, based on 
faith in economic and societal progress. Ghana is situated as the locus of 
hope for realizing an attractive future although, interestingly, the profession 
of ambassador involves traveling in a highly regularized and comfortable 
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uncertainty and it is notable that both Kufuor and the politician’s articula-
tion of hope emphasized praying rather than absolute certainty.
However, in spite of poverty reduction and economic growth, Ghana is 
also characterized by rising inequality (Osei-Assibey 2014). Dissatisfac-
tion and disillusion among disadvantaged parts of the population are rife.
Whereas the number of new private cars seems to be ever-expanding in 
Accra and other major towns and there is a construction boom in all major 
cities in Ghana, with big houses being built by the growing middle class and/ 
or international migrants (Smith and Mazzucato 2009), many people strug-
gle to get by. The growing assortment of expensive consumer goods in Accra 
and elsewhere is out of reach for the large majority of the population, who 
can, in both a literal and an abstract sense, see the goods but not enjoy them.
The conspicuous consumption and highly visible wealth create frustrations 
among those who feel excluded from the economic growth in the country.
Unemployment, especially among youth and people with little education, is 
high and is often linked to an alleged rise in armed robbery and other social 
problems. What is more, the economy has slowed down, with growth rates 
dropping to 7.6 per cent in 2013 and 4.2 per cent in 2014.6 Nevertheless, the 
confident distribution of societal hope in the early and euphoric oil-finding 
days was wide in scope by the end of 2012 and the first part of 2013, when 
I did my main fieldwork. In combination with the visible but inaccessible 
presence of prosperity and progress, this may well have added to the sense of 
disappointment and disillusion and the urge to seek a better future elsewhere 
which was expressed by many people.
Today Ghanaian migration takes on a multiplicity of forms, ranging from 
high-skilled persons to students and labor migrants. The total number of 
Ghanaians living outside Ghana today is unknown but is estimated to be 
more than 1.5 million people (Quartey 2009). About 70 per cent of them 
are estimated to live in the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) zone, with the United States, the UK, Italy, and Germany as 
other main destinations (Quartey 2009). As indicated above, political sta-
bility and economic growth have not halted Ghanaian migration, which 
continues to play an important role in terms of livelihood strategies, educa-
tion, and what is often articulated as ‘exposure’ to other places in the world.
However, different types of migration and destinations are seen as enabling 
different opportunities and prestige, which together constitute a variety of 
topographies of hope.
In the context of high-risk migration, it is particular interesting to take 
a closer look at the Borga figure. Borgas (sometimes spelled Burgers) is 
a Pidgin English word for Ghanaians living abroad. Etymologically, it is 
related to Ghanaian migration to Hamburg in the 1980s and early 1990s,
when a large number of young, mainly male labor migrants managed to 
save money through doing blue-collar work and living austere lives. When 
visiting Ghana, they displayed their hard-earned wealth, distinguishing 
themselves from their peers as well as from educational return migrants and 
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other elite strata of the population (Nieswand 2013). Today the term  Borga
is widely used to refer to successful migrants—or at least migrants who 
appear so through the sending of remittances, presents, cars, gadgets, and 
Western clothing from the country of residence or when visiting or return-
ing. As Nieswand (2013) aptly notes, Borgas embody a transnational status 
paradox: being working-class in the country of settlement while performing 
and consuming a middle-class lifestyle in Ghana—much like the Vadimba-
zakas in Madagascar (Cole 2014a). This makes the  Borga figure contested 
in some circles in Ghana in that Borgas typically lack the conventional legit-
imation of high social status, such as higher education or prestigious family 
background, and jump social and economic hierarchies through their speedy 
accumulation and display of wealth. However, Borgas are still held in high 
regard in Amanfo, to where I now turn.
Connected to the World: Amanfo as a  Borga Town 
Amanfo is the capital of a district located in the Brong Ahafo Region in 
the western part of Ghana. The district has an estimated population of 
95,000 persons, of whom about 30,000 are estimated to live in Amanfo.
Being located in the Cocoa Belt, agriculture is the most important livelihood.
Amanfo is distinctly rural, with tractors, farmers in rubber boots, and goats 
and chickens everywhere. There is a hospital, several schools, and many 
churches. Women sell dried fish and vegetables from wooden structures in 
the back alleys. Hairdressers, shoe shops, and convenience stores in contain-
ers or wooden kiosks abound at the roadside, and spots (as bars are called) 
play blazing highlife music or the latest azonto hits—a Ghanaian dance and 
music style which has become immensely popular in large parts of West 
Africa. A few years ago, a new market was established on the outskirts of 
town, as the old one had become too crowded. Each Tuesday, Amanfo is full 
of people from the nearby towns and villages, selling all kinds of goods at the 
New Market, as it is now called. Old  Tico cars (small, and often extremely 
battered, cars produced in South Korea) serve as shared taxis up and down 
the few tarred roads, whereas bigger cars drive between Amanfo and the 
neighboring towns. The houses in town are a mix of old run-down struc-
tures and new big houses painted in bright colors. Likewise, there are several 
hotels, of which the smartest has an outdoor restaurant serving chicken or 
fish with banku— a favorite staple throughout Ghana, made of boiled fer-
mented corn and cassava dough.
At first sight, Amanfo thus seems like a quiet rural town, mainly con-
nected to the surrounding villages and towns in the district. It is a far cry 
from the hustle and bustle of Accra or other major cities in Ghana. How-
ever, even the occasional visitor, if he or she takes a closer look, will notice 
how many bars, stores, and schools have names that refer to places from 
outside— as places outside Ghana are usually called—such as Chicago Hard-














   
 




    
180 Nauja Kleist 
the internationally named barbershops in Arusha, Tanzania (Weiss 2002),
the references to outside demonstrate multiple connections to the world, as 
do the persistent ‘Hello’s from people who will tell you that they have been 
to Italy, Spain, or Libya or, at least, that they would like to go there.
International migration from Amanfo dates back to the 1960s. Townsmen 
started to migrate to Nigeria, inspired by the country’s booming economy at 
the time, the presence of Nigerian traders in town, and the economic crisis 
in Ghana, and brought back money and built houses in Amanfo. This migra-
tion continued throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, until the migrant 
workers from Amanfo were expelled from Nigeria, like other Ghanaians.
They returned to Amanfo with tape recorders and transistors, which they 
placed in front of their houses or carried on their backs, playing loud music 
for everyone to hear and see that this person had been to Nigeria. However,
the political and economic crisis in Ghana during these years, aggravated by 
droughts and severe bushfires that resulted in the loss of agricultural land and 
an ensuing famine, made it difficult for returnees to provide for their families 
(Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar 2013; Nieswand 2013). One of the results was 
re-migration to other West African countries, especially neighboring Côte 
d’Ivoire. From the late 1980s and early 1990s, Libya7 became a prominent 
destination for Amanfo migrants, who primarily found work as masons or 
construction workers. Likewise, a number of migrants continued—or aimed 
to continue—onwards to Italy and Spain as the most popular destinations 
and also to Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, Canada, and Israel,
constituting a hierarchy of destinations in the local topographies of hope. It 
is estimated that, today, about 15 per cent of the population of Amanfo are 
international migrants.8 
Walking around Amanfo with this in mind and in the company of a local 
friend, one quickly realizes that the town has its fair share of Borgas, and of 
their houses, businesses, and cars. The smartest hotel is owned by a returnee 
from the United States, who drives around in a big car, enjoying his retire-
ment by running his business and drinking with his friends. Likewise, the 
other hotels and the big new houses are almost all built by international 
migrants, the wealthiest ones carefully repainting their houses every year so 
that they keep on looking new. Many of the bigger and more comfortable 
shared taxis driving between Amanfo and surrounding towns are owned by 
migrants in Europe or North America who have friends or family members to 
drive for them, whereas the cheaper and battered Tico cars running in town 
are mostly owned and driven by less-prosperous return migrants. The school 
fees for pupils at private schools with fancy names are paid by migrants (and 
a small but growing middle class of non-migrants) who do not trust the state 
schools and want their children, nephews, and nieces to attend good schools 
so that they can become ‘big’ men and women when they grow up. The inter-
national shop and spot names also usually refer to the owners’ past or present 
stay outside, often seen as a kind of quality guarantee. Amanfo is thus full of 
Borgas and people who desire to become Borgas themselves.
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Hope and Uncertainty in High-Risk Migration 
Kwaku was one of many young men in Amanfo longing for  Borga status .
When I first met him, he explained: ‘I want to be a  Borga, you know, Can-
ada Borga. I want to be a  Borga because they do things. They build houses.
They drive big cars’. Going to Libya would be a first step in realizing this 
life. Kwaku thus decided to brave the desert, knowing full well that the 
journey could be dangerous. What he had not realized was the extent of the 
difficulties and suffering he would encounter—kidnapping, detention, and 
then overland deportation to Agadez in Niger, where he and several hundred 
other sub-Saharan Africans were transported in pick-up trucks and then 
dumped and left to survive on the streets.
The high-risk nature of the overland migration through the Sahara under-
taken by Kwaku and many other West African migrants must be seen within
the overall context of increasingly restrictive mobility regimes (Glick Schiller
and Salazar 2013) in Europe and Africa which have made legal migration hard
to achieve for most Ghanaian migrants with destinations outside ECOWAS. It
has also made traveling or living in irregular ways more difficult and danger-
ous, affecting many townspeople in Amanfo. Whereas a few have the oppor-
tunity to travel to Western countries and other attractive destinations through
family reunification or on educational or tourism visas, the majority do not.
Instead, much migration from Amanfo takes place outside the legal circuits
of international migration, entailing the risk of abuse, assault, detention, and
deportation9—even death (cf. Amnesty International 2015; Bredeloup and
Pliez 2011; Hamood 2006; Lucht 2011). The mobile livelihoods and high-
risk nature of much migration from Amanfo imply that migration projects are
often temporary, disrupted, and in flux, rather than permanent emigration, and
that involuntary return migration is common. In 2011, for instance, 20,000
Ghanaian labor migrants were evacuated from or fled the conflict in Libya
(Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar 2013; Kleist forthcoming), of whom about 1,000
alone returned to Amanfo. Deportees like Kwaku add to this number.
The effects of restrictive mobility regimes are aggravated by conflict and 
political instability in transit zones and destinations, making overland migra-
tion from places like Amanfo to Libya more uncertain and more risky but, as 
we have seen, it does not stop it. Risk has been defined as the ‘known prob-
abilities of outcomes’ (Williams and Baláz 2012, 168). However, migrants 
rarely have full knowledge of the conditions of their migration. This makes 
Horst and Grabska suggest that ‘under conditions of mobility in conflict,
a focus on uncertainty rather than risk is more appropriate’ (2015, 5)—an 
argument that could be extended to most migration situations. ‘Risk-taking’,
in this sense, relates to how migrants manage and relate to uncertainty (cf.
Hernández-Carretero and Carling 2012) which, again, relates to different 
modes of hope.
In his taxonomy of five modes of hope,Webb (2007) distinguishes between 
hope with an open-ended orientation towards the future and goal-oriented 
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hope with specific objectives. Overland migration to Libya can be seen as 
an example of the latter, which Webb again divides into estimative, resolute,
and utopian modes of hope. Estimative hope refers to an assessment of the 
probability of a positive outcome of an action or process, e.g., to informed 
risk assessment, which is problematic in contexts of outspoken uncertainty.
Webb’s notion of resolute hope as taking a chance in spite of a ‘less than 
fair gamble’ (2007, 81) is more helpful, pointing to how migrants (and oth-
ers) approach and handle a high degree of uncertainty. The question is not 
only the kinds of challenge and obstacle that migrants expect (or fear) to 
encounter but also the notions of the life and future that they hope to realize 
through migration—their social hope, in other words.
When I discussed this question with my interlocutors in Amanfo, their 
initial response focused on material outcomes: houses, cars, businesses, and 
consumer goods. During interviews and participant photography,10 deport-
ees, returnees from Libya, prospective migrants, and migrant family mem-
bers consistently expressed the same hopes for the good life: to have one’s 
own house, to have a steady income, to own a car, and to be able to send the 
children to good schools. Such visions of the good life reflect the material 
outcomes of being a Borga (or other kinds of successful migrant) or having 
a Borga in the family, and are in line with a perhaps increasingly universal,
middle-class lifestyle. The focus on cars and houses could, indeed, be seen 
as an expression of what Thompson has called the ‘privatization of hope’ in 
relation to ‘economic reductionism in its consumer-capitalist form’ (2013,
1). The deportees and their families were hoping for a prosperous and com-
fortable lifestyle and future—reaching out for the promises of wealth and 
modernity, seemingly without questioning the overall political and economic 
structures which constrain their access to realizing these hopes. Certainly,
Webb suggests that resolute hope tends to be self-efficacious and private,
serving a socially conservative function (2007, 71).
However, I posit that the social hope underpinning migration from Amanfo 
should not primarily be understood in terms of consumption or the material 
aspects of becoming a Borga. Cars and houses not only constitute material 
goods and comfort but also represent security and autonomy for the indi-
vidual and his or her family. There are several aspects to this. First, money 
and material resources enable people to invest in social relations and hence 
engage in long-term patterns of reciprocity which may provide support in 
future times of need (Awedoba and Hahn 2014; Thorsen 2014). Second, my 
interlocutors explained that the cars were meant both for personal transport 
and also for serving as commercial vehicles—granting an income—and the 
houses were for accommodation for the family, who would thus be inde-
pendent from the moods of a landlord, as well as for renting out. Whereas 
the few interlocutors who were in relatively more privileged positions, with 
good jobs or wealthy backgrounds, expressed personal ambitions in terms 
of their careers, the remainder hoped for stability and social and economic 
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both a means to this end and objects of desire in their own right. Finally, it 
should be noted that autonomy, accumulation, and economic independence 
are established cultural values among the Akan (Arhin 1983; Clarke 2000; 
Fortes 1963), the biggest ethnic group in this part of Ghana.
The prominence of high-risk migration as a means to provide these goods 
and hence to enable security and autonomy, must be seen in the light of 
the lack of opportunities for people without much education and of poor 
backgrounds in Amanfo and elsewhere in Ghana (and in Africa). They do 
not find themselves in a position where they can easily ‘do things’, as Kwaku 
said, at least not all the things they would like to do. On the contrary, many 
of the interlocutors described their situation as ‘being stuck’, with few or no 
opportunities, money, educational diplomas, or connections. This feeling of 
being stuck in life can be perceived as existential immobility when ‘a person 
suffers from both absence of choices or alternatives to the situation [he or 
she] is in and an inability to grab such alternatives even when they present 
themselves’ (Hage 2009, 4). As shown above, the societal hope distributed 
by the government and main political parties in Ghana is linking educa-
tion, oil money, and (future) prosperity, locating a promising future  and the 
means to reach it in Ghana. This topography of societal hope, however, is 
not shared by many people in Amanfo. Although many do perceive the ideal 
future as located in Ghana, they do not think that they can actually realize 
a promising future through staying in the country.
Disrupted Migration Projects: Life after Deportation 
Most interlocutors in Amanfo did indeed describe Ghana as a nice place but
were quick to add that ‘money is a problem’. Whereas migration to attrac-
tive destinations like Europe or North America might entail long-term resi-
dency, none of the deportees I talked to expressed a desire to actually live their
entire life outside. Rather, they envisioned their long-term future in Ghana
as a successful returnee, as a Borga. In Akyeampong’s words: “‘Success” in
the immigrant community comes to depend on one’s exertions, and material
accumulation is open to all [.  .  .] The successful migrant returns home as
an “upper-class” citizen, respected for her/his wealth’ (2000, 187). Migration
abroad is a means to realize (at least) two overall goals: to take care of one’s
family and oneself and to be able to return with a status of respect. Ghana thus
constitutes a place of potential pleasure, security, and well-being in the local
topography of hope after successful migration, when the migrant has trans-
formed his or her social and economic status. Conversely, returning involun-
tarily and empty-handed is seen as catastrophic and shameful, as the ultimate
failure of the migration project. This failure is embodied by deportees who
are sometimes called Borga lose or Borga useless (cf. Kabki  et al. 2004, 90;
Nieswand 2013, 15–16). The hopeful  Borga has turned into a loser, suffering
a drastic decline in status, turning into ‘deportee trash’ in the public imaginary,
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Shame and failure are recurrent themes in studies of post-deportation,
whether focusing on Africa (Alpes 2011; Drotbohm 2015; Peutz 2010; Tii-
likainen 2011), Central America (Brotherton and Barrios 2009; Sørensen 
2011; Walter et al. 2004), or Asia (Koshravi 2009; Majidi 2012; Schuster 
and Majidi 2015). Shame is ‘evoked by failure of an individual or group 
to live according to their values or commitments, especially the ones con-
cerning their relations to others and goods which others also value’ (Sayer 
2005, 953–954). As Sayer further notes, shame is the most likely to occur 
when experiencing disrespect from ‘those whose values and judgements one 
most respects’ (2005, 954). Returning empty-handed to one’s family and 
local community, with nothing but debt and worries galore, represents the 
epitome of failure, aggravated by public ridicule and shaming from other 
people in the hometown. Whereas the suffering experienced on the way to 
Libya and back again—being kidnapped, imprisoned, fearing death, and 
begging for survival in the streets of Agadez—was extremely painful for 
Kwaku, he did not articulate it as shameful. This indicates that shame is 
not an attribute of deportation itself (cf. Galvin 2015; Schuster and Majidi 
2015). Rather, shame relates to how certain activities and experiences are 
perceived and evaluated in the moral universe of the deportee and his family 
and surroundings with regard to conceptions and expectations of migration 
and its outcomes, including the economic gain and loss.
An understanding of shame as related to an individual’s significant others 
also shed light on why many migrants refrain from disclosing degrading 
life and working conditions abroad to family or community members and,
conversely, that family members often do not enquire about them. Such an 
economy of appearance (Cole 2014b) makes it possible to uphold the Borga
status through collaborative silences (Nieswand 2013) about disgraceful or 
shameful conditions and activities abroad (see also Bredeloup, this volume; 
Hernández-Carretero and Carling 2012). It is effectively destroyed, however,
when migrants return empty-handed. The shame may be further aggravated 
by the often collective aspects of migration in terms of financing the journey 
of a family member and the expectations of subsequently benefiting from 
its outcome. It is not only the social repositioning of the migrant which has 
failed but potentially that of the entire family. Deportation thus demon-
strates how social hope can turn into social hopelessness, so to speak; how 
the potentiality of hope may evaporate and leave only uncertainty.
Despite the challenging nature of life after deportation, deportees described 
their return in different ways. Whereas Kwaku was caught and deported 
before starting to work, other deportees had managed to save money. Pas-
tor Emmanuel had worked in several European countries before he was 
deported from Norway in 2002 and was widely described as a successful 
returnee. Working for a farmer in a Norwegian village and keeping his 
expenses to a minimum, he had managed to save 22,000 USD, which he sent 
back to Amanfo, enabling him to buy a house and start small-scale farming.
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from his traveling. Now he was doing well, having married and started a 
family, owning his own house, and being respected as a pastor. When I asked 
him to describe his deportation, he explained: 
I was feeling happy, yeah. Even the majority of them [townspeople in 
Amanfo] thought my goods were coming on their way. They thought 
that because they think I am looking fine. I don’t normally eat any com-
mon food so they prepare food for me nicely, because they think I am 
having money. So if you come home like that, people know that you 
are a traveler, and they will come to you for advice. Yeah, they will be 
coming for advice here and there.
Contrary to Kwaku’s story, Pastor Emmanuel’s account highlights success 
and admiration. He came back with money, and people thought that his
belongings from Europe were on their way because of his confident appear-
ance. He described his migration as a transformational experience where he 
learnt several European languages and gained important experience that he
now uses to give advice to people in relation to traveling and to other import-
ant life choices. Pastor Emmanuel even claimed to have changed his eating 
habits, preferring fruit and light meals, rather than the heavy meals and sta-
ples that many Ghanaians prefer, setting him apart from the ordinary towns-
people in Amanfo. He thus embodied the successful returnee, the Borga,
who had managed to transform himself during his journey abroad and 
who had returned with the resources and experience to become a big man.
His success shows that savings and investments made during migration, in 
combination with the comportment of the deportee, are significant in rela-
tion to how the deportee is perceived by his or her surroundings (cf. Alpes 
2011; Drotbohm 2015). It also demonstrates that migrant success revolves 
not only around economic achievement but also around the broadening of 
horizons through ‘exposure’ to  outside and the acquisition of competences.
However, it should be added that Pastor Emmanuel’s deportation took place 
ten years ago, indicating the importance of a temporal perspective in any 
analysis of post-deportation.
The ‘Safe Migration’ Position: Locating Societal 
Hope in Ghana 
The stories of Kwaku and Pastor Emmanuel illustrate how the public eval-
uation of success or failure of Borgas and deportees relates to what they 
(are believed to) have achieved during their migration project. Furthermore,
this evaluation tends to focus on individual virtue and discipline, or the lack 
thereof, rather than linking deportation to restrictive regimes of mobility 
and global and local inequalities—despite the fact that the hardship of trav-
eling to or living in Libya (and other destinations) is well-known in Amanfo 
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deportation from Europe to Afghanistan, such a response can be perceived 
as ‘a way of holding on to the dream of a better life in a distant destination,
a dream challenged by deportation’ (2015, 14). In the Ghanaian context,
this translates into holding on to the social hope that a family member will 
become a Borga and thereby transform the life of the family still in Ghana.
It can thus be seen as an expression of the conflict between local and state 
topographies of hope and the structures of opportunities and constraint that 
shape how and whether these hopes can be realized.
However, Pastor Emmanuel did not encourage prospective migrants and 
deportees in Amanfo to follow his example. Quite the contrary, he told them 
to stay and seek their fortune in Ghana through education, hard work, and 
prayer, sharing the societal hope distributed by the Ghanaian state. This 
may be a way of distinguishing himself from other deportees, positioning 
himself as a respectable man in society. He and a number of other persons 
in Amanfo—usually in elite, middle-class, or otherwise relatively well-off 
positions—were part of what can be termed the ‘safe migration position’ or,
when more organized, the ‘safe migration industry’ (cf. Gammeltoft-Hansen 
and Sørensen 2013). Consisting of individuals, NGOs, and institutions that 
promote safe migration through information campaigns and advice, the safe 
migration industry can be found all over Ghana and, indeed, in most coun-
tries from where there is (what may become) irregular international migra-
tion.11 The overall premise of such interventions is first, and usually quite 
mistakenly, that prospective migrants do not know the risks and hardship 
which their migration projects entail and, second, that a life in Ghana offers 
better prospects for the future.
Proponents of the safe migration industry thus share the visions of Gha-
naian politicians who locate societal hope in Ghana. However, the Ghanaian 
state does not discourage migration as such. Changing Ghanaian govern-
ments have particularly embraced high-skilled migrants in Western countries 
with regularized statuses since 2001 and initiated a range of policy initiatives 
to encourage migrants’ contributions to development in Ghana (Kleist 2013; 
Kleist 2015). Some types of migration are thus seen as acceptable, even desir-
able, in the state’s topography of hope. This does not apply to unskilled 
migrants, however. Rather, the Ghanaian state is discouraging and aiming 
to prevent high-risk and (what eventually becomes) irregular migration 
through an increasing emphasis on migration management, partly funded 
by European countries as part of the externalization of border controls.
Whether focusing on preventing the loss of lives or on the legal aspects,
both high-risk and irregular migration were discouraged by safe migration 
proponents, while they articulated a sedentary lifestyle as a safer, better, and 
sometimes morally superior choice. In 2012 and 2013 the safe migration 
proponents in Amanfo and elsewhere repeatedly explained to me that there 
is a bright future in Ghana for those who work hard and for those who are 
educated—especially in the light of the recent economic growth and the oil 
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Europe, which make life less promising there, on the other. Likewise, they 
emphasized that, if only the migrants would use the money they would oth-
erwise spend on the journey to Libya on investment in Ghana, and if they 
would exercise the same work ethics back home as they do outside, they 
would easily be able to succeed in Ghana. Migration was not discouraged 
per se, as legal migration ‘with a purpose’—such as obtaining a degree at a 
foreign university followed by return to Ghana—is seen as a positive phe-
nomenon. However, this kind of migration is rarely available for poor and 
low-skilled persons such as deportees and prospective migrants in Amanfo.
Whereas they shared the end goal of living a comfortable, prosperous, and 
respectable life in Ghana, they did not share the belief that they could actu-
ally realize it without traveling outside the country.
The implication is that high-risk migration to places like Libya remains 
an element in the local topographies of hope in places like Amanfo, at 
least partly because of the lack of a convincing alternative. Nevertheless,
the Borga position seems to be changing and becoming more ambivalent.
Not only has it become more difficult to enter Europe, find work, and save 
money, and hence be able to perform ‘Borganess’ in Ghana, but the growth 
and unequal but visible wealth in Ghana in recent years also means that 
the social distinctiveness of Borgas is becoming less conspicuous. Whereas 
Borgas were generally respected and admired in Amanfo, their position was 
in the process of changing, as explained to me by Kwame, the brother of a 
deportee. This change is outspoken in major cities. ‘Accra doesn’t have any 
regard for Borgas’, he said, ‘there are people there who live big lives without 
ever having traveled outside Ghana, so they don’t respect  Borgas at all’.
Kwame himself had traveled no further than a neighboring country but had 
obtained a university degree and subsequently landed a good government 
job in Amanfo, earning well, driving a nice car, and living in a comfortable 
house, owned in fact by a Ghanaian living in Italy. He had realized much of 
the Borga position, in other words, without going through the hardships of 
traveling. Stories like his, Kwame further continued, are beginning to change 
the Borga status, even in Amanfo: 
One thing about the Borgas is that, when they come home, we who 
have lived in the system for a while . . . we are able to sustain ourselves 
economically for a long time. But when they come, they are not able to 
do that. Because some want to show off and, before they know it, the 
few thousand euros or dollars they bring are gone, and they get a bit 
miserable.
According to Kwame, the disenchantment of the  Borga position is based on 
the growing wealth and opportunities for living ‘big lives’ in Ghana, meaning
that the Borgas’ demonstration and, sometimes, squandering of money is 
no longer seen as exceptional or respectable. Even in Amanfo, persons like 
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job—were doing better, being able to sustain themselves rather than spending 
all the money at once and then being impoverished. Achievement in Ghana is 
possible, according to Kwame, if you live and work with ‘the system’, rather 
than going aimlessly outside and risking your life crossing the desert and the 
sea. He thus adhered to the societal distribution of hope and its focus on 
prosperity in Ghana through hard work and educational achievement.
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to establish an analytical framework that
combines the concepts of social hope (Hage 2003) and topographies of hope
(Mar 2005) and hence links the temporal and spatial dimensions. Focusing
on Ghana, I have shown a tension between the Ghanaian state’s topography
of societal hope and local topographies of social hope among deportees in the
context of high-risk migration and restrictive mobility regimes. The narra-
tives of societal hope are embedded in messages of economic optimism after
the finding of oil in 2007, and revolve around a prosperous future in Ghana
achieved through hard work and educational excellence, rather than migra-
tion. However, economic growth in Ghana is highly unequal, and there is a
widespread sense of dissatisfaction with the lack of economic opportunities
for large swathes of the population. This is indeed the case for poor and low-
skilled deportees and prospective migrants, who find themselves in a situation
in which they have no access to legal migration and few prospects for pros-
perity through educational achievement. The potential of societal hope—that
the hoped-for future may happen—is not distributed to this group, who find
themselves in a schism between ‘the culturally expected and the socially pos-
sible’ (Vigh 2009, 95) in terms of expectations from families, the local com-
munity, and the migrants themselves. Becoming a  Borga or having one in the
family is perceived as a pathway for social mobility but this pathway is con-
sidered illegitimate in the visions of societal hope generated and distributed
by the state. Nevertheless, migration to Libya and other destinations remains
a central element in the local topographies of hope—a risky but potentially
possible way of supporting one’s family and progressing in life.
The chapter thereby accentuates the importance of examining deportation 
as a process and of including the local context of reception (Drotbohm and 
Hasselberg 2015). I have shown how post-deportation status depends on 
achievement and resource mobilization: deportees can become ‘big men’ or 
Borgas if they return with money, consumer goods, and ‘exposure’—like Pas-
tor Emmanuel. However, most deportees—like Kwaku—return empty-handed
and face difficulties, shame, and ridicule, and the same as or worse economic 
conditions than before their migration. This indicates a high degree of indi-
vidualization of deportees’ situations that downplays structural constraints.
From the point of view of safe migration proponents, deportation demon-
strates the non-viable nature of high-risk migration as a livelihood strategy 
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migrants and family members individualize the causes of deportation, they 
maintain the social hope of high-risk migration as a pathway to a better 
life, in the absence of convincing alternatives, despite its uncertain nature.
They thus demonstrate the continuing importance of migration in the local 
topography of social hope.
Acknowledgements 
I thank all interlocutors in Amanfo and elsewhere in Ghana for their help 
and time. I have received helpful questions and comments on previous 
versions of the chapter at the ECAS conference, Lisbon, 2013; the IUAES 
Congress, Manchester, 2013; the Interdisciplinary Network’s workshop on 
Hope, Prague, 2014; the ESA network on emotions, Rhodes, 2014; and 
the Precarious Futures workshop, Tisvildeleje, 2015. I also thank the two 
reviewers and Dorte Thorsen, Robin May Schott, and Ulla Holm for valu-
able feedback. The research was funded by a grant from the Danish Council 
of Independent Research—Humanities.
Notes 
1. All names have been changed to protect the privacy of the interlocutors.
2. http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/gha.html.
3. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6766527.stm.
4. See Darkwah (2013) for a fascinating analysis of how a youth training program 




region=SST (accessed 03 September 2015).
7. Libya has become a less attractive destination in recent years because of the civil 
war in 2011 and the outbreak of conflict again in 2014; however, Libya-bound 
migration is still ongoing.
8. Interview with the local NADMO (National Disaster Management Organisation) 
representative, March 2013.
9. Mass deportation from Libya also took place in May 2013, when almost 800 
sub-Saharan Africans were deported to Agadez in pick-up trucks: http://www. 
rfi.fr/afrique/20130529-centaines-clandestins-nigeriens-refoules-libye.
10. I held 15 sessions of participant photography with deportees, involuntary return 
migrants, and their family members, asking them to take photos of their every-
day life and what they would like to achieve in the future.
11. In the cases where the focus is explicitly on preventing irregular migration, a 
more appropriate term would be ‘anti-illegal-migration industry’.
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